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ABSTRACT
MATERIALISM AND THE SELF
Kathleen Shirley Micken 
Old Dominion University, 1993 
Director: Dr. John B. Ford, IV
Materialism has been called the most significant macro development in 
modern consumer behavior. Despite its importance, research about die construct 
is rather new. Two scales have been developed to measure materialism, one 
proposed by Belk, the other by Richins and Dawson.
The purpose of this dissertation is threefold. First, it extends the 
materialism research program by investigating the relationship between 
materialism and one's self concept. Hypotheses which drive the research posit 
that people who are more materialistic have lower self-esteem, are less likely to 
be self-actualized, are extrinsically rather than intrinsically motivated, and are 
likely to be high self-monitors. The second purpose is to assess the reliability and 
validity of the two scales. Third, the definition of materialism itself is addressed.
Data were collected via a questionnaire distributed to adults. Hypotheses 
were investigated with correlation analysis. The reliability of the two scales was 
assessed by calculating Coefficient Alphas and item-to-total statistics. 
Confirmatory factor analysis and the hypothesis tests were used in assessing 
validity. A profile of materialists was developed by analyzing the top and 
bottom terciles formed from scores on the Richins and Dawson scale.
All hypotheses were confirmed. People scoring high on the materialism 
scales were found to be less self-confident and to rely on the opinions of others. 
While materialism was equally distributed across categories of gender and ethnic 
background, materialists tended to be younger, to not have a college degree, and 
to have either relatively high or relatively low household incomes.
The Richins and Dawson scale was found to be the more reliable scale. 
Validity assessment also suggested that it may be superior to the Belk scale.
Finally, a distinction was drawn between materialism and other constructs 
such as consumerism and conspicuous consumption. The importance of the 
self-concept to an understanding of materialism and the resulting implications 
for the definition of materialism were explored.
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CHAPTER ONE 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
LIVING IN A MATERIAL WORLD
Madonna sings about being "a material girl." Andre Agassi tells viewers
that "image is everything" in his promotion of Canon's EOS Rebel camera.
Marketers and advertisers are blamed for fostering pernicious materialism
among consumers (e.g. Schudson 1984). America has been dubbed the
"consumer society" and consumption motives have been identified as dominant
in our culture. As early an observer of the United States as de Tocqueville noted,
"I know of no country, indeed, where the love of money has taken stronger hold
on the affections of men" (1961, p. 43). More recently, Arensberg and Niehoff
(1980) suggested that materialism is a core American value. On a more global
scale, Nava (1992) argues that materialism
has become a powerful and evocative symbol of contemporary 
capitalism and the modem Western world. Indeed, in the climate of 
1991, faced by the crisis of the environment and the radical 
transformations in Eastern Europe, it is perhaps the most resonant 
symbol of all (p. 185).
Evidence such as this leads to Belk's (1987b) pronouncement that materialism is
the "dominant consumer ideology and the most significant macro development
in modern consumer behavior" (p. 26). Is he right?
Various authors (e.g. Horowitz 1985; McCracken 1988; McKendrick,
1
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Brewer, and Plumb 1983; Mukerji 1983) trace the origins of materialism and a 
consumer culture to the industrialized nations. Others (for example, Mason 1981) 
suggest that materialism, or conspicuous consumption, has almost always been 
present in some form or another and should be expected to be found in societies 
in the future. Regardless of its genesis and /o r dispersion, whenever it is 
discussed materialism is routinely criticized as a bankrupt life style. As Miller 
points out, "Materialism has virtually no defenders" (1991, p. 130). For example, 
both Scitovsky (1976) and Leiss (1976) suggest that materialism carries with it the 
seeds of its own destruction, concluding that consumption is, by itself, ultimately 
unfulfilling. Others (e.g. Boorstin 1973, Duming 1991, Lasch 1979) have 
suggested that materialism, fostered by marketing (with advertising often cited 
as the primary culprit), is responsible for overconsumption, which in turn is 
leading to the depletion of the world's resources and pollution of the 
environment. Materialism is also said to result in the alienation of people from 
each other and from the real purpose of life (Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg- 
Halton 1981; Fromm 1947,1956,1976; Halton 1992; Rochberg-Halton 1986).
Materialism and Religion
These criticisms are not surprising, since "all major religions" include some 
exhortation for followers to forego earthly pleasures for the sake of rewards in 
the life hereafter (Belk 1985, p. 265). Historian Arnold Toynbee's research led him 
to the conclusion that, while the founders of the world's religions "disagreed 
with each other [about] the nature of the universe, the nature of the spiritual life, 
the nature of ultimate reality.... they all said with one voice that if we made 
material wealth our paramount aim, this would lead to disaster" (quoted in 
Wachtel 1983). In the Christian tradition it is easier for a camel to pass through 
the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven (Matthew
2
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19: 23-24). Modern day apologists have suggested that this parable was not 
meant to be as harsh as it sounds; that Jesus was only trying to make a point. 
After all, one really can't be expected to give up one's possessions, can one?! In 
its way, Martin Luther's rebellion against the Catholic church was 
antimaterialistic. He was opposed to several "materialistic" practices within the 
Catholic church, such as acquiring large tracts of land and impressive quantities 
of items fashioned from precious metals, as well as sometimes withholding 
absolution for sins unless lands were willed to the church (Williams 1991). He 
declared that it was not good works (doing good deeds, living a righteous life, 
making gifts to the church, purchasing indulgences) that saved one's soul, but 
rather faith (Luther 1517/1883).
Similar ideas are found in the Koran, the sacred writings of Islam, "But as 
for him w h o ... longs for wealth, and calls the good a lie, we will send him easily 
to difficulty! And his wealth shall not avail him when he falls down (into hell)!!" 
(Chapter of the Night). In Asian religions, the middle way is advocated. In the 
Buddhist tradition, "whoever in this world overcomes his selfish cravings, his 
sorrows fall away from him like drops of water from a lotus flower"
(Dhammapada, 336). The Bhagavad-Gita admonishes adherents of Hinduism that 
the "person who lives completely free from desires, without longing... attains 
peace" (n.71). A common thread seems to be the admonition inscribed at the 
Oracle of Delphi,1 "Nothing in Excess." The premise is that it is okay to get 
enough, but more than "enough" is sinful, wasteful, and to be avoided.
Three exceptions to this general condemnation of materialism should be 
noted. The first is a religious tradition from Calvinism. John Calvin was a firm
1 The oracle of Delphi was the spokeswoman for the god Apollo. Actually, "she" was one 
of three priestesses who resided at the temple at Delphi, Greece. She provided advice on politics,
morality, law, and justice. This location is also referred to as the Oracle of Delphi (Durant 1939).
3
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believer in the doctrine of predestination, the idea that one's salvation or 
damnation was fixed before s /he  was born. Unlike some religious leaders of the 
time, especially the Catholic bishops, however, he "was well disposed toward 
business and finance" (Durant 1961, p. 335), since material success in this life was 
evidence of a heavenly reward in the next. The second example, as personified 
by some televangelists, might be labeled the "gospel of prosperity" (Barnhart 
1988; Cardwell 1984). It is more recent but flows from the Calvinist perspective 
that earthly success is a reflection of God's pleasure. This movement is 
considered to be a reaction to the secularization of life in the United States, to the 
perceived decline of America's prestige and power in the world, as well as to a 
perceived decline in the standard of living (O'Guinn and Belk 1989). The 
explanation which has been offered by some televangelists is that if the U.S. 
would only return to a moral, Christian way of life, then God would once again 
reward the country with material bounty. As O'Guinn and Belk (1989) put it, 
"the consumption imperative of the New Right is that wealth and conspicuous 
consumption are not only acceptable, they are desirable as evidence of God's 
pleasure" (p. 229). They quote Jerry Falwell, a Baptist minister who not only 
founded Liberty University in Lynchburg, Virginia, but also initiated a 
wide-reaching television program of evangelism, as saying that "Ownership of 
property is biblical. Competition in business is biblical. Ambitious and successful 
business management is clearly outlined as part of God's plan for His people" (p. 
229). Thus the link between Protestantism and capitalism that Weber (1958) 
offered almost 100 years ago is still being promoted today. The third example is 
Mormonism, which seems to have successfully blended religion and materialism 
(Wright and Larsen 1992). Church leaders are selected, in part at least, on the 
basis of their material achievements. However, positive attitudes toward 
possessions and the consumption of material goods are tempered with cautions
4
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about subordinating material goals to spiritual ones. Mormons may enjoy the 
materials-intensive society in which they live, but wealth should be used in the 
service of the church and the poor (Ozanne, Hill and Wright 1992).
The Spread of Materialism
That materialism is prevalent in industrialized nations, then, is not 
surprising. Belk (1988b; Ger and Belk 1993) reports that the consumer culture, 
and hence, materialism, is being emulated at an increasing rate in the Third 
World. There, however, the path to materialism is being reversed. In the West, a 
consumption ethic followed the development of wealth. In Third World 
countries, the consumption ethic is preceding wealth. Because of tourism 
(Buzzell 1968; Belk and Costa 1991; Leontiades 1986; Walters and Toyne 1989), 
the penetration of marketing messages via satellite television2 (Clemens 1987, 
Eger 1987, Killough 1978), and other means, citizens of developing nations 
acquire a desire for products well before the products are available, or before the 
means to purchase them is at hand. For example, after the Berlin Wall fell, a 
study by Landor Associates (reported in  The Economist 1990) ranked East 
European perceptions of 400 of the most famous Western brands. Rankings were 
based on familiarity and the esteem in which the brands were held. Overall, 
Eastern Europeans were familiar with the names of between 100 (by Russians) 
and 252 (by Hungarians) brands, many of which they had never even seen. 
Landor Associates concluded that its survey pointed to a "tremendous hankering 
after luxury and the more visible symbols of capitalism" (p. 71). This finding is
2
O'Guinn, Lee, and Faber (1986) make the point that the pictorial mass media also 
"teaches" immigrants in the U.S. about the consumption ethic, instructing them on how and what 
to consume. They suggest that the media influence is so strong that it should be incorporated in 
models of acculturation.
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consistent with Levitt's (1973) prediction that the same types of products would 
be desired by consumers everywhere: "everyone... wants products and features 
that everybody else wants.... The same countries that ask the world to recognize 
and respect the individuality of their culture insist on the wholesale transfer to 
them of modern goods, services, and technologies" (p. 96,99).
In the West, materialism has been linked to the Protestant Work Ethic 
(Weber 1958). But recent studies (e.g. Furnham and Muhiudeen 1984; Tallman, 
Marotz-Baden and Pindas 1983) suggest that the ethic is now stronger in 
developing countries (regardless of the dominant religion) and weaker in the 
post-industrial nations. One possible reason for this switch is that for citizens of 
industrialized nations, once wealth is achieved, the desire to achieve further is 
dampened (see Campbell 1987; Fox and Lears 1983; Horowitz 1980).
Materialism and Marketing
It would seem, then, that an understanding of materialism would be useful
for domestic as well as for international consumer research. Nevertheless, within
the marketing discipline the investigation of the phenomenon is relatively
young. This is not surprising since the investigation of the wider field of
possessions and ownership is itself of relatively recent interest. Furby's (1991)
perspective on the broader issue of possessions is also appropriate for the more
narrow focus on materialism.
We remain a long way from the ultimate goal: A thorough 
understanding of the nature of possession and ownership.... Yet 
there is hardly a more ubiquitous phenomenon in our daily lives 
than possession. The more we can understand about the many 
forms of, motivations for, and determinants of, possession and 
ownership, the more we will understand about many other aspects 
of human cognition, behavior, and attitudes" (p. 463).
Perhaps the greatest proponent of the study of materialism has been Belk
6
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(1983,1984,1985; Ger and Belk 1990,1993). His seminal Journal of Consumer 
Research (1985) article on materialism is one of the most cited articles from that 
journal (Cote, Leong, and Cote 1991). In it Belk identifies five issues related to 
materialism:
• whether materialism is a positive or negative trait
• whether marketing creates or exacerbates materialism
• whether materialism is an egoistic trait
• the impact of materialism on interpersonal relationships, and
• the relationship between materialism and positive self-identity.
Thus, Belk set the research agenda for materialism in the marketing
discipline. However, he cautions that before such topics can be appropriately 
addressed, the nature of the phenomenon and its dimensions must be identified" 
(Ger and Belk 1990, p. 192). The work in this area is addressed next.
DEFINITIONS
The American Heritage Dictionary defines materialism as "undue regard for
worldly concerns." Marketers, however, tend to expand the definition to include
its impact on consumer attitudes and behaviors. Early researchers into the
phenomenon, Ward and Wackman (1971), defined materialism as "an orientation
which views material goods and money as important for personal happiness and
social progress" (p. 422). This definition was adopted until Belk (1984) proposed
an even more expanded one. He suggested that
materialism reflects the importance a consumer attaches to worldly 
possessions. At the highest levels of materialism, such possessions 
assume a central place in a person's life and are believed to provide 
the greatest sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction in life (p. 291).
7
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Since then, most marketing researchers have adopted this definition. [While it is 
stated a bit differently, the definition employed by Richins and Dawson (1992) is 
consistent with Belk's: "materialism is a set of centrally held beliefs about the 
importance of possessions in one's life" (p. 308).]
There is an important distinction that should be emphasized here. A 
consumer society is not the same as a materialist society (Harris 1981). Schudson 
(1984) explains the difference, which is critical to this dissertation. It is important 
to "distinguish materialistic values—placing material above social or spiritual 
goals—from a materials-intensive way of life, which may use goods as means to 
other ends" (p. 143). When the term "materialist" appears in this dissertation, 
unless otherwise noted, it is used in the sense of Belk's and Richins and 
Dawson's definitions which are consistent with Schudson's distinction. A 
materialist is one who believes that "the ultimate goals of personal life can be 
fulfilled by things" (Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton 1981, p. ix). 
Possessions become the objects of desire and the ultimate goal. That we all live in 
a material world and like material things, that possessions carry social meaning, 
is not materialism.
Descriptions of a Materialist
Having defined materialism, the next step would be to provide a fuller 
description of a materialist. Materialism might be termed the "George Carlin" 
phenomenon—an emphasis on one's "stuff" (Carlin 1981).3 Not only are 
possessions important and central to one's existence (Belk 1984,1985,1988a; 
Richins 1987; Richins and Dawson 1990,1992), but the processes of acquiring and
3
The comedian George Carlin does a routine about our possessions, our "stuff." He pokes
fun at the importance we attach to our possessions: we have special places for them, w e may
even move so that w e have a larger house in which to accommodate them, and when w e travel
w e have to carry some of them with us.
8
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maintaining them are also important. The focus then narrows to questions such 
as, when acquisitions are central, what other activities are "required"—and, 
conversely, because of time, energy, and resource constraints, what activities are 
limited or unattended? Some answers from the literature are discussed below.
Fournier and Richins (1991) solicited commonly-held conceptions of 
materialism and materialists from a sample of twenty-nine respondents (11 
residents of a blue collar suburb, 11 airline travelers, and seven undergraduates) 
via an open-ended survey. Materialists were thought to be "possession-focused 
in thought, word, and deed.... [they] view the world through a lens focused only 
on possessions, and evaluate themselves and others in terms of what is owned" 
(p. 408). Important motivations for materialism were identified as "status display 
and self-affirmation through ownership of statused possessions," as well as the 
"use [of] possessions" to connote success—the more you have, the more 
important you are (Fournier and Richins 1991, p. 408).
Ger and Belk (1993) also provide descriptions of a materialist based on 
focus group interviews of MBA students in the United States. The student 
conceptions are consistent with those reported by Fournier and Richins (1991). 
Materialists are characterized as selfish and self-indulgent, as being attached to 
things more than to people, and as evaluating themselves as well as others on the 
basis of material possessions.
Because of this possessions focus, being a materialist is a time- and
attention-consuming orientation. Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-FIalton (1981)
speak of the considerable "psychic energy" which individuals invest in
possessions. Leiss (1976) addresses the time-consuming nature in an example.
[OJne who drapes the latest sartorial splendour over a properly 
deodorized frame, and then treats his locks with an old-fashioned 
pomade rather than the newest lacquer spray, will quickly learn 
what it really means to be an inattentive consumer. The point of all
9
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this is quite simple: the fragmentation of needs requires on the 
individual's part a steadily more intensive effort to hold together 
his identity and personal integrity. In concrete terms this amounts 
to spending more and more time in consumption activities (p. 19).
One must not only acquire possessions, but acquire the "right" possessions 
and in the right combination.4 The acquisition must be timely (one cannot wear 
last year's fashion). Further, the acquisition must be cared for and, perhaps, even 
surrounded by companion possessions. Thus, the materialist is forced into a 
constant environmental scanning process. Accordingly, a materialist might be 
expected to be more media oriented, to belong to more social clubs or groups, 
and to spend more time shopping not only for goods, but also to keep abreast of 
what is available.
The results of the Fournier and Richins (1991) study support these ideas.
Materialists are described as continual information gatherers,
constantly scanning the environment for material offerings ...on the 
lookout for more ...figuring out what to acquire nex t... reading 
catalogs and magazines, observing what others have acquired, 
visiting shops to see what is available. Always thinking about 
future purchases so that thinking about buying involves pleasure 
and happiness" (p. 410).
Accordingly, materialists are more likely to engage in behaviors such as ongoing
search and shopping to prepare them for future acquisitions.
In many of these respects, the materialist exhibits characteristics of the 
opinion leader (Bloch and Richins 1983) or market maven5 (Feick and Price
4
A materialist must be certain to maintain a consistent set of goods which have what 
McCracken (1988) refers to as "Diederot unity." That is, certain goods "go together" by virtue of 
their correspondence with the same set of cultural categories. McCracken employs the example of 
the consistency of Rolex watches and BMWs for Yuppies. There is no inherent reason why these 
two products should carry similar cultural meaning, other than the influence of advertising and 
the fashion system which have attached similar cultural meanings to these objects.
5
Both opinion leaders and market mavens are thought to mediate the flow of information 
from mass media sources to individuals. They influence the (Continued on the next page.)
10
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1987)—except that the materialist is an opinion follower. The views of others are 
more important than his/her own views, since the approval of others is critical. 
When the views of others take precedence, then some would say that the 
materialist lacks self-esteem and is not becoming self-actualized (Fromm 1976, 
Maslow 1950,1970). Snyder (1987; Snyder and Gangestad 1986) has labeled this 
tendency to shape one's behavior to the views of others "self-monitoring."
Further the materialist cannot engage in these activities and do everything
else as well. What, then, is likely to suffer? Csikszentmihalyi and
Rochberg-Halton (1981) provide one answer.
If things attract our attention excessively, there is not enough 
psychic energy left to cultivate the interaction with the rest of the 
world. The danger of focusing attention exclusively on a goal of 
physical consumption—or materialism—is that one does not attend 
enough to the cultivation of the self, to the relationship with others, 
or to the broader purposes that affect life (p. 53).
Additionally, life satisfaction and happiness are thought to be beyond the grasp
(and reach) of materialists. Relationships with others, happiness, and cultivation
of the self are each briefly addressed next.
Some (c.f., Fournier and Richins 1991; Fromm 1956,1976; Ger and Belk 
1993; Heilbroner 1956) have suggested that activities which build true 
relationships between people are neglected by materialists. It is a bit paradoxical 
that while materialists must understand and seek the opinions and approval of 
others, they may also allow personal relationships to suffer. A materialist must 
be a social individual. To learn "what's in" and to gain approval, the materialist 
must participate in socially visible activities, such as group memberships, having
5 (Continued from the previous page) opinions and choices of other individuals about 
products, political candidates, and ideas. The distinction between the two is that the influence of 
opinions leaders is thought to derive from their involvement with a particular product class, 
while market mavens have knowledge expertise and influence about the marketplace in general.
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people over to one's house, etc. As Veblen (1899/1979) suggested, consumption 
must "concentrate upon the lines which are most patent to the observers whose 
good opinion is sought" (p. 112). A materialist, however, is likely to be interested 
in social connections as means (to gather information, to solicit praise, etc.) and 
not as ends in themselves. Two characteristics of materialists seem to flow from 
this consequence. First, materialists are more likely to be motivated by external 
factors such as the approval of others—extrinsic motivation—than by internal 
factors such as the enjoyment of a piece of sculpture or a game of golf for 
itself—intrinsic motivation. Secondly, materialists may be more likely than other 
people to be "self-monitoring" (Snyder 1979; Snyder and DeBono 1985). This 
term describes individuals who are attuned to the opinions of others and who 
mold their appearances and behavior to these opinions.
Materialists are also thought to be unhappy or dissatisfied. According to 
Veblen (1899/1979), an individual cannot simply purchase items and then sit 
back and receive the approbation of others. Standards keep rising and changing 
so that round after round of accumulation is fueled (p. 31). More recently, 
Brickman and Campbell (1971) make much the same point, calling the effect an 
"hedonic trap," greater and greater pleasures are necessary to maintain a 
constant level of satisfaction; hence, happiness is unobtainable. Eisert and Kahle 
(1983) suggest another reason for the unhappiness. They argue that social and 
emotional support which is found in close relationships with others is important 
for long-term physical and emotional health. Materialists neglect these 
relationships at the cost of unhappiness. In developing their scales to measure 
materialism, discussed below and in the next chapter, both Belk (1984,1985) and 
Richins and Dawson (1990,1992) address the correlation between materialism 
and happiness.
Finally, the cultivation of the self suffers. Self-esteem and self-actualization
12
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are often cited as casualties of materialism. Bond (1992) explains that if one's life 
is directed only toward "pleasure or the accumulation of wealth, there is no hope 
of self-esteem" because the honor and recognition received from others will 
"ring hollow" (p. 165). In discussing self-actualization, Maslow (1950,1970) 
reports that to be psychologically autonomous and self-determined, a person 
must be free of dependence on other people—which, as noted above, the 
materialist is not. Fromm (1976) offers another perspective on materialism's 
undesirable impact on the self. He speaks of the "marketing character," the 
phenomenon of experiencing oneself as a commodity to be exchanged on the 
"personality market." Pollay (1986) explains that the preoccupation with 
acquiring and owning goods has "a social effect of displacing affect from people 
to objects and an alienating effect where the self is perceived... as an exchange 
commodity" (p. 25). This objectification (or reification) of people is a perspective 
offered by several writers in the postmodern tradition (c.f. Baudrillard 1988, Firat 
1991). Instead of being able to say, "I am what I do," people are reduced to 
saying of themselves, "'I am what I have,' thus providing the direct link between 
the search for the self and the consumption process in industrial societies" 
(Kilbourne 1987, p. 229).
CONCEPTUALIZATION AND SCALE DEVELOPMENT
While there is agreement on the definition of materialism (and consensus 
about the characteristics/descriptions of a materialist), there is no clear 
agreement about how to measure the construct. Most acknowledge that 
materialism is a complex phenomenon, comprised of several dimensions. 
However, Belk (1984,1985; Ger and Belk 1990,1993) conceives of the dimensions
13
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as being personality traits. Richins and Dawson (1990,1992) argue that a value 
orientation is more accurate. In adopting this perspective, they are following the 
lead of Rokeach (1973) who defined a value as "an enduring belief that a specific 
mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to 
an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence" (p. 5). In 
other words, the acquisition of possessions is believed to be desirable in itself as 
well as an acceptable means of attaining other desired goals.
Each "party" has developed its own scale to measure the construct. Belk 
measures traits of possessiveness, envy, nongenerosity and preservation. Richins 
and Dawson measure three domains of materialism: the centrality of acquisitions 
in one's life, whether acquisitions are used to define happiness, and whether they 
are used to define success. Each developer suggests that scores on the individual 
subscales as well as overall aggregated scores may be correlated with measures 
of attitudes and behaviors.
Because of its earlier appearance, Belk's scale has been more widely used 
(see for example Dawson and Bamossy 1990; Ellis 1991; Hunt et al. 1990; Rudmin 
1988; and Wallendorf and Arnould 1988). However, research which has 
investigated materialism using the two scales, indicates that the Richins and 
Dawson scale is the more reliable (Cole et al. 1992; Othman 1989); validity 
comparisons between the two scales has only been addressed tangentially. 
Specific discussions of the two scales are included in the next two chapters.
Measures of Materialism and Consumer Attitudes,
Behaviors, and Motivations
Following Belk's agenda, various researchers have investigated the 
relationship between materialism and considerations such as happiness, life 
satisfaction, and interpersonal relationships. This research addresses the issue of
14
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the validity of the scales. Belk (1985) reports that, as expected, materialism 
correlates negatively with satisfaction in life. Other researchers have reported 
similar results. The Belk scale has also been used in assessing other issues as well. 
For example, H unt et al. (1990) found moderate support for the hypothesis that 
materialism and external locus of control were correlated. A cross-cultural study 
by Dawson and Bamossy (1990) reported that the envy subscale had the highest 
correlation life satisfaction. In his own cross-cultural study (Ger and Belk 1990, 
1993), Belk reports inconsistent results. The factor solutions are the not the same 
for samples from different countries. Scale reliability and validity also vary from 
one country to another.
Richins and Dawson (1992) found that relationships between their 
materialism measures and other constructs, such as life satisfaction, generally are 
in the directions hypothesized. For example, materialism correlates negatively 
with measures of voluntary simplicity, with satisfaction with family life, and 
with self-esteem.
In a study using the two scales, Cole et al. (1992) investigated materialism 
and three different measures of life satisfaction. Most correlations were 
statistically significant and were in the direction expected, for example the life 
satisfaction correlated negatively with materialism. However, they could not 
reproduce Belk's factor structure.
While materialism has been a topic of "report and discussion" for some 
years in various social science disciplines (Rudmin and Richins 1992), research is 
still in its relative infancy, as evidenced by the continuing scale development and 
exploratory research into connections between materialism and various 
consumer attitudes and behaviors. As noted above, initial research has probed 
the relationship between materialism and measures of life satisfaction. The 
relationship between materialism and the self, however, has not yet been
15
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addressed directly. A number of articles, both empirical and conceptual, have 
been written about the relationship between people and their possessions, yet 
none were driven by considerations of materialism and the self.
THE PROPOSAL
What is the nature of identity in a consumer culture? More specifically,
what is the nature of the materialist "self"? If people construct their "selves," at
least in part, through their possessions, which have been given meaning by
culture, then the task is to learn in what ways the materialist constructs
him /herself that is different from the non-materialist. Lunt and Livingstone
(1992) provide some guidelines.
The construction of personal identities draws on conventionally 
given class, gender, cultural and generational identities as well as 
on individual biographical and family experience. The identities 
which result reflect... people's feelings of security, their notions of 
their needs and desires,... their response to social influence and the 
way they conduct their social relationships. They give meaning to 
everyday economic activities and experiences. These diverse
£
Certainly there has been much theorizing about the relationship between possessions and 
the self. However, research guided by hypotheses about materialism and the self have not been 
reported. Richins and Dawson (1990) administered a measure of self-monitoring to one of their 
samples, but the results were not discussed. In a personal communication (May 20,1993) Richins 
said that the correlation between materialism, as measured by an early version of the Richins and 
Dawson scale, was moderately positive. In a later study (1992) self-esteem was measured, but it 
was not the focus of the research. Belk (1988a, 1989a) has written about possessions being an 
extension of the self, but did not directly address materialism and the self. In a cross-cultural 
study, Wallendorf and Arnould (1988) assessed the role that favorite possessions play in self 
definition. While they used a variation of the Belk materialism scale as part of their research, the 
relationship between materialism and the self was not at issue. Finally, Ball and Tasaki (1992) 
investigated attachment to possessions and the self. They also utilized a version of the Belk scale, 
but hypothesized (and found) that there was no relationship between attachment and 
materialism. The materialism consideration was not a major component of their study.
The one exception is Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton's (1981) work which 
investigated the interaction between people and the household objects they consider special. 
While materialism was a factor in this study, it was not the principal focus.
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aspects of personal identity are constructed through responding to 
the challenge, opportunities and problems which modern 
consumer culture presents to the individual" (p. 24-25).
This dissertation investigated materialism by considering the impact of 
materialism on the self. Research into the aspects of materialism associated with 
the self concept has been advocated both by Belk (Ger and Belk 1993) and Richins 
and Dawson (1992), among others. The study specifically addressed hypotheses 
about materialism and self-esteem, self-actualization, self-monitoring, and 
intrinsic/extrinsic motivation. Investigation of the hypotheses involved the use 
of both the Belk (Ger and Belk 1993) and Richins and Dawson (1992) materialism 
scales.6 Those scoring high on the two scales are hypothesized to be more 
self-monitoring individuals, extrinsically motivated, but with lower self-esteem 
and less self-actualization than those who score low. This study also moves 
forward the process of testing and refining the two materialism scales. 
Additionally, knowledge about the validity for the two scales—do the measures 
"behave as expected" (Churchill 1979)—has been advanced. Construct validity 
has been assessed first, by the investigation of materialism along with measures 
of the self constructs in a nomological network, and second, by assessing the 
convergent validity of the two scales. Finally, the definition of materialism is 
reassessed and an alternative conceptualization, based on the results of this 
study, is proposed.
Organization
Chapter Two presents a literature review of the topics of materialism and 
the self-concept. Historical reviews of these two topics as well as a consideration
While several other studies have used the Belk scale, this study employs the most recent, 
unpublished version (Ger and Belk 1983), which reflects the revisions and refinements Belk has 
made in response to earlier test results.
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of the role of possessions in self-definition are also included. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the relationship between materialism and the self.
Specific research hypotheses are presented in Chapter Three, as is the 
research design. The instruments used to measure materialism and the four 
constructs of self-actualization, self-esteem, self-monitoring, and 
intrinsic/extrinsic motivation are discussed and defended.
Chapter Four presents the analysis of the data, tests of the hypotheses, a 
discussion of the reliability and validity of the two materialism scales, and 
develops a profile of materialists based on these results.
Chapter Five provides a discussion of the findings, drawing conclusions 
about the definition of materialism and about the applicability of the two scales. 
Additionally, implications for the marketing discipline, limitations of the 
research, and suggestions for future research are addressed.
18
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter contains discussions of research about materialism and about 
the self-concept. In so doing, it presents information about the historical 
development of each construct and empirical research in each area. The chapter 
begins with a consideration of materialism, then moves to discussions of the self, 
and ends with an investigation of the relationship between the two.
DEFINITIONAL CONCERNS
The general denunciation of materialism reported in the first chapter 
illustrated the negative connotations associated with it. Agreement about 
materialism, however, stops there. There seems to be no agreed upon definition 
or conceptualization of either materialism or of what it means to be a materialist. 
Even within academia, writers and researchers are not always careful to define 
terminology. When the terms "materialism" and "materialist" are used, they do 
not necessarily carry the same meaning from one author to another. The situation 
is both exacerbated and strengthened by the cross-disciplinary nature of the 
research. Different disciplines have different terminologies for the same idea. At 
the same time, however, different disciplines often use the same terminology to 
express diverse ideas. For example, to investigate "materialism," a researcher
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should search for studies of "consumption," "conspicuous consumption," 
"consumerism,"1 "ostentatious display," and "material culture," among others.
In an attempt to sort out the situation, several authors have presented 
thorough reviews of the history of consumerism in Western societies (e.g., Fox 
and Lears 1983; McCracken 1986; Mukerji 1986); others have elucidated the 
differences in perspectives across disciplines (e.g., Belk 1985; Fournier and 
Richins 1991; Rassuli and Hollander 1988; Richins and Dawson 1990 and 1991). 
Putting aside philosophical materialism, the idea that ultimately there is a 
material explanation for all phenomena (see e.g. Lange 1865/1925), there seem to 
be two general conceptualizations of materialism, one based in economic theory 
and the other in anthropological/sociological theory. Proponents of the first 
approach draw a distinction between using goods to satisfy "real" versus "false" 
needs. Adherents of the second perspective take a more holistic approach to the 
role of goods in society. The following discussion, which focuses on Western 
notions of materialism, elucidates the two views.
The Dichotomy of Needs Perspective
Economists assume that people are rational beings who purchase goods in 
order to maximize utility. Preferences enter this scenario in the form of 
indifference curves which illustrate the points at which goods are considered to 
be acceptable substitutes for one another. When consumers act to maximize 
utility, they are assumed to consume goods which meet their needs (Benton 1985; 
Hamilton 1989). Accordingly, one must look to need theory.
Perhaps the most famous theory is Maslow's (1954) which posits a 
hierarchy with physiological and safety needs at the "bottom" and social and
^ e r e ,  "consumerism" refers to living in a materials-intensive world, It is not synonymous 
with another use of "consumerism" which refers to protecting consumers' rights and interests.
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psychological needs at the "top." More recently, Hanna (1980) has proposed a 
classification of needs which may be satisfied through consumption activities.
Yet this set, too, flows from physical safety "up" to personal growth. Given such 
conceptualizations, it is easy to understand why the purchase and use of physical 
goods to satisfy physical needs has been approved, but the purchase and use of 
physical goods to satisfy social and psychological needs has been considered 
inappropriate (c.f. Bell 1976; Fromm 1956,1976; Galbraith 1958,1974; Kilbourne 
1987,1991). As indicated in the first chapter, the general religious emphasis on 
self-restraint has also come down on the side of "enough" in terms of the 
satisfying of physical and safety needs (Belk 1983). Individuals are admonished 
to consume in moderation: enough, but not too much (Leiss 1976).
Inglehart (1981; Abramson and Inglehart 1987) utilizes this distinction 
among needs in his research on values. His use of the term "materialist," 
however, is distinctly different. For Inglehart, materialists generally live in 
countries which are still striving to satisfy their citizens' basic physical and safety 
needs. Materialists can also be found in post-industrial societies; however, they 
can be identified as those favoring social/political policies which emphasize 
economic growth and security. Post-Materialists, on the other hand, tend to live 
in post-industrial nations and favor "higher" quality-of-life goals such as 
environmentalism. They do not view "ever increasing GNP" as a laudable, 
primary goal. Roberts and Smith (1992) adopt this post-materialist perspective 
for their postmodern development continuum. Post-industrial societies are 
encouraged to take advantage of technology, but to continue to preserve 
individual tastes and cultural distinctions.
Most scholars who approach materialism from the dichotomy of needs 
perspective (real versus false or illusory needs), however, consider materialism 
to be an "over- emphasis," on physical goods with insufficient attention paid to
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other objectives (e.g., Belk 1983,1984,1988a). This approach to materialism often 
carries moral overtones. For example, the English essayist and historian Thomas 
Carlyle warned against materialism, calling it the "Pig Philosophy" (Miller 1991). 
This perspective illustrates the problematic nature of increases in the standard of 
living (e.g., Horowitz 1985; Mason 1981). Leading comfortable, safe lives is 
judged to be good; but comfort, it is argued, should not become luxury and 
waste. The consumption of goods to satisfy "real"" needs is acceptable. 
Consumption of goods for satisfaction beyond these basic needs is not. Wasteful 
spending and consumption are decried. One is reminded of President Bush's 
remark about Democrats in his 1992 state-of-the-union address: "they lie awake 
at night worried that someone else might be having a good time."
One of the most famous writers in this tradition was Thorstein Veblen, who 
after finishing a Ph.D. in philosophy returned to school to study economics 
(Murphey 1988). His work (1899/1979) on conspicuous consumption and 
conspicuous leisure has been enormously influential. Not only did Veblen coin 
the term "conspicuous consumption," but he connected it with the connotation 
of "conspicuous waste" and excessive expenditure on superfluities (p. 97-98) 
which characterizes this economic perspective. More recently, Bell (1976) 
expressed concern over trends in U.S. culture which he views as the necessary 
consequences of capitalism: Americans are becoming hedonistic, concerned with 
play, fun, display, and pleasure (xi - xii; 70). One has only to turn on the 
television and listen to politicians, preachers, and pundits decry the loss of "real" 
values to know that this concern for wasteful consumption is alive and well.
From such a perspective, materialists are often considered in a similarly 
negative light. A whole litany of bad traits are attributed to materialists (Fournier 
and Richins 1991), as detailed in the first chapter. For example, they are viewed 
as using goods to replace personal relationships or to compensate for bad or
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nonexistent personal relationships; they are accused of "worshiping" things and 
of making a religion of materialism (Belk 1983,1985). In fact, Christmas, in the 
United States, has been called the "National Festival of Consumption" (Boorstin 
1973, p. 162), with Santa Claus as the supreme deity (Belk 1987a, 1989b). As an 
illustration of this last point, Shlien's (1959) suggests that after Christ, Santa 
Claus is the most sacred folk hero in America, even though, as Belk (1987a) 
points out, the two represent almost polar opposites in societal values. "The 
miracles of Christ provided health and necessities while the miracles of Santa 
Claus provide toys and luxuries" (p. 91).
Belk's definition of materialism is consistent with this economically driven 
perspective: materialism refers to "the importance a consumer attaches to 
worldly possessions. At the highest levels... possessions assume a central place 
in a person's life and are believed to provide the greatest sources of satisfaction 
and dissatisfaction" (1984, p. 291). Other researchers agree. Hunt et al. are even 
more biting in their characterization of materialism as "an orientation that 
equates symbols with substance and objects with essence" (1990, p. 1101).
The Social Science Perspective
In direct contrast, most anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, and 
some consumer behavior scholars eschew the economic view (e.g., Douglas and 
Isherwood 1979; Horowitz 1985; Mason 1981; McCracken 1986,1988; Schudson
1984). Instead, the consumption of goods is considered to fulfill a societal 
function. The role of goods in society is considered morally neutral. Several ideas 
are inherent in this perspective.
• Goods are one way we communicate with each other. As such, they 
help us categorize the world (McCracken 1986,1988).
• Instead of replacing human relationships, goods and attendant
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rituals, such as gift giving, often solidify them. Material goods often are used to 
express and meet higher-order needs and values (Rook 1985; Belk 1987b; 
Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton 1981).
• Materialism is always with us in some fashion or another because of 
the role it plays in society (Mason 1981). Consumption provides a way to make 
status visible.
According to Douglas and Isherwood (1979), this perspective puts
materialism back into the wider social realm in which it belongs.
[T]he very idea of consumption itself has to be set back into the 
social process, not merely looked upon as a result or objective of 
work.... Goods, work, and consumption have been artificially 
abstracted out of the whole social scheme. The way the excision has 
been made damages the possibility of understanding these aspects 
of our lives (p. 4).
Schudson (1984) and Miller (1991) would agree both in substance and in 
implication.
In the tradition of Thorstein Veblen, sociologists and cultural critics 
have thought it clever and damning to show of some social 
behavior that its function is to display status rather than to serve 
"basic" needs. But this view implicitly accepts the puritanical 
prejudice, which neither Smith nor Marx succumbed to, that 
whatever is not a fundamental material need is superfluous. The 
assumption is that people care about status only because they are 
vain, foolish, economically irrational, or in Veblen's view, 
industrially unproductive. But that is not sociology, it is 
economistic ideology (Schudson 1984, p. 134).
Thus, people use goods to say to themselves and to the world who they are. 
People ascribe meaning to goods to make material their intangible values. As 
McCracken said, "the premises of our existence are the premises of our 
existence" (1988, p. 132).2 In other words, our homes, where we live, reflect the
2
Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton make much the same point. "One of the most 
important psychological purposes of the home is that those (Continued on the next page)
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basic assumptions about our lives. Or, as Joy and Dholakia (1991) put it, "people 
endow their homes with meaning and, in turn, use these meanings to define 
themselves" (p. 386). Belk (1985) agrees with this conceptualization, saying that 
since goods are one way in which we make the abstract concrete, they help 
define who we are. He further suggests that the use of goods and the attendant 
consumption rituals are often instrumental in meeting those needs and 
expressing values (Belk 1985; Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton 1981; Rook
1985). This perspective is amplified later in the discussion of the self and 
possessions.
A corollary to the social science view suggests that materialism is more
<3
likely to be present in more stratified, complex societies than in more traditional, 
less complex societies (Douglas and Isherwood 1979; Mason 1981; Triandis 1990). 
Advocates for this position argue that once institutions lost their hold over 
society, and as individuals became more mobile, new ways of identifying and 
separating people were needed. Tangible goods assumed that role. A brief 
discussion of this progression is presented next.
2
(Continued from the previous page) objects that have shaped one's personality and which 
are needed to express concretely those aspects of the self that one values are kept within it. Thus 
the home is not only a material shelter but also a shelter for those things that make life 
meaningful" (1981, p. 139).
George Carlin (1981) takes a more prosaic view: "A house is just a pile of stuff with a cover
on it.... That's what your house is, a place to keep your stuff while you go out and g et more
stuff!"
3In discussing cultural complexity, Triandis et al. (1988) distinguish among "extremely 
simple societies (e.g. the Mbuti Pygmies)," societies exhibiting "higher levels of complexity (e.g., 
the Romans, Aztecs, Chinese)" and "extremely complex cultures (e.g., modem industrial 
cultures)" (p. 324).
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HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS
There is some agreement that the "history of materialism" mirrors the rise 
of the consumer society (e.g., Mason 1981; McCracken 1988; Mukerji 1983). From 
this history, however, different authors draw different conclusions. Marx and 
Veblen saw materialism as an evil of capitalism which required increasing 
consumption to fuel the economic engines.4 Still others, such as Inglehart (1981), 
connect materialism with times of economic want, and post-materialism with 
times of economic security. Finally, writers in the social science tradition suggest 
that materialism will always be present because of its integral role in negotiating 
social networks and relationships and in attaining and maintaining status goals. 
The form of materialism may shift with society, but it is always there.
The Meaning of Goods
Goods, possessions, have always had some meaning beyond the merely 
utilitarian for the people who owned and/or used them. Evidence for this 
position is provided by the existence of "grave goods," or artifacts which are 
buried with the dead. Elliott (1990) notes that over 100,000 years ago, 
Neanderthals buried flowers, stone tools, and other simple objects with their 
dead. The much more elaborate grave goods of the ancient Egyptians are well 
known to us all. The thrust of this section is to illustrate how the meaning of 
goods has shifted over time and the impact of that shift on Western cultures and 
its implication for the study of materialism.
4This statement is not as contradictory as it sounds. Marx disliked capitalism because it 
forced the worker to sell their labor to capitalists who used that labor to enrich themselves and to 
increase their power over workers. However, he did not take the position that in conforming to 
the ways of the capitalist system, there was something wrong with the workers. He understood 
the uses of goods in such a system and admitted that needs were socially determined. Thus Marx 
damned the sin (capitalism) but not the sinner.
26
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Before the 16th century, the family (and one's obligation to the feudal 
lord—or to those for whom one had feudal responsibility) was the repository of 
value and values (e.g., McCracken 1988). The family and the feudal system 
defined and sustained social stability. Meaning was passed from generation to 
generation within the family. Goods were purchased for the family 
corporation—an entity which existed before and which would exist after the life 
of any single individual. Goods represented the family's identity and honor, and 
an "important" family could be identified by its "old" goods (McCracken 1988).
Queen Elizabeth's government by consumption, however, altered the 
situation dramatically (McCracken 1988). She spent lavishly and she forced her 
nobles to leave their lands, to come to court, and to spend in a like manner. The 
meaning of goods began to shift. Whereas before special possessions which over 
time could acquire "patina" were prized, now items which were new and 
fashionable became desirable.
Time passed. Society became more mobile, and city loyalties broke down. 
Now, instead of status being assessed by one's family relationships, the reliable 
way to assess status was through observation of an individual's possessions. 
Before, status had been ascribed; now, it was achieved.5 Individual identity and 
meaning were transferred from institutions, such as the family and feudal city, to 
goods. "This connection between consumption and individualism, largely 
wrought in the eighteenth century but begun ... in the sixteenth century, is one of 
the great cultural fusions of the modern world" (McCracken 1988, p. 20).
McCracken (1988) further suggests that this use of consumer goods 1) to 
express social and cultural values, as well as 2) to be instruments of change is a
5
Though, as any consumer behavior or marketing text will point out, admission to the 
upper-upper class in the U.S. is inherited wealth from a socially prominent family. If wealth and 
position are earned in the current generation, then one is a member of the lower-upper class.
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phenomenon unique to Western civilization. This meaning transfer is linked with 
the success of the industrial revolution. If goods had not taken on such 
importance, the industrial revolution might not have been so successful. 
Horowitz (1985) similarly traces the changes in thoughts of moralists who, 
originally aligned with the church, warned the working classes about 
over-reliance on worldly possessions. These same moralists, however, at the 
time of the industrial revolution, aligned with the industrialists and exhorted the 
working classes to consume (Horowitz 1985).
The industrial revolution, however, was not the only "revolution." 
McCracken (1988) suggests that the consumer revolution which preceded it and 
has continued after it "changed Western concepts of time, space, society, the 
individual, the family, and the state" (p. 3). The changed concept of the 
individual is discussed next.
Why Societies Became More Individualistic
A concurrent trend which facilitated the identity transfer from institutions 
to possessions was the shift from collectivistic to individualistic societies. Bell 
(1976) notes that "the fundamental assumption of modernity, the thread that has 
run through Western Civilization since the 16th Century, is that the social unit of 
society is not the group, the guild, the tribe, the city, but the person" (p. 16). 
Triandis (1990; Triandis et al. 1988) explains why. As society allowed more 
mobility and freedom to the individual, and as work became more specialized, 
societies became more complex in terms of social networks and opportunities 
available to the individual (or at least males). People were no longer likely to 
belong to and to be subject to the influence of just a few groups. Instead, people 
belonged to many different groups, and became less emotionally attached to them.
With greater specialization and complexity came greater conflict among the
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norms of various groups. One way to avoid conflicts was migration, which also 
had the effect of reducing the control of the groups (Triandis 1990). Affluence 
also resulted in more individualism. Financial independence meant freedom to 
"do one's own thing" and more freedom from group influences (Triandis 1990; 
Triandis et al. 1988).
The ascendancy of individualism in Europe after the 16th century, also 
signaled the diminished importance of demographic attributes for identity 
purposes (Baumeister 1986,1987). Instead, "identity is defined by what one has: 
what I own, what experience I have had, what I have accomplished (e.g., my list 
of publications!)" (Triandis 1990, p. 82). Different values also became important. 
Pragmatism, human rights, freedom, competence, enjoyment, and pleasure are 
valued by individualistic but not collectivistic societies (Schwartz and Bilsky 
1987,1990). Thus was the groundwork for materialism laid.
Materialism and Individualism
As noted above, a common theme in accounts of the history of the meaning 
of goods is the shift in industrialized societies from the tyranny of institutions to 
the ascendancy of the individual. As long as institutions controlled meaning, 
loyalty was to groups (family, church, etc.) and meaning (and status distinctions) 
inhered in the groups (e.g., Douglas and Isherwood 1979; McCracken 1988). Once 
individuals broke free from reliance on group membership for meaning and 
status, however, these distinctions became more difficult to identify. Society 
required a new means of self expression and identification. Goods became the 
object of choice. The implication for materialism research may be illustrated by 
considering the differences between individualistic and collectivistic societies.
Foa and Foa (1974) identified six kinds of resources that humans exchange: 
love, status, services, money, information, and goods. The first three are
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characteristic of traditional cultures (their terminology) where the emphasis is on 
people; the last three are characteristic of more modern complex cultures where 
the emphasis is on tasks (Triandis 1990; Triandis et al. 1988). Based on studies of 
three collectivist (Triandis' terminology) cultures (Indonesia, India, People's 
Republic of China) and two individualist cultures (US and France) Triandis 
(1990; Triandis et al. 1988) suggests that collectivists do a good job of exchanging 
love, status, and services, while individualists do well when exchanging 
information, money, and goods. Problems occur, however, when individualists 
try to exchange services, love, and status in intimate, face-to-face relationships. 
Accordingly, Triandis suggests that the defining attribute of individualism is not 
self-reliance, as is often thought. Rather, distance from ingroups, much emotional 
detachment from others, extreme lack of attention to the views of others, 
relatively little concern for family, and tendency toward competition are factors 
which define individualists.
Support for this position also comes from Hofstede (1984) who found that 
individualism accounted for most of the variance in a factor analysis of value 
data across cultures. He considered four value dimensions: power distance (the 
emotional dependence on more powerful people), how societies deal with the 
uncertainty of the future, individualism versus collectivism (the individual's 
dependence on the group), and masculinity versus femininity. Overall, Hofstede 
found that items measuring individualism and power distance, which correlated 
with individualism at -.67, combined on the first factor to account for 24 percent 
of the variance in values. Earlier, when Mezei (1974) factor analyzed the 
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) values, he found that an individualistic— 
traditional dimension had strong explanatory power for the economic and 
community relations problems presented in the value survey.
It seems warranted, then, to hypothesize that individualists are more likely
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to have trouble with relationships and to be more comfortable dealing with 
things (possessions), in short, to exhibit the tendencies which have been 
attributed to materialists. That individualism and materialism should be 
associated has already been explained by the historical analysis which links the 
rise of individualism with the rise of the consumer culture. However, while 
individualists may also be materialistic, all materialists may not be 
individualistic—especially since, as discussed in the first chapter, materialists are 
thought to be very attentive to the thoughts and ideas of others.
Thus far, the discussion has suggested that individualistic cultures are more 
likely to be materialistic and collectivist cultures less so. There is evidence, 
however, that this dichotomy is not necessarily true. For example, in 
investigating materialism cross-culturally, Ger and Belk (1990) found that the 
Turkish students, from a collectivistic culture, were much more materialistic than 
the U.S. or any of the European student groups who were from much more 
individualistic cultures. At the same time, the Turkish students exhibited lower 
levels of nongenerosity than any of the others. Ger and Belk (1990) suggest that 
the explanation for these results may be that materialism and collectivism are not 
polar opposites if the desire for material goods is extended to the family instead 
of the individual. They opine that the conceptualization of materialism might be 
thought of as desiring possessions for some unit. In some cultures the unit is the 
individual, in others, the family.
Now that historical and definitional concerns have been addressed, the next 
issue is how to conceptualize and measure materialism. Two intertwined streams 
of research will be reviewed. The first stream is the development of reliable, valid 
scales to measure materialism. The second is an investigation of the attitudes and 
behaviors which are consistent with a materialistic life-style.
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MATERIALISM SCALES
Early Scale Development
Early measures of materialism truly are a "mixed bag." They span the 
disciplines of political science, psychology, and marketing. No one theoretical 
conceptualization of materialism drives the research. As a result, each instrument 
addresses different aspects of materialism, with none taking into account the 
multidimensional nature of materialism discussed in the first chapter. Further, 
some measures are primarily concerned with societal rather than individual 
manifestations of materialism; others have been developed for children rather 
than adults. And, finally, reflecting the standards of different disciplines and 
different times, not all measures have been fully reported in the literature. 
Occasionally, only sample scale items have been made available. Nevertheless, a 
brief review of some of the more often noted instruments is warranted since they 
provide a prologue to the two measures developed within the marketing 
discipline which are the focus of this study.
Campbell. One of the early materialism scales was developed by Campbell 
(1966) as one of six scales to measure social attitudes. The scale assesses attitudes 
toward materialism in society with an eight-item, forced-choice format. This 
scale is presented in Figure 1. No research seems to have been reported about the 
use of this scale (Belk 1985; Robinson and Shaver 1973).
Inglehart. Another instrument which addresses social attitudes associated 
with materialism has been developed by Inglehart (1971,1977,1981). This value 
survey has been much praised for being one of the few value measures which is 
theory driven (Braithwaite and Scott 1991) and which has been subjected to 
longitudinal testing (Richins and Dawson 1992). Inglehart, and others, have been 
studying the social values and national goals held by citizens of European
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Figure 1 
Campbell's Materialism Scale
1. A. "A loaf of bread, a jug of wine..." this epitomizes all the material requirements for
personal happiness.
B. "A loaf of bread and a jug of wine" may have been alright [sic] for someone who hasn't 
known anything else, but let's face it; in twentieth century America w e approach 
happiness as the carpet gets thicker and the steaks less "rare." *
2. A. My philosophy is: to have or to have not is the question, and if I'm lucky enough to
have, I'm going to enjoy it. *
B. To have wealth and material goods is not more conducive to happiness than to have 
debts and cancer.
3. A. An orderly, uncluttered house and a well-kept lawn will be important features of my
future home. *
B. I'm frankly not really interested in how my physical surroundings will be disposed in 
my future home.
4. A. The joys which wealth and material possessions bring are superficial and short-term as
compared to the real joys in life.
B. The only people who can say "money can't buy happiness" are those who never had a 
chance to try. *
5. A. A society that worships such extravagances as "golfmobiles" and all electric kitchens is
indeed a "sick" society.
B. If things were such that everybody in the world had stereophonic record players and 
champagne, wars would probably be obsolete. *
6. A. To conjecture upon the size of one's starting salary when leaving college is a natural
tendency on the part of a modem college student. *
B. A person with a "healthy" value system rarely if ever reflects on his future salary.
7. A. Neatness and physical appearance of my like-sexed friends are entirely accidental in
terms of my associations.
B. Important determinants in my choice of like-sexed friends in my living group at college 
are physical attractiveness and stylishness of dress. *
8. A. A place for everything and everything in it's place is a good maxim to abide by. *
B. Although cleanliness is important in material things, order, per se, bores me.
D. Campbell (1966). Unpublished papers, Department of Psychology, 
Northwestern University. Reported in John P. Robinson and Phillip R. Shaver 
(1974), Measures of Social Psychological Attitudes, Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for 
Social Research.
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nations (primarily Germany), the United States, Canada, and Japan. Inglehart 
works from his thesis, first developed in the 1970s (Inglehart 1971), that the 
values held by citizens of industrialized nations are moving from materialism to 
post-materialism. This concept was shaped in large part by the needs hierarchy 
proposed by Maslow (Inglehart 1981, p. 881). That is, as nations advance 
economically, citizens no longer focus on developing a comfortable standard of 
living (materialistic goals). Instead, they direct their concern toward other social 
and political issues such as peace and the environment (post-materialistic goals).
Inglehart (1971,1981) developed an instrument to measure materialism in 
which respondents are asked to order twelve goals (or values) from most to least 
important. This list of goals is presented in Figure 2. Materialistic goals include 
fighting crime and inflation, and maintaining a stable economy. Post-materialistic 
goals, on the other hand, are concerned with giving people more say in 
governmental decisions, making cities more beautiful, and moving toward a 
society where ideas count more than money.
As Richins and Dawson (1992) explain, the primary problem with using 
Inglehart's value survey to measure individual materialism is that the instrument 
focuses on social rather than individual goals. These goals are "not likely to have 
large influences on day-to-day consumption choices" (p. 306). Additionally, 
Inglehart's survey does not provide a measure of the "complex, 
multidimensional nature of materialism" (Richins and Dawson 1992, p. 306).
Still, the measure is useful in that it does provide some assessment of attitudes 
toward money.
Ward and Wackman; Moschis and Churchill. In investigating the 
influence of the family and the media (specifically television commercials) on 
adolescent consumer learning, Ward and Wackman (1971) developed a six-item 
scale to measure materialistic attitudes. This scale was part of a larger overall set
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Figure 2 
Inglehart's Materialist and Post-Materialist Values
Maintain order in the nation. *
Give people more say in the decisions of the government.
Fight rising prices. *
Protect freedom of speech.
Maintain a high rate of economic growth. *
Make sure that this country has strong defense forces. *
Give people more say in how things are decided at work and in 
their community.
Try to make our cities and countryside more beautiful.
Maintain a stable economy. *
Fight against crime. *
Move toward a friendlier, less impersonal society.
Move toward a society where ideas count more than money.
* A materialistic value/goal.
Ronald Inglehart (1981), "Post-Materialism in an Environment of Insecurity," 
American Political Science Review, 75 (December), 880-900.
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of thirteen measures (scales, indices, and open-ended questions) which were 
used to assess various factors influencing how adolescents learn to be consumers. 
In this research, materialism is defined as "an orientation which views material 
goods and money as important for personal happiness and social progress"
(1971, p. 422). Only a representative item for each scale is provided. For the 
materialism scale the item is, "It's really true that money can buy happiness."
In their research program into the consumer socialization and learning of 
adolescents, Moschis and Churchill (1978), Churchill and Moschis (1979), and 
Moschis and Moore (1982) adopted the theoretical foundation and 
methodological approach initiated by Ward and Wackman. They expanded the 
research design to incorporate thirteen scales to measure variables such as 
materialism, knowledge of consumer affairs, television viewing, and peer 
communications about consumption. The materialism scale was the same as that 
used by Ward and Wackman. Unfortunately, no specific scale items were 
reported in this research either.
Yamauchi and Templer. In what would seem to be a more direct 
antecedent to the Belk and the Richins and Dawson scales, Yamauchi and 
Templer (1982) explored the relationship between money and psychology. 
Acknowledging that money is a dominant feature of modern life, they trace the 
interests of psychologists from Freud to Fromm in the relationship between 
money and human behavior. They lament, however, that this area is 
under-studied in psychology because of a lack of a standardized instrument for 
assessing "money behavior" (p. 522). To fill the void, they developed an 
instrument to measure attitudes toward money, the Money Attitude Scale 
(MAS). From a sample of 300 adults living in Los Angeles and Fresno, California, 
they generated 62 items which were reduced to four factors representing 
attitudes toward money. The scale is presented in Figure 3. While scale items
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address the use of money for power and prestige and address anxieties 
connected with having and spending money, they do not measure attitudes 
about possessions. The first factor measures the use of money to impress and 
influence others — money as an indicator of success. The second factor measures 
attitudes toward financial planning for the future. The third factor addresses 
attitudes toward money situations — are people suspicious and doubtful or 
trusting and accepting of situations involving money. The fourth and final factor 
measures whether or not money is a source of anxiety and worry. The advance 
provided by the MAS is the connection of money with prestige and status and 
the measure of individual attitudes which might be expected to correlate more 
directly with behavior. Still, however, the scale does not address possessions 
directly—and that is the focus of the two scales used in this study.
Others. More recently, Tashchian, Slama, and Tashchian (1984) developed 
a scale to measure social attitudes similar to the ones of interest to Inglehart 
(1971). Materialism is measured along with attitudes toward material growth 
and toward energy conservation. Finally, Richins and Dawson report (1992) that 
an additional scale which incorporates materialism is under development by 
Heslin, Johnson, and Black. While the overall focus of the work is on measuring 
spending versus saving, a six-item measure of materialism is included in their 
work (Richins and Dawson 1992).
Scale Development in Marketing
Recent work on developing materialism scales has been more focused and 
driven by theoretical considerations. It has proceeded with the assumption that 
materialism is a multidimensional construct which cannot be adequately 
assessed with single measures. Belk (1984,1985) began the process. He offered a 
scale to measure the materialistic tendencies, or personality traits, of individuals,
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by considering traits of possessiveness, nongenerosity, and envy. In later 
research Ger and Belk (1990,1993) extended the scale to include a fourth trait of 
tangibility—now termed "preservation." Richins and Dawson, however, while 
agreeing that materialism is a complex construct, conceive of it as a value. With 
this orientation they developed a scale (1990,1992) which measures three 
domains of the value "materialism": centrality of acquisitions, acquisitions 
leading to happiness, and acquisitions as definitions of success.
It may not be necessary to "take sides" on the trait/value debate, since 
personality traits are inextricably bound up with values (Braithwaite and Scott 
1991; Kreitler and Kreitler 1990). An emphasis on values, though, does not carry 
with it the significant problems of personality and behavior research outlined by 
Kassarjian and Sheffet (1981). They report that personality inventories relevant to 
consumer behavior are not readily available or applicable (too often they address 
deviant personality types), that the relationship between personality and specific 
consumer behaviors (such as product choice and /o r use) has little theoretical 
justification, and finally, that only a few studies report statistically significant 
findings.
Further, Triandis (1990) suggests that measuring personality in conjunction 
with behavior may be difficult. He draws on Doi's (1986) idea that people have a 
public and a private self. In collectivist societies, the public and private selves are 
kept quite separate and only the public self is "shown." In more individualistic 
societies, the public and private selves are interrelated because the private self is 
allowed more expression; still, people may be concerned with doing the right 
thing. Thus, in either society, measuring personality is likely to be fraught with 
dangers if the interest is to try to determine behavior from personality. As part of 
the private self, personality is either totally hidden (collectivist societies) or 
partially hidden (individualistic societies).
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Finally, Rokeach (1968) suggests that while personality factors will give rise 
to variations in individual value systems, cultural, institutional, and social factors 
"will nevertheless restrict such variations to a reasonably small number of 
dimensions" (p. 161). Consequently, the value orientation seems warranted. 
While each scale will be discussed below, a fuller discussion of the empirical tests 
and criticisms of each is presented in Chapter Three.
THE BELK MATERIALISM SCALE (1984,1985; Ger and Belk 1990,1993)
Belk conceives of materialism in two ways. First, he suggests that it is a 
complex second-order construct which can be measured via three correlated 
first-order constructs of possessiveness, "the inclination and tendency to retain 
control or ownership of one's possessions" (Belk 1984); nongenerosity, "an 
unwillingness to give possessions to or share possessions with others" (Belk 
1984); and envy, "a desire for others' possessions... [and resentment of] those 
who own the desired possessions" (Belk 1984). [A fourth subscale, tangibility, 
was added later; see page 42.] A second conceptualization is that materialism is a 
single-factor construct which may adequately be measured with the aggregation 
of the subscales (Belk 1985). Specific information about the reliability and validity 
of the overall scale and subscales is presented in Chapter Three. What is of 
interest here is how the scale has been used by other researchers to investigate 
materialism in various settings. While the focus of this dissertation is on 
materialism in the United States, research conducted outside the U.S. is included 
in this survey, in the interest of completeness.
Cross-cultural Measures of Materialism
Dawson and Bamossy (1990) suggest that differences in consumption
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patterns between countries with different economic and cultural structures are to 
be expected. Of more interest, however, would be an investigation of differences 
in materialism between two countries which are relatively similar. For the study 
they selected the U.S. and the Netherlands. Because of differences in social, 
religious, and political structures, they expected materialism to be higher in The 
Netherlands. To investigate this hypothesis, the authors utilized Belk's 
materialism scales.
Both Dutch and American envy scales achieved adequate internal 
consistency (Alphas of .81 and .76, respectively). The Dutch nongenerosity scale 
indicated lower reliability (.46) than did the American (.63), while reliability of 
the Dutch possessiveness scale was higher (.68) than the American (.53). Overall 
aggregate materialism measures also were low (.61 for the Dutch sample and .62 
for the American). Because of these initial results, the authors caution against 
drawing too strong a conclusion from the study.
More specifically, the results of ANOVA analysis indicated that the most 
significant differences in materialism between the two samples was in 
possessiveness. Respondents did not differ significantly on measures of envy, 
nongenerosity, or on overall aggregate measures of materialism. The authors also 
included measures of life satisfaction in their study. As reported by others, envy 
was the only materialism sub-construct which was strongly (and negatively) 
related to life satisfaction. Accordingly, Dawson and Bamossy conclude, "these 
differences in scale means perhaps challenge the unidimensionality of the 
summary materialism scale when conducting cross-cultural studies" (p. 183).
An interesting aspect of this study was in the explanation for the higher 
possessiveness of the Dutch sample. While the U.S. may have a throw-away 
society, the Dutch tend to hold on to their possessions longer. The authors report 
that garage sales and second-hand markets such as swap meets and flea markets
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are virtually non-existent in the Netherlands. They conclude that "in a world of 
topped-off land fills, 'possessiveness' may not deserve the negative connotation 
often associated with 'materialism'" (Dawson and Bamossy 1990, p. 184).
Research by Wallendorf and Arnould (1988) and Rudmin (1988) suggests 
that Belk's materialism scales may be more appropriate for the United States than 
other cultures, especially those in developing nations. To remedy the situation, 
Belk sought to modify his scales to facilitate cross-cultural investigation of 
materialism (Ger and Belk 1990,1993). In the 1990 study, factor analysis of data 
from university students in the U.S. and Turkey, as well as students from 
England, France and Germany attending an international institution in France, 
yielded four factors. In addition to the three previously established factors of 
possessiveness, nongenerosity, and envy, a fourth, which came to be called 
"tangibility" emerged. Tangibility is defined as "the conversion of experience 
into material form. Taking pictures during a vacation, keeping souvenirs, and 
taking slides of places visited and showing them to friends are examples" (Ger 
and Belk 1990, p. 186). Ger and Belk (1990) report that even with the revised 
scales, the result is "more reliable in the United States and Europe than in 
Turkey" (p. 188). Within Turkey, reliabilities are higher for students from 
Istanbul than from the countryside, reflecting the penetration of Western 
products and communications in the more cosmopolitan areas of the country.
Ger and Belk (1990) conclude that the expression of materialism is not 
consistent across cultures. For example, Turkish students were the most 
materialistic overall, being the most possessive, envious and tangibilizing, but 
yet the most generous. U.S. students "placed" second on envy and, along with 
England and France, on tangibility. They also were the most nongenerous.
Among Europeans, German students were the least materialistic, scoring lowest 
on the envy, tangibility, and nongenerosity subscales.
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In more recent cross-cultural research, Ger and Belk (1993) once again 
modified the scale after a series of focus group discussions in thirteen countries. 
Among other changes, the tangibility subscale was renamed "preservation, "the 
conversion of experience into material form" (Ger and Belk 1993). As before, 
findings of materialism varied from one country to another as did the reliability 
of the scale. Ger and Belk (1993) suggest that it is not surprising that there are 
trade offs to be made in pursuit of a truly international scale, since meanings of 
materialism seem to differ among countries. They conclude that while "the basic 
dimensions [of materialism] are relatively similar" across cultures, the 
"particular events arousing the issues of concern, or behaviors or feelings 
underlying the dimensions" differ (p. 10). Specific results from this study are 
presented in Chapter Three when this revised scale, which is used for this study, 
is discussed.
Materialism and Attachment to Possessions
Ball and Tasaki (1992) hypothesize that there is a difference between 
materialism, which refers to the importance of possessions generally, and 
attachment, which is centered on specific possessions owned to develop and 
maintain one's self-concept. Referring to Belk's scales of possessiveness, 
nongenerosity, and envy, they suggest that none of these "imply that 
materialistic people should use possession for the purpose of maintaining a 
concept of self and nonmaterialistic people should not" (Ball and Tasaki 1992, p. 
160). Even though possessions are generally important to materialistic 
individuals, they are not expected to use all their possessions to support their self 
concept. And conversely, even nonmaterialists are expected to be attached to 
some of the things they own. Among their many hypotheses about attachment, 
the authors theorize that little relationship should be expected between
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materialism and attachment. In the study, the authors used 16 of Belk's 24 items 
and added four of their own. Item analysis of the group of twenty suggested that 
only 16 should be retained. Cronbach Alpha for the overall 16-item scale was .76, 
roughly similar to Alphas of .66, .73, and .68 obtained by Belk with his original 
scale. As expected, attachment does not correlate with materialism.
THE RICHINS AND DAWSON SCALE (1990,1992)
The initial Richins and Dawson scale was not reported until the 1989 
Association for Consumer Research conference. This early seven-item scale has 
been used in some research, but results have not been widely reported. Where it 
has been employed, however, the results have been favorable. For example, 
Othman (1989) reports superior results with this scale than with Belk's. Cole et al. 
(1992) report similar findings, detailed above.
More recently, Richins and Dawson (1992) have undertaken extensive scale 
development efforts to develop and test a valid, reliable materialism scale. Like 
Belk's, the revised scale is built on the assumption that materialism is a 
multidimensional construct and ought to be measured accordingly. A review of 
the literature as well as the results an eleven-person focus group generated an 
initial pool of items which was refined and factor analyzed. Consistent with their 
theorizing, three subscales emerged. They measure the centrality of acquisitions 
in a person's life, the extent to which happiness is defined by acquisitions, and 
the extent to which success is defined by acquisitions.
While specific information about scale reliability and validity are presented 
in Chapter Three, it should be noted here that the early findings are quite 
positive. With these results, one might reasonably conclude that the Richins and
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Dawson scale can confidently be adopted for further research.
Having addressed materialism, the discussion next turns to a consideration 
of the self, which is followed by a concluding section on materialism and the self.
THE SELF
In this section, the discuss turns to a consideration of the impact of 
materialism on a person's self identity, on selfhood. First, the term "self" is 
defined and then a brief history of how this definition of the self, in Western 
societies, came to be is presented. The historical discussion reveals that as culture 
changed, so did the concept of the self. Accordingly, the next topic is the role of 
culture in self definition. That discussion, in turn, provides a springboard for a 
more specific investigation of the role of possessions in self identity. Finally, the 
discussion turns to a consideration of materialism and the self. The relationship 
between materialism and each of four constructs is explored: self-esteem, 
self-actualization, intrinsic/extrinsic motivation, and self-monitoring. These 
relationships later form the basis for the research hypotheses for this study.
What Is the Self?
It is always appropriate to begin with an understanding of the 
terminology—in this case, the "self." In 1982 Sirgy reviewed the consumer 
behavior literature which addressed the "self" and found it to be "fragmented, 
incoherent, and highly diffuse." Worse, much of the research seemed not to be 
guided by theory, and measures of the self which were used often had no 
theoretical basis. These conclusions are not unique to the consumer behavior 
field. In 1974 and again in 1979, Wylie evaluated psychological and sociological
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studies of self-concept and self-esteem. She found that most of the self-concept 
measures "had been used only once or a few times, precluding evaluation of their 
adequacy and interpretation of the results of studies based on them" (Wylie 1989, 
p. 1). Further, of the fourteen instruments which had been subjected to more than 
one test, several were "judged to be seriously deficient [on psychometric criteria] 
and hence not to be recommended" (Wylie 1989, p. 1). In 1989, she again made a 
careful review of the more recent research in the two disciplines and came to the 
same dismal conclusions. After reviewing available literature on the reliability 
and convergent validity of various instruments, she was able to select only ten 
measures of the self-concept for recommendation (though two other measures 
under development also looked promising). The point here is that while there is 
a great deal of literature on the self, one must use caution in selecting from 
among it. Wylie herself explains that part of the problem "lies in the vague state 
of theorizing in the self-concept domain" (1989, p. 2), a problem not uncommon 
in social science research when we try to provide labels for processes which 
cannot be observed. As Cohen (1989) observes, labels are not explanations.
What is meant by the term "self"? Many researchers (c.f. Hill and Stamey 
1990; Johnson 1985; Richins 1991; Sirgy 1982) reference Rosenberg's (1979, p. 7) 
definition of the self-concept as the "totality of the individual's thoughts and 
feelings having reference to himself as an object." Within this framework, the self 
has often been treated as multidimensional. Belk (1988a) acknowledges that "the 
particular number o f ... levels of self is an open question—Rappaport (1981) 
suggests that there are four levels of self, Atkin (1981) seven, and Feldman (1979) 
11" (p. 152). For his own work, Belk (1988a) addresses four levels of the self, the 
individual (myself as my self), the family (myself as a member of my family), the 
community (myself as a community member), and the group (myself as a group 
member). The first of these is an individualistic conception of the self, the last
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three collectivistic conceptions. Freud, of course, identified three aspects, the ego, 
the id, and the super ego. Allport (1961) suggested eight categories of the self, 
ranging from the self as knower, to the self as a fighter for ends, to the self as a 
cognitive processor. Sirgy (1982) identifies three dimensions of the self as being 
common to many researchers: the actual self (how a person perceives 
him/herself), the ideal self (how a person would like to perceive him/herself), 
and the social self (how a person presents him/herself to others). In other 
research, Sirgy (1980) has added an additional dimension of the ideal social self 
(how a person would like to present him/herself to others). More recently, 
Greenwald (1988) has suggested four facets of the self: the diffuse self, the public 
self, the private self, and the collective self. And Greene and Geddes (1988) have 
suggested that researchers should consider the self as "modular" with different 
modules (or what they call "nodes") being activated, or brought to the front, in 
different situations. Finally Sampson (1978) suggested "location of identity" as a 
way to cut across the various levels, facets, and selves which had been proposed 
by other researchers. He suggested that some people define themselves more in 
terms of externally located characteristics, while others employ more internally 
located characteristics in self identity.
In another tradition, formed mainly by the phenomenological 
psychologists, the self is thought of as the nucleus of a more general conceptual 
system. Here, the self is often referred to as the "self-system." Proponents of this 
perspective are Lecky (1969), Snygg and Combs (1949), but the best known is 
Carl Rogers (1951,1961). Rogers' basic theory is that the individual is the center 
of a continually changing world of experience. For him, the self is "an organized, 
fluid, but consistent conceptual pattern of perceptions of characteristics and 
relationship of the T  or the 'm e/ together with values attached to these 
concepts" (1951, p. 498). All these theorists stress the unity of the self.
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The question arises, then, of which perspective to adopt, a unidimensional
or a multidimensional perspective? Gergen (1971) offers some rapprochement
between the two perspectives.
The way in which we talk about a person's concept or view of 
himself suggests that we largely think of the self in the singular....
Yet... if a person is asked to describe himself he will typically use a 
large number of different concepts.... Former President Lyndon 
Johnson once described himself as a "free man, an American, a 
United States Senator, a Democrat, a liberal, a conversative [sic], a 
Texan, a taxpayer, a rancher, and not as young as I used to be nor 
as old as I expect to be" (pp. 19 -  20).
Epstein (1980) continues with the thought that the "many selves are incorporated
into a unified overall self-system" (p. 119). Further, while the self aims at overall
consistency within the system, it never succeeds, for there will always be
contradictory elements. Epstein (1980) concludes, "The argument of whether
there is one self or there are many selves is, in a way, reminiscent of the older
argument of whether intelligence is general or specific. The answer turned out to
be that it is both" (p. 119).
Agreeing with Belk (1988a) that there is no agreement about the number of 
levels (or facets, or dimensions) of the self, this study will adopt a more global 
perspective suggested by Brewster Smith (1985) that most of these labels and 
conceptions are culture- and time-bound and may often reflect differences in 
disciplinary traditions and semantics rather than differences in concepts. He 
suggests that we might think of the "self" not as some concrete, substantive 
entity, but rather as the collection of the universal features of being a person. He 
cites reflexive self-awareness as both the primary feature of being human and 
that which warrants the term selfhood. He objects to terminology about the self 
which implies a "surgically or conceptually separable object of reference—other 
than the person." Actually, he also objects to the use of the word "self" in any way
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other to "treat it as synonymous with the person" (p. 61). It is in this light that 
Baumeister (1986,1987) is able to trace the history of "the self" from Medieval 
times to the present. It is in this tradition that Cushman (1990) can ponder "Why 
the Self Is Empty." In fact, the authors noted above who address various 
dimensions of the self begin and end their discussions with the more global 
references to the "self." It is this perspective which guides the work here. The 
investigation focuses on the materialist as a person, on materialism and selfhood.
What do we know, then, about the self? As Smith (1985) and others have 
said, the modern conception of selfhood is quite different from that of other eras. 
To pu t the discussion in perspective, a brief historical review of the self is 
presented next.
"How the Self Became a Problem" (Baumeister 1986,1987)
Believing that the self is a social construction and hence an artifact of the 
culture in which it is created, various authors have tracked changes in the 
concept of self over time and from one culture to another. The investigation has 
been conducted using historical records as well as literature. The presentation 
here is limited to a discussion of the self in Western societies. While different 
authors draw their lines of demarcation at different dates and events in history, 
what follows is an attempt to draw them all together using the historical eras 
proposed by Baumeister (1986,1987). The review begins with the early Greeks,6 
then moves to Medieval Europe, then the "early modern" times of the 16th 
through 18th centuries. From there the more recent history of the Puritans, the 
Romantic era of the late 18th and early 19th century, the Victorian period (mid
6The discussion begins with the Greek civilization since it was, as Durant (1939) so 
eloquently puts it, "the bright morning of that Western civilization which, with all its kindred 
faults, is our nourishment and our life" (p. 671). Owens (1959) also traces "the beginnings of 
Western philosophy in the genuine sense" to the Greeks (p. 5).
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and late 19th century), and then both the early and the late 20th century are 
addressed. What emerges from this journey is a recognition that our focus on the 
importance of the individual and on individual fulfillment (self-actualization) is 
a relatively recent phenomenon.
The Greeks. The discussion begins with a personal note. As a college 
student I took a number of courses on Greek history and literature. The professor 
often spoke about the Greek's psychology and their underdeveloped view of the 
self and self responsibility. Greek psychology explained the almost personal 
relationship the Greek heroes seemed to have with the gods. It also accounted for 
why there were so many gods. The early Greeks did not believe that an 
individual alone could accomplish much of anything. Whatever someone did, 
whether heroic or not, was accomplished with the aid and assistance of a god. 
Thus The Iliad begins with a feud between Achilles and Agamemnon, a quarrel 
which was not of their own making, but which was the "fault" of the god Apollo 
(Homer 1966). So also, one didn't get drunk, but rather Dionysus entered one's 
body! In reading about the self for this study, I once again came upon this 
concept—much to my delight, for I had not found any references to it, beyond 
class notes, since my college days. In discussing the stories of the Greek poets, 
Smith (1985) refers to the "constant intrusion" of the gods when some course of 
action was necessary. Morris (1972) agrees, citing the example of the Oedipus 
story in which the "personal character of Oedipus is really irrelevant to his 
misfortunes, which were decreed by fate irrespective of his own desires" (p. 4). 
Certainly the contemporary concept of self was not held by the Greeks.
Medieval Europe. Neither was it present in the late Medieval period when 
Christianity held sway and "self" was synonymous with "soul." Aries (1981) 
points out that in early Christian beliefs, salvation was collective. Weintraub 
(1978) provides further evidence of the collective conception of the self by noting
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that during the Middle Ages the only autobiography he could find was by 
Petrarch (in the 14th century). The thrust of Petrarch's work, however, was to 
compare himself with others and not to discover his own individuality. Medieval 
people had clear guidelines from the church about self-fulfillment—which was 
to work toward salvation. And it was the same for everyone. Further, the social 
hierarchy was fixed. Nisbet (1973) notes that beliefs in this regard were 
influenced by St. Augustine who wrote that God had assigned each person a 
fixed place in society. This belief, coupled with the lack of a sense of an inner self, 
led medieval people to equate the person with h is/her public, visible actions and 
appearances (Trilling 1971).
The Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries. By the 16th century, the 
beginnings of the modem era, a shift from a religious to a scientific view of the 
world had begun. People started believing in a separate self—but believed it to 
be hidden. Accordingly, they became obsessed with knowing the inner selves of 
others, with deception and pretense (Trilling 1971). One finds ample evidence of 
this interest in the plays of Shakespeare, which are rife with people not being 
whom they appear to be. During this time (from the 16th to the 18th centuries), 
Christianity began to lose its hold on society. According to MacIntyre (1981), 
morality was now just a set of rules, with no particular legitimatizing force 
behind it. Further, he suggests, the demise of traditional Christian morality 
brought with it an end to the view that a person was obligated to act according to 
his rank and station in life. With this increased social mobility, the implication for 
the self was that a person was "thought of as an individual prior to and apart 
from all roles" (MacIntyre 1981, p. 56). In examining the history of food, table 
manners, and household arrangements, Tuan (1982) notes that during this time 
individual chairs replaced benches for seating, mirrors were found in most
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households for the first time, and private spaces and rooms started to become 
features of houses.
The Puritans. With Puritanism, the interest in knowing about the inner self 
shifted to an interest in knowing about one's own inner self. The doctrine of 
predestination helped foster this interest. "Puritans became self-conscious to an 
unprecedented degree" as they tried to learn if they were one of "the Elect" 
(Baumeister 1987, p. 165). For the Puritans, self-fulfillment came from good, 
honest hard work, with success in work often being taken as a sign that one was 
a member of the elect (Weber 1958).
The Romantic Era. Moving to the Romantic era, the individual ascended in 
importance. Emphasis was placed on each person's uniqueness and individual 
destiny. Secular notions of self-fulfillment on earth replaced heavenly salvation. 
During this time "personality (rather than social rank or roles) came to be 
increasingly regarded as a, even the, central aspect of the self" (Baumeister 1987, 
p. 166). Literary evidence for this fascination is found in biographies which 
began to focus more on personal information. The lives of artists, who were 
thought to live particularly rich inner lives (Altick 1965), were a specific 
fascination. In this period, conflict between the individual and society also came 
to be a theme of literature and politics (Trilling 1950). "Beginning with Rousseau 
and continuing throughout the Romantic period, the forms of society were 
blamed for personal nonfulfillment" (Baumeister 1987, p. 169).
The Victorian Era. In the Victorian era, the hidden self once again was of 
great interest. "Habits of self-scrutiny ... combined with impossibly high moral 
standards, forced Victorians to become self-deceptive" (Baumeister 1987, p. 166). 
The Victorians were quite concerned that the inner self might be involuntarily 
revealed, so they always had to be on their guard. The self, while still individual, 
was perceived as "deep, secret, instinct-driven, and potentially dangerous"
52
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
(Cushman 1990, p. 600). In the U.S. near the middle of the 19th century, 
transcendentalism emerged as a dominant literary and philosophical theme. In 
this perspective, society was regarded as a necessary evil. One had to "to it 
alone" for self-fulfillment. Thoreau was perhaps the archetypal example. 
(Baumeister 1986,1987).
The Twentieth Century. By the early 20th century, however, alienation 
had become a dominant literary theme (Cushman 1990). The idea that a person 
could ever reach fulfillment in either this life or the next was rejected. These 
attitudes may have been produced, in part at least, by the industrial revolution. 
Baumeister (1987) explains that society was still viewed as blocking individual 
self-fulfillment. Industrialization had caused one's economic livelihood to be 
even more dependent on society, so that fulfillment independent of society, as 
the transcendentalists had advocated, was not feasible.
In more contemporary times, post World War n, emphasis still is placed on 
the individual, and self-actualization is almost a societal goal.7 However, some 
writers have lamented that the total immersion of the individual in society, 
especially in a consumer culture (e.g. Fox and Lears 1983; Fromm 1955,1976), 
may mean that the possibility for true individuality is vanishing. The 
"fragmented self" became a common term (c.f. Kilbourne 1987,1991; Lasch 1979; 
Leiss 1976). And Cushman (1990) laments that the modem self is "empty" 
because of a loss of a sense of community and tradition—a theme also found in 
Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1981), Rochberg-Halton (1986), and 
Halton (1992). Others, however, have suggested that people must find an 
accommodation with society (Klein 1964). Sampson (1988) reports that American 
society still remains committed to the idea of self-contained individualism as the
7
As an illustration of societal interest in the individual and the self, Blascovich and 
Tomaka (1991) note that the state of California established a Commission on Self-Esteem.
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way to realize personal freedom and independence, maintain socially
Q
responsible behavior, and allow people to achieve to the best of their potential.
Psychologists use the term "indigenous psychology" (Cushman 1990; 
Sampson 1988) when they speak of a particular culture's understanding of what 
is necessary to be truly human. What remains to be addressed, then, is a fuller 
consideration of culture's role in self identity.
Culture and the Self
Descartes was wrong (Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton 1981). The 
mind and the body are not separate entities. In fact, they are inextricably linked. 
How is it that we know our "self"? We know about our "self" through an 
inferential process. Thus, Descartes was also right—when he said that he knew 
he existed because he could perceive himself thinking. Kant opined that 
Descartes really could not have inferred his existence from observing that he was 
thinking because to make that observation, he first had to exist! Nonetheless, 
Descartes made a valuable contribution in suggesting that we know about 
ourselves by drawing inferences from empirical evidence.
Working with the idea of inference, Kant (1929) explained that we can 
never know our "real" self, our "noumenal self"—but that we can know our 
phenomenological self. That is, I know myself by perceiving my own acts of 
perception. My self is not something I come to know in isolation. I come to know 
of my self in relation to the world which I perceive. Knowledge of my self is 
mediated over time by physical cues in the world.
So, if we know ourselves through our perceptions, what do we know about
Q
Sampson (1988), himself, however, doubts that these goals can be achieved unless society 
returns to a more collective form of individualism, which he terms "ensembled individualism."
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ourselves? We return to Descartes for an answer. A contemporary of Descartes, 
Gassendi, took him to task for thinking that a person's mind could be thought of 
as pure rationality: "Tell me frankly, do you not derive the very sound you utter 
i n ... saying [I think, therefore 1 am] from the society in which you have lived? 
And, since the sounds you utter are derived from intercourse with other men, are 
not the meanings of sounds derived from the same source?" (Mumford 1970, p. 
82). The answer to the question of what we know of ourselves is that we know of 
ourselves from our world and from our culture.
The culture in which we are raised sets the guidelines and parameters for 
our knowledge and our interest. What we know of our selves and of others is a 
constructive enterprise (e.g., Berger and Luckman 1967), constructed by the 
people and institutions of the culture in which we live. As one anthropologist 
points out, "Man can be characterized as an obsessive creator of meaning 
systems" (Barley 1989, p. 41). One of the meaning systems we create is our 
"selves."
As has been discussed, the notion of the uniqueness of each individual is a 
rather recent concept in the Western world. In the not too distant past, people's 
identify was tied to the groups to which they belonged. Identity was ascribed, 
being based on inherited position (Belk 1984; Csikszentmihalyi and 
Rochberg-Halton 1981; Dittmar 1992). The rationale for the "tyranny" of the 
group is explained by Douglas and Isherwood (1979). When groups, such as the 
church and government, held the power, they could lay claim to taking the long 
view for the benefit of society (and for the benefit of the particular organization). 
Any single individual simply was incapable of making this same claim since 
individual lives are much shorter than institutional "lives." Accordingly, 
consumption could be proscribed to be carried out by and on behalf of the 
organization or group instead of the individual. Individual consumption was,
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thereby, held to a minimum. Because consumption options were so restricted, 
objects were relatively unavailable for helping to define the individual self. In 
more recent times, however, when self identify is achieved, people came to be 
defined by what they have instead of their kinship (Dittmar 1992). Objects 
became important to persons for more than their functional uses.
What then is the relationship between the self and possessions? Perhaps the
most widely quoted (c.f. Baumeister 1986,1987; Belk 1988a; Csikszentmihalyi
and Rochberg-Halton 1981; Dittmar 1992; Lunt and Livingstone 1993; Rochberg-
Halton 1986) description of this relationship is provided by William James.
The Empirical Self of each of us is all that he is tempted to call... me.
But it is clear that between what a man calls me and what he simply 
calls mine the line is difficult to draw. We feel and act about certain 
things that are ours very much as we feel and act about ourselves 
.... In its widest possible sense, however, a man's Self is the sum total of 
what he CAN call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but 
his clothes and his house,... his reputation and works, his lands 
and horses, and yacht and bank account.... If they wax and prosper, 
he feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels cast 
down. (1890/1981, p. 279 -  280, emphases in the original).
James draws the link not only between the self and possessions, but also the
link between evaluation of the self and possessions. The same position has been
articulated more recently by Tuan (1980) who suggests that our "fragile sense of
self needs support, and this we get by having and possessing things because, to a
large degree, we are what we have and possess" (p. 472). This idea of the
symbolic use of objects, of course, is not new with James or Tuan. As
Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1981) point out, anthropologists have
"accumulated incredibly detailed descriptions of the symbolic use of objects in a
variety of cultures" (p. 26). Wallendorf and Arnould (1988) would concur.
[T]he research in ownership in a number of fields leads us to 
contend that attachment to objects as symbols of security, as
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expressions of self-concept, and as signs of one's connection to or 
differentiation from other members of society is a usual and 
culturally universal function of consumption.... Although the 
meaning of self differs cross-culturally and varies in its link with 
individualism (Hsu 1985), the fact that these conceptions of self are 
expressed to some degree through objects seems to be universal (p. 532).
From a study of the meaning of possessions, Furby (1991) reports much the 
same conclusion. The research spanned three cultures and involved 
developmental interviews with people of five age levels in each culture. Two 
basic themes emerged. The first was that possessions were "linked to the 
experience of efficacy and a sense of personal control." The other "was an 
association between possessions and one's sense of self. Both the meaning of, and 
the motivation for, possession was frequently related to one's self concept" (1991, 
p. 459).
Yet another researcher reports similar findings.
Writings throughout the last century suggest that possessions play 
an important role in people's lives.... One of the recurrent themes in 
this literature is the notion of the relation between possessions and 
the self. These writings collectively suggest that personal 
possessions come to be symbols of, embodiments of, and 
indistinguishable from the self of the owner (Kamptner 1991, p.
210).
Anthropologists have well documented this link between possessions and 
the self in traditional societies. For example Beaglehole (1932) explained that 
possessions were thought to be imbued with the owner's spirit. To prevent 
contamination by the selves of others, possessions were not touched by other 
people and were often buried with the owner. The link was often made more 
obvious, and more public, by licking new possessions, by claiming ownership of 
objects by touching them or shedding blood on them.
The link is still with us today, as suggested by Barley, a British 
anthropologist who undertook an ethnographic study of his own country. He
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makes the point that "it is, curiously, in the Western cultures, where people make 
very few of the things they own, that we nevertheless expect to be able to draw 
inferences about owners from their possessions.... We expect to be able to tell a 
great deal about the internal states of people by their faces, their clothes, the way 
they talk" (1989, p. 41 -42).
What then can we say about the role of possessions in defining the self? 
Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1981) suggest that possessions help to 
express qualities of the self, provide signs of status, serve as symbols of social 
integration, and assist with socialization. Belk (1988a) develops a similar list. He 
says that possessions help provide a sense of self, help distinguish our self from 
others and from our environment, manage our identities, and help achieve a 
sense of self continuity. For these researchers, as well as for the others cited here, 
possessions fulfill these and many other functions. The common thread which 
binds them all together is the idea that possessions help provide meaning in our 
lives by being "objective manifestations of the self" (Belk 1988a, p. 159). How 
this association develops is considered next. Theoretical concerns are presented 
first, and then empirical evidence for the role of possessions in self definition is 
reviewed.
Possessions as Means of Acquiring and Expressing Identity
"We derive our self-concept from objects" (Wallendorf and Arnould 1988, 
p. 531). That is, we use possessions to say to others as well as to ourselves who 
we are (Belk 1988a; Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton 1981; Levy 1981; 
McCracken 1986,1988; Rook 1985). Because of this function of goods, Douglas 
and Isherwood (1979) contend that goods themselves are neutral, but their uses 
are social; they may be used as fences or bridges. Csikszentmihalyi and 
Rochberg-Halton (1981) make much the same point suggesting that while the
5 8
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term "materialism conjures up images of crass self-centeredness, of mindless 
consumers buying needless things and devoting their lives to a shallow quest for 
the acquisition of money and possessions that will serve as status symbols,... it is 
also apparent that goods can serve the 'common good.' Indeed, they are essential 
to it" because of their role in fashioning and communicating identity (p. 231).
Dittmar (1992) expands the idea by suggesting that the relationship of
interest is not just between an individual and his/her possessions, but is a triadic
relationship among the individual, the object (possession), and the other.9 We
cannot use goods as an expression of our identity unless there is someone else
out there to acknowledge the expression. Mead (1934) sets forth the argument for
the importance of shared underlying conceptions of material possessions.
If we say, "This is my property, I shall control it," that affirmation 
calls out a certain set of responses which must be the same in any 
community in which property exists. It involves an organised 
attitude ... which is common to all members of the community....
The man is appealing to his rights because he is able to take the 
attitude which everybody else in the group has with reference to 
property, thus arousing in himself the attitude of others (p. 161 -  
162).
From a consumer behavior product-oriented perspective Hirschman (1981) 
suggests much the same thing, "consumers... must have in common a shared 
conception of the product's symbolic meaning. For example, driving a 'prestige' 
automobile will not serve as an effective symbol of one's social status unless 
others... share the driver's belief that the automobile is indeed, prestigious" (p. 5). 
Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1981) also support the triangular
O
Roberts and Dant (1991) offer an alternative perspective in their conception of a "personal 
fund" of resources which consumers allocate only to themselves. They suggest that some 
personal rituals and behaviors are for oneself exclusively and have no real social goal or outcome, 
such as reading a mystery novel. Their focus seems to be on behaviors, however, rather than 
goods.
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relationship when they declare that "information about the self is not released 
through direct interaction between person and object but, instead, is mediated by 
the opinions of others" (p. 141).
Implicit in this view is the notion that possessions are a means of 
communication. Via possessions we communicate to ourselves and to others who 
we are, who we hope we are, and who we hope to become. This communicative 
role of goods is possible, of course, only because of a socially shared sense of 
meaning. Douglas and Isherwood (1979) conceive of goods being both the 
hardware and software of the social information system (p. 72). Because goods 
are the markers of cultural categories (see also McCracken 1986), they are an 
integral part of a live information system. The essential function of consumption, 
then, is its capacity to make sense of the world for us. In a sense, consumption is 
joint production, with our fellow consumers, of meaning, of values, of our 
universe (Douglas and Isherwood 1979, p. 4,5,10,59-60,62,67).
Belk (1988a) extends these ideas with the thought that we not only use 
possessions to define ourselves, but that possessions can themselves alter our 
identity. This position was anticipated by Csikszentmihalyi and 
Rochberg-Halton. "In all cases where actual physical objects become associated 
with a particular quality of the self, it is difficult to know how far the thing 
simply reflects an already existing trait and to what extent it anticipates, or even 
generates, a previous nonexistent quality" (1981, p. 28). For example, feeling 
sophisticated when we get dressed up is a perception engendered more by the 
clothes we are wearing than by ourselves. An extension of this idea of presented 
by Schouten (1991) in his study of women and cosmetic surgery. He concludes 
that the surgery is symbolic consumption which people use to restore, repair, 
and in other ways deal with an unsatisfying self-concept.
Goods not only help define who we are, but also help differentiate us from
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others—thereby establishing us as a unique individual. (Though, of course, there 
is an integrating aspect to this differentiation since other people are still required 
to acknowledge the differentiation (Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton 
1981).) Wallendorf and Amould (1988) found that people's favorite things 
enhanced self-expression and helped not only to differentiate the individual 
from society but also to integrate the individual within society.
On the other hand, we may use goods to signal, consciously or not, our 
association with a membership or aspirational group. Belk (1988a) provides a 
variety of examples to illustrate this point. By wearing Brooks Brothers suits and 
by decorating our house with antiques and /or antique reproduction furniture, 
we are saying to the world that we are a certain kind of person. Belk refers to 
research by Weisner and Weibel (1981) which demonstrates that families with 
different lifestyles and from different social classes live in different kinds of 
houses which are decorated in different styles.
This social construction of the self, to borrow a phrase from Berger and 
Luckman (1967), is true even of people who have few possessions. Hill and 
Stamey (1990) found that homeless people often dealt with the socially negative 
connotations of their condition by defining themselves as resourceful individuals 
who could live by their own abilities and did not need welfare or the help of 
social services. The meaning of "home" also is altered by the homeless. 
Additionally they found that these individuals often engage in meaningful work 
to bolster their self-concept. For example, many are involved in recycling and 
scavenging activities which they perceive to be beneficial not only for themselves 
but to society as well. Thus the homeless use the meanings of their own 
subculture to build and reinforce their identities.
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Studies Investigating the Role of Possessions in our Lives
The evidence presented in this discussion of material objects and 
self-identity is extended by several studies which have specifically investigated 
the relationship.
General. Two studies, conducted with adults, have empirically 
investigated this relationship between possessions and the self. The earlier is 
reported by Prelinger (1959). In this study people were given a list of 160 items 
from eight different categories. Respondents were asked to rate each item on 
scale of 0 to 3 depending on the extent to which the item was "definitely a part of 
your own self." Of the eight categories, possessions were ranked fourth 
highest—though of non-body items, they were rated first. Body parts were 
considered closest to one's self (mean = 2.98), body-internal processes were next 
closest (mean=2.46), personally identifying characteristics such as age or name 
were next (mean=2.22), and then possessions and productions were rated 
(mean=1.57). Abstract ideas, other people, objects in the close physical 
environment, and the distant physical environment comprised the remaining 
categories in order of closeness to the self. In the second study, after repeatedly 
asking, "Who are you?" Gordon (1968) found that people often named material 
objects and possessions as elements of their selves.
Children and possessions. Some have turned to studies of children and 
possessions to bolster the theory that material objects are considered part of our 
selves. For example, in a longitudinal study in the UK of children, Newson and 
Newson (1976) conclude that having their own personal possessions was 
important for children to develop a sense of self. "A child's personal possessions, 
including first of all his name and his memories, but extending to the material 
objects that he can touch and hold and know to be his, establish him in his own 
identity and confirm him as a person in his own right" (p. 128).
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Furby's studies of possessions reach similar conclusions. For example, 
Furby and Wilke (1982) report that more than 70 percent of the six-month old 
children studied had preferences for a specific object, even if they did not view it 
as separate from themselves.10 Furby (1980) hypothesizes that since every society 
tries to protect objects from the potentially destructive actions of children, 
children, to assert themselves, come to identify particularly with the objects to 
which they are allowed access. Accordingly, "possessions and self become 
intimately related" (p. 35). Furby concludes that "if the toddler were given 
unlimited access to everything, then the whole story might be different" (p. 36).
Not only are possessions inextricably part of our selves from the very 
beginning of life, they continue to be an important part of our self definition near 
the end of our lives as well.
Possessions and aging. While several studies (Belk 1985; Csikszentmihalyi 
and Rochberg-Halton 1981; Kamptner 1991) have demonstrated that the types of 
possessions we are attached to and which we treasure change as we age, 
possessions are still important for maintaining a dignified sense of self. For 
example, Sherman and Newman (1977) report that when elderly people enter a 
nursing home, they may bring with them a favorite object or two to compensate 
for a feeling of a loss of status. They also report that elderly people who have 
cherished possessions, regardless of where they are living, are happier than those 
who do not. Dittmar (1992) hypothesizes that possessions may become 
especially important to the elderly who tend to lose other identity markers. For 
example, being retired, no longer being a full-time parent, and perhaps being 
less active in various organizations and groups, the elderly lose the forms of
10These objects, such as a blanket, a diaper, or a pillow, really serve as "part-self objects." 
That is, "although the object may be an extension of the se lf..., it is nevertheless not yet a 
complete and autonomous object for the child" (Gulerce 1991, p. 194).
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identity which they had in earlier years. Possessions, however, remain to 
reaffirm who they are. Along the same lines, McCracken (1987) reports that when 
people who enter a nursing home are forced to give up their possessions, their 
sense of identity tends to be eroded. Dittmar (1992) concurs, saying that in such 
situations, possessions help people maintain a sense of control and of social 
status.
Finally, Unruh (1983) extends the importance of possessions as a marker 
reporting that people like to leave some of their treasured possessions to their 
heirs as a means of preserving their identity "beyond the grave." Alternatively, 
some people desire to have special possessions buried with them. From a survey 
of morticians about contemporary grave goods, Elliott (1990) reports that 
possessions ranging from "typical items" such crucifixes, photographs, and 
jewelry to "unusual" items such as tennis rackets, golf clubs, and a set of 
wrenches have been buried with their owners. When asked for reasons why 
possessions were buried with a loved one, morticians responded that, among 
other reasons, people wanted to express who the deceased was and "to show 
how the person was different in life" (p. 610).
It is not just the elderly, however, who do not function well when their 
possessions are taken from them. This phenomenon seems to be common to 
people of all ages.
The self and loss of possessions. Dittmar (1992) explains the theory here. 
"If material possessions are constitutive parts of self, it follows that their 
unintentional loss should be experienced as a lessening of self" (p. 46). Fromm's 
(1976) expression of the point is more biting. "If I am what I have and i f  what I have 
is lost, who then am I? Nobody but a defeated, deflated, pathetic testimony to a 
wrong way of living" (pp. 96 -  97). Sometimes personal possessions are taken 
from people for the express purpose of lessening any sense of self uniqueness, as
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in the military. At other times the loss of personal possessions is less voluntary, 
as when someone is the victim of burglary or natural disasters. Both situations 
are discussed next.
Goffman (1959,1961) discusses the "stripping" process which occurs when 
people are institutionalized—in prisons, mental hospitals, boarding schools, 
monasteries, the military and the like. Everything personal is taken from the 
individuals involved. Then, they are dressed like everyone else, given the same 
living arrangements and the same possessions. The sense of an individual self, 
different from others, is stripped away. In its place, a sense of group identify is 
created by providing each person with a kind of standard identity kit (Belk 
1988a). Accordingly, soldiers, boarding school students, and inmates wear 
uniforms which identify them as members of the group but separate them from 
people outside the institution. In a similar vein, Hill (1991) studied the lives of 
otherwise homeless women who were living in a shelter. He found that because 
the Sisters of Mercy who ran the shelter determined what possessions the women 
could acquire and keep, the women exhibited some of the same characteristics of 
the groups of people just described who had been "stripped" of their 
possessions.
A less voluntary loss of of possessions occurs when a person is robbed or 
when a natural disaster destroys home and possessions. Several studies of 
burglary victims (c.f. Brown and Harris 1989; Paap 1981; Van den Bogaard and 
Wiegman 1991) report that people feel a sense of loss because of the stolen 
possessions, but they also feel as if they have been violated and a part of their 
selves has been taken away. In her study of police response to burglary, Stenross 
(1984) found that police are more diligent in pursuing crimes when certain kinds 
of possessions have been stolen jewelry and sentimental items). She suggests 
that the police recognize that people suffer greater distress when possessions
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"typically regarded as markers of the self" have been lost (1984, p. 389).
The same seems to be true when possessions are lost because of a fire, 
flood, or other natural disaster. Erickson (1976) reports that people who lost 
possessions because of a flood actually mourned that loss. McLeod (1984) found 
the same to be true of people whose possessions were lost in a mudslide. Belk 
(1988a) reports his own experiences with flood victims, saying that even six 
weeks after the disaster, people could not talk about the event and were still "in 
the early stages of grief," (p. 142).
In a commentary on Belk's article, "The Extended Self," Cohen (1989) 
objects to the conclusion that emotional response to a loss of possessions is due to 
a "diminution of self" (p. 127). The emotional trauma might be explained by 
other factors, he suggests, such as the loss of ability to provide for one's family, 
to a loss of trust in institutions (which perhaps did not protect home and 
possessions). Belk (1989a) does not respond to this specific argument in his reply. 
One might respond for him, that while possessions are linked with self identity, 
that position in no way excludes self identity being defined in other ways as well, 
such as thinking of oneself as a good provider. So, when Cohen objects that the 
emotions resulting from a loss might really reflect a sense of loss of abilities, it is 
still the sense of self which is diminished. Further, since possessions help define 
the self because of the meanings they carry, then house and property certainly 
can be taken for a material sign of one's ability to provide for one's family. And 
that ability certainly can be part of one's self concept. It is not a very great leap to 
see that when the symbols of that ability are lost, the individual would feel some 
loss of self as well, whether one thinks he is mourning the loss of the material 
possessions or the loss of the meaning they carried.
A similar involuntary loss is the loss of one's job. Yet even when one's 
income is reduced, people still often try to continue the consumption of visible
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symbols of identity. For example, Richins and Dawson (1992) report the case of a 
30-year-old woman who refused to sell her Mercedes and mink coat even after 
her condominium was repossessed because the "loss in image and self-esteem 
would be too great" (p. 303). Similarly, in a study of steel workers who had been 
laid off, Roberts (1991) found that many continued to purchase visible products 
such as cars, trucks, vans, and horses, while they cut back on the types of food 
they ate and on entertainment.
It should be clear now that possessions play an important role in defining 
and communicating about the self. As Ball and Tasaki (1992) point out, however, 
that knowledge is not enough, since both materialistic and nonmaterialistic 
people use possessions to maintain a concept of self. The focus of this study is 
not the relationship between consumption and the self, but rather the more 
narrow topic of materialism and the self. That is the topic of the next section.
MATERIALISM AND THE SELF
The many researchers noted above would agree with Csikszentmihalyi and
Rochberg-Halton (1981, p. ix) that the transactions between people and things is
central to the human condition. In fact Douglas and Isherwood's (1979) basic
thesis was that we should view consumption as properly belonging to the social
process and to recognize that goods contribute to a rational life by providing,
along with language and gesture, the channels of communication within a
culture. If goods then are not "bad," where does that leave materialism? It may
be useful to return to the definition of materialism which guides this study.
Materialism reflects the importance a consumer attaches to worldly 
possessions. At the highest levels of materialism, such possessions 
assume a central place in a person's life and are believed to provide
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the greatest sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction in life (Belk 
1984, p. 291).
With this definition, a materialist is one who goes beyond using
possessions in the service of self identity, beyond using possessions for the
meaning they convey about one's self to oneself and to others. Instead of
focusing on the communicative role of the possessions, the materialist focuses
solely on the possessions. In so doing, the materialist is cut off from engaging in
other activities. Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1981) draw this
distinction quite clearly when they suggest that
[i]f things attract our attention excessively, there is not enough 
psychic energy left to cultivate the interaction with the rest of the 
world. The danger of focusing attention exclusively on a goal of 
physical consumption—or materialism—is that one does not attend 
enough to the cultivation of the self, to the relationship with others, 
or to the broader purposes that affect life (p. 53).
Their position is similar to that proposed by the economist Linder (1970). He
suggested that acquiring and maintaining objects can easily fill up a person's
time to the point that there is no time left even to use and enjoy the things one
acquires. When that stage is reached, Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton
suggest that "the adaptive value of objects is reversed.... The former tool turns its
master into a slave" (1981, p. 53). Belk (1988a) himself makes much the same
point when he discusses pets as part of the extended self. "Although pets, like
other objects that become part of the extended self, may be beneficial, they can
also become harmful fetishes if too much of one's self and one's world is invested
in them" (p. 156).
If this is true, then we need to know what the materialistic self is like. Belk 
and Richins and Dawson have developed scales to measure whether or not one is 
a materialist and have investigated correlations between materialism and life 
satisfaction. Other researchers have studied differences in materialism based on
68
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
gender, whether one is an expatriate or not, etc. But to date, no one has looked at 
the self of a materialist. Richins and Dawson (1992) call for further investigation 
of the self in this light. Dittmar (1992) explains the impact of such study is 
nothing less than "imperative for a more complete understanding of the 
consequences of our Western materialist, consumption-dominated societies" (p. 
17).
For purposes of this study, four aspects of the self have been selected for 
study, self-esteem, self-actualization, self-monitoring, and intrinsic motivation. 
The rationale for these selections is addressed next.
Self-Esteem and Materialism
Self-esteem is often used as a global measure of self-worth. This 
perspective is strongly influenced by Rosenberg (1979) who defines a person 
having high self-esteem as an individual who considers himself to be a "person 
of worth," who "appreciates his own merits" yet "recognizes his faults" (p. 54). A 
person with low self-esteem, on the other hand, "lacks respect for himself, 
considers himself unworthy, inadequate, or otherwise seriously deficient as a 
person" (p. 54).
Possessions and their meanings are available not only for describing who 
we are, but also for evaluating ourselves. Allport (1937) explains that we develop 
our identity, and hence gain self-esteem, in part, by acquiring a continuously 
expanding set of possessions which we regard as our own. Gecas (1982) and 
Scheier and Carver (1980) take the idea one step further by suggesting that a 
distinction can be drawn between self-conceptions (identities) and 
self-evaluations (such as self-esteem). According to Gecas (1982), "Identity 
focuses on the meanings comprising the self as an object, gives structure and 
content to the self-concept, and anchors the self to social systems. Self-esteem deals
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with the evaluative and emotional dimensions of the self-concept" (emphasis 
added) (p. 4). Material possessions, then, serve as symbolic extensions of the self 
as well as concrete representations of self worth.
In fact, one of the common themes to emerge from Ger and Belk's (1993) 
focus group interviews in several countries was that materialists use possessions 
to improve their self-esteem. The irony is that in focusing just on possessions, 
materialists are, in effect, taking themselves out of the social system. This leaves 
them with only goods for determining self-esteem. Relationships and 
connections with others have effectively been shut out. This conclusion is 
supported by the research of Richins and Dawson (1992) in validating their scale. 
Using Kahle's (1983) List of Values, they found that people who scored high on 
materialism were more likely to value "financial security" and less likely to value 
"warm relationships with others" than those who scored low.
Not only have materialists shut themselves off from alternative means of 
evaluating themselves, but they have selected an evaluative yardstick which is 
flawed. As McCracken (1986,1988) and others (Brickman and Campbell 1971; 
Fromm 1976; Lasch 1979; Leiss 1976; Lunt and Livingstone 1992; Wachtel 1983) 
have pointed out, a life focused solely on possessions ultimately will be 
unsatisfying because there will always be something new (and/or more) to 
acquire. Further, the categories of goods which signal success are always shifting. 
Hence, if self-esteem is assessed as James (1890/1981) proposed, as a ratio of 
successes to expectations, self-esteem is likely to be lower for materialists than 
for non-materialists because, for materialists, the ante is always being raised.
Bond (1992) reaches the same conclusion, but for a different reason. He 
theorizes that self-esteem should be lower for materialists since evaluations of 
self-worth are based on what they own and not what kind of person they are or 
what kind of life they have led. He argues that while material possessions can be
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important contributors to feelings of well-being, possessions alone are not 
sufficient no matter how many one has.11 Bond offers friendship, mutual 
affection, and striving to do something worthwhile—beyond simply striving for 
pleasure and wealth accumulation—as necessary ingredients for self-esteem.
That people use possessions to try to enhance self-esteem has been the 
subject of several research projects. Wicklund and Gollwitzer's (1982) study of 
symbolic self completion found that when collectors' self-esteem was low, they 
bolstered it by adding objects to their collection. Dawson and Bamossy (1991) 
found that one characteristic of successful expatriates was high self-esteem 
which allowed these individuals to detach from their "old" possessions when 
they moved to a new job in a different country. Along the same lines, Ertel et al. 
(1971, quoted in Dittmar 1992) demonstrated that when participants' self-esteem 
was experimentally lowered, they used valued objects to bolster their 
self-esteem. Beggan (1991) reports that to counter negative implications of 
failure, people used personal property to enhance feelings of self-worth. Finally, 
Jackson (1979) found that feelings of self-esteem were related to a ratio of 
possessions wanted to possessions actually owned. The point here is that when a 
sense of accomplishment, a sense of success can only—or primarily—be 
measured by outward, tangible signs (such as driving status automobile) instead 
of coming from an inner sense of having done well, satisfaction is unlikely, and 
so self-esteem is likely to suffer. This conclusion is supported by one of Richins 
and Dawson's studies (1992). For people in a large western city, the correlation 
between high scores on the materialism scale and high scores on the Rosenberg 
(1965) self-esteem scale were negative and statistically significant.
am reminded of the bumper sticker, "He who dies with the most toys wins." Bond 
might respond that "he" may be the winner, but "he" will not have had a life filled with a sense 
of well-being. Bond might find the bumper stickers and tee shirts which proclaim, "He who dies 
with the most toys still dies" or "The best things in life aren't things," more to his liking.
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Not only does self-esteem suffer when one is a materialist, but one is less 
likely to achieve self-actualization.
Self-Actualization and Materialism
While the term "self-actualization" was originated by the psychologist
Goldstein (Maslow 1950), the term is closely connected with the writings and
ideas of Abraham Maslow, who "did more to popularize it than any other single
individual" (Welch, Tate, and Medieros 1987, p. ix). Maslow's own definition of
the concept is as follows:
self-actualization (SA), as yet a difficult syndrome to describe 
accurately,... may be loosely described as the full use and 
exploitation of talents, capacities, potentialities, etc. Such people 
seem to be ... doing the best that they are capable of doing.... This 
connotes also either gratification past or present of the basic 
emotional needs for safety, belongingness, love, respect, and 
self-respect, and of the cognitive needs for knowledge and for 
understanding (1950, p. 12).
Researchers in the field acknowledge the difficulty even today of "pinning 
down" the concept. For example, after reviewing the writings of several authors, 
Crandall and Jones (1991) conclude that "there is still conceptual 'fuzziness' 
about what self-actualization is" (p. 340). And Weiss (1991) complains that 
self-actualization theory "appears to be in fragments with many seeming 
incongruous versions" (p. 268).
Nevertheless, definitions offered by others are consistent with Maslow's 
initial conceptualization. For example, according to Shostrom (1976), author of 
two of the most widely used tests for self-actualization (Flett et al. 1991), the term 
refers to
an active process of being and becoming increasingly 
inner-directed and integrated at the levels of thinking, feeling, and 
bodily response. It is, therefore not an end point, but a process of
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moving from normal manipulation toward growth, development, 
and the unfolding of human potential.
The Encyclopedic Dictionary of Psychology (Harre & Lamb, 1983, p. 559)
offers a similar definition. "The inherent tendency towards self-fulfilment,
self-expression and the attainment of autonomy from external forces. It is a
process rather than an end state." It is the ideas contained in these definitions
which are adopted for this research.
Even with these definitional difficulties, self-actualization remains an
important contemporary concept. Baumeister (1986) opines that
"self-actualization has become increasingly accepted by the general society as a
legitimate and important aspect of life" (p. 163). However, the relationship
between possessions and self-actualization is not a simple one. Csikszentmihalyi
and Rochberg-Halton (1981) explain that if possessions reflect nothing more than
ties with other people then we are unlikely to develop as individuals, and, hence,
not become self-actualized.12 At the other extreme, however, if we are not in
possession of our self, if we are "possessed" by objects, then neither are we free
to develop ourselves. This understanding of the lack of self development
resulting from either not focusing enough or focusing too much on goods is also
argued by Maslow.
The neurotic organism is one that lacks basic need satisfactions that 
can come only from other people. It is therefore more dependent on 
other people and is less autonomous and self-determined, i. e., 
more shaped by the nature of the environment and less shaped by 
its own intrinsic nature. Such relative independence of 
environment as is found in the healthy person does not of course, 
mean lack of commerce with it; it means only that in these contacts
12Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1981) explain that "most traditional peoples 
have emphasized the integrated or social self at the expense of personal uniqueness, whereas 
modem Western culture has tneded to stress the differentiated, uniquely individual self. Thus 
runaway fragmentationis more of anactual possiblity in our own culture" (p. 40).
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the person's ends and his own nature are the primary determinants, 
and that the environment is primarily a means to the person's 
self-actualizing ends" (1970, p. 68).
Thus, it is true that people need goods for self definition and to differentiate 
them from other people. Yet an over-emphasis on goods to the exclusion of all 
else is equally as bad. In support of this idea, Richins and Dawson (1992) found 
that people scoring high on the materialism scale were less satisfied with their 
income or standard of living and with life as a whole. They tended to be more 
envious, as evidenced by a strong correlation between high scores on the Richins 
and Dawson materialism scale and high scores on Belk's (1984,1985) envy 
sub-scale.
As Maslow (quoted above) suggests, the individual who is not becoming 
self-actualized is overly-dependent on other people. Rochberg-Halton (1986) 
draws the link among this dependence, becoming self-actualized, and 
materialism. "Those who pursue [materialism] most fervently have a goal of 
becoming a pure individual, yet they can never satisfactorily attain this goal 
because they are always dependent upon other people to appreciate their 
individuality and give them the status they so desperately want" (p. 181). This 
idea of an external instead of an internal focus leads to the next discussion of 
materialism and intrinsic/extrinsic motivation.
Intrinsic/Extrinsic Motivation and Materialism
Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation have been defined in a number of ways. 
The discussion here begins with a brief review. One of the most often quoted 
sources in intrinsic motivation, Deci, has provided a variety of definitions. In 
1972 he stated that intrinsic motivation referred to performing some activity 
solely for the pleasure of the activity. In 1973 he suggested that intrinsic 
motivation referred to engaging in behavior which is itself rewarding. He
74
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
provided a more expansive definition in 1980: a person's striving to be effective 
and competent when dealing with his/her environment (1980, p. 50). In 1985 he 
added the concepts of interest and emotion (Deci and Ryan 1985). These ideas are 
further explained below.
In addition to Deci's work, however, others have proposed definitions 
which are generally consistent, though the focus for the motivation is sometimes 
placed on the individual and sometimes on the task. For example, Florey (1969) 
said that a person is intrinsically motivated if he or she experiences pleasure and 
satisfaction with the activity itself. Similarly, McReynolds (1971) suggested that 
intrinsically motivated behaviors are those which are in themselves inherently 
appealing. Csikszentmihalyi (1975) offered that intrinsically motivated activities 
are those which are enjoyable in themselves, and for which the reward is the 
ongoing experience of enjoying the activity.
These conceptions of intrinsically motivated activity are contrasted with 
that which is extrinsically motivated. For example, McReynolds (1971) defines 
extrinsically motivated behavior as being focused on the end result and not the 
process. Koch (1956) describes extrinsic motivation as working or striving or 
doing something in order to reach a particular reward. And DeCharms (1968) 
refers to externally motivated individuals as "pawns," since they are dependent 
on others for their rewards.
In summary, then, we might agree with Mayo (1976) that intrinsic 
motivation is "derived from an interest inherent in the task performance itself"
(p. 1), while extrinsic motivation is aimed at seeking a reward (or interest) 
outside the task or experience itself. This idea of interest in the task is not unique 
to Mayo. Deci and Ryan (1985) report that "when intrinsically motivated, one 
follows one's interests" (p. 12). Additionally, enjoyment and excitement are 
emotions which accompany intrinsically motivated behavior and which
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represent the "rewards" of the behavior—though they are not rewards which are 
separate from the activity itself (Deci and Ryan 1985). With extrinsic motivation, 
on the other hand, the reward is beyond the activity or task; it may be social 
approval, money, or some material object. The enjoyment is not inherent in the 
activity, rather the enjoyment is in the reward.
Before proceeding further, the distinction between intrinsic/extrinsic 
motivation and locus of control should be made clear. According to Rotter (1966), 
who developed the construct, locus of control refers to the degree to which 
individuals judge the reinforcements they receive to be the result of their own 
efforts (or attributes) or the result of external forces (luck, fate, the actions of 
others). The former judgement is termed internal locus of control, the latter, 
external locus. While there are similarities between the locus and 
intrinsic/extrinsic motivation constructs, they are not the same. There may, 
however, be some similarities in the behavior of external locus individuals and 
individuals prone to extrinsic motivation. That is, these individuals would be 
expected to "possess the other-based reference system associated with high 
levels of materialism" (Hunt et al. 1990, p. 1102). In fact, Hunt et al. did find 
modest support for the link between materialism and locus of control.
Materialism and extrinsic motivation should also be linked. The materialist 
is concerned with owning and doing the "right things," for it is possessions 
(broadly construed) which help define success and happiness. Further, the 
materialist is dependent on the approbation of others for these feelings of success 
and happiness. The possessions (or club memberships) are not rewarding in and 
of themselves. Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1981) provide an 
example of this distinction. They talk about valuing a painting only because it 
was a wedding gift or because it fits with the room's color scheme, or because it 
makes one look sophisticated, rather than valuing the painting for itself (p. 179).
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The materialist's dependence on the opinions and attitudes of others also is 
consistent with extrinsic motivation. The materialist does not follow his/her own 
interests (as does an intrinsically motivated individual), but rather is constrained 
to select objects and activities which have received the stamp of approval from 
others. Deci (1980) explains that the notion that people are free to choose what to 
do and how to behave is implicit in the definition of intrinsic motivation. He 
draws the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in the following 
way: "we infer intrinsic motivation for an activity when a person does the 
activity in the absence of a reward contingency or control (Deci and Ryan 1985, p. 
34). [Wjhen the motives are extrinsic, the decision involves selecting what 
extrinsic rewards to strive for and what behaviors to undertake in quest of the 
rewards" (1980a, p. 50). One of the aspects of materialism which emerged from 
Ger and Belk's (1993) U.S. focus group illustrates this difference quite nicely. 
Materialists were thought to view work "merely as a means of earning money 
rather than as an end and source of reward in itself" (p. 17). One person voiced 
the idea this way, "[Tjhere are a lot of people in law and medicine that are more 
interested in the financial, the money, the materialistic things they can gain from 
having that profession than saving lives or in winning lawsuits for justice" (p. 17).
The focus on the opinions of others which accompanies extrinsic motivation 
is also characteristic of people termed high self-monitors (Snyder 1987; Snyder 
and Gangestad 1986).
Self-Monitoring and Materialism
To begin this discussion, we turn once again to the work of William James 
(1890/1981). In addressing the social nature of the self, he speaks of each 
individual having multiple selves:
A man has as many social selves as there are individuals who
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recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind.... [H]e has 
as many different social selves as there are distinct groups of 
persons about whose opinions he cares.... From this there results 
what practically is a division of the man into several selves 
(emphasis in the original; p. 294).
James provides the example of our acting differently with our family, with
employers, and with close friends.
This perspective has been carried forward and adopted by psychologists, 
sociologists, and consumer behavior theorists today. Consistent with James, 
Goffman (1959,1967) explains one reason for the different presentations of the 
self. In our social interaction we come to realize that different people interpret 
our actions differently. And so we try to control the self which we project to 
foster desired images in the eyes of others, "to maintain an image appropriate to 
the current situation and to secure a positive evaluation from the other person" 
(Goffman 1967, p. 38 -  39).
People who make a conscious attempt to vary their self-presentation have
been termed "high self-monitors" (Snyder, 1987; Snyder and Gangestad 1986).
Snyder draws the distinction between high and low self-monitors quite clearly.
The prototype of the high self-monitor is someone who is 
particularly sensitive to cues to the situational appropriateness of 
his or her social behavior and who uses these cues as guidelines for 
monitoring (that is, regulating and controlling) his or her 
expressive behavior and self-presentations. By contrast, the low 
self-monitor is less attentive to social information about 
situationally appropriate self-presentation and does not possess a 
highly developed repertoire of self-presentation skills. His or her 
expressive self-presentations seem ... to be controlled by inner 
attitudes, disposition, and values, rather than to be molded and 
shaped to fit the situation (1987, p. 14).
Snyder (1987) also makes clear that the distinction between low and high 
self-monitors should not be taken as a distinction between a desirable and an 
undesirable way of life. Rather he sees these two self-presentation styles as just
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that, two different ways of behaving. He reports various studies which link 
self-monitoring with various professions. For example, professional actors, 
managers and mediators, and leaders all tend to be high self-monitors. Each of 
these professions require people to have good social and communication skills. 
Actors, of course, make their living by believably altering their presentation. In 
fact, Snyder (1987) reports that the one item on his scale which best distinguishes 
between high and low self-monitor is, "I would probably make a good actor."
But what about materialism and self-monitoring. As noted in Chapter One, 
materialists need to be continual information gatherers to keep abreast of the 
current meaning of goods so that they can acquire and display just the right 
goods (Fournier and Richins 1991). Materialists read "catalogs and magazines, 
observ[e] what others have acquired, visit shops to see what is available. [They 
are] always thinking about future purchases" (p. 410).
High self-monitors have been shown to have much the same 
characteristics. Snyder (1974) demonstrates that when given the opportunity, 
high self-monitors consult information about their peers' self-presentation more 
frequently and for longer periods of time than do low self-monitors. Other 
studies (Cheek and Brigs, Cheek and Busch, both unpublished, cited in Snyder 
1987) conclude that high self-monitors place a high value on social aspects of 
identity, considering external identity characteristics, such as group membership, 
particularly important. Snyder and Cantor (1980) also found that high 
self-monitors were able to readily report the behaviors that would convey 
specific social images and the situations that would provide opportunities to 
play particular roles, even if they themselves did not take on those roles. Finally, 
Glick (unpublished, cited in Snyder 1987) found that high self-monitors are quite 
aware of the messages they project by their clothing and other personal items 
and that they tend to be avid readers of magazines and books geared to these
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concerns. Consistent with these findings, is that of Hosch and Platz (1984) that 
high self-monitors are more accurate eyewitnesses than low self-monitors.
While there seems to be substantial overlap between materialism and high 
self-monitoring, then, not all high self-monitors would be expected to be 
materialists. Making that assumption would be to fall into the trap warned 
against by Douglas and Isherwood (1979) and others. High self-monitors are 
simply making full use of the social system in constructing their identities. 
However, the converse association may be assumed to be true, that materialists 
are likely to be high self-monitors. But what of self-monitoring and other 
constructs which are important to this study?
Snyder (1987) suggests that while self-monitoring does not correlate well 
with measures such as self-esteem, the need for approval, extroversion, locus of 
control, among others, there is some overlap with Riesman's (1969) inner- and 
other-directed social characters. Inner-directed people are guided by personal 
values and standards, as are low self-monitors; other-directed individuals are 
more attuned to the expectations and preferences of others, as are high 
self-monitors. However, Snyder (1987) suggests that the two concepts rely on 
different levels of analysis. Self-monitoring is an individual phenomenon while 
inner- and other-directedness is "defined at the level of social characters 
characteristic of entire nations, societies, cultures, and historical periods" (p. 28). 
However, the intrinsic/extrinsic motivation measure employed in this study is 
not the same as Riesman's social character types. Hence, the self-monitoring 
concept is expected to add to the understanding of materialists in ways which 
would not be expected of the other self measures.
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CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the research on materialism and the self, this chapter has 
presented a number of areas which would provide fertile ground for the further 
investigation of materialism. Our understanding of the construct would be 
broadened if we could further understand the relationship between materialism 
and the self. The specific hypotheses which address this topic and the research 
design for the study are presented in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY
This study proposes to examine materialism as an independent variable. 
The focus of the study is on the "materialistic self." More specifically the study 
will investigate the impact of materialism on self-monitoring, self-esteem, 
self-actualization, and on extrinsic motivation. Hypotheses about these effects 
are presented below. Investigation of the hypotheses will involve the use of both 
the Belk (Ger and Belk 1993) and Richins and Dawson (1992) materialism scales. 
Additionally, the construct validity of the two scales will also be assessed.
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Echoing the ideas of Daun (1983) and Riesman and Roseborough (1955), 
Fournier and Richins (1991) conclude that for the materialist, consumer products 
"engage values that are centrally-held, serve as a source of meaning, and 
provide structure for life's goals and daily activities" (p. 404). Taking this 
conclusion as a base, a number of questions about the materialist lifestyle might 
be raised. Do people who value materialism work harder at behaviors connected 
with that value? Do they put more effort into materialism-related activities? For 
example, do they spend more time shopping? When they shop do they buy more 
frequently? Do they derive pleasure from the act of purchasing? In being 
influenced by the opinions of others about goods, are materialists similarly
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influenced by the opinions of others about themselves? Are materialists more
other- than inner-directed, more extrinsically than intrinsically motivated? Are
their self-concepts tied more to the opinions of others than to their own
opinions? Questions such as these have not yet been directly addressed in
1
materialism research. It is the purpose of this study to begin to find answers to 
the latter questions which address materialism and the self.
Psychological Constructs and Motivational Measures
W hat follows are the research hypotheses accompanied by brief 
discussions of why the specific motivations and psychological constructs would 
be expected from materialists. The first hypothesis deals with materialism and 
self-monitoring.
HI: Those scoring high on either materialism scale will also 
score high on the self-monitoring scale.
Rokeach (1973) suggests that values: 1) guide the presentation of the self to 
others, 2) guide our evaluation and judgment of ourselves and others, and 3) 
provide a means of comparing ourselves to others. More recently, in their 
extension of Rokeach's work, Kahle and Timmer (1983) also explain that values 
are important for self-description and impression management. For the 
materialist, the behavior which has been labeled "conspicuous consumption" 
(Fournier and Richins 1991; Mason 1981; Veblen 1899/1979) is a direct response 
to impression management and to the evaluation of the self and others.
Richins and Dawson (1990) report some initial interest in the self-esteem and 
self-monitoring ideas. However, scales to test these concepts were not administered to the entire 
sample, and specific results were not reported. This focus of their research seems not to have 
been continued (Richins and Dawson 1992).
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Conspicuous consumption is defined as deriving product satisfaction from the
reaction of others, instead of from the utility of the product itself (Fournier and
Richins 1991; Veblen 1899/1979). Objects are valued for their ability to generate
recognition or envy among others. Dawson and Bamossy (1991) explain that, "we
seek to acquire and have those things which other people expect us to have, and
value us having" (p. 380). Fournier and Richins (1991) lend support to this
position by suggesting that possessions allow "estimates of one's standing in
relation to others and in relation to the values deemed most important in the
culture"(p. 404). Leiss, Kline and Jhally (1986) concur:
people tend to compare their actual situation with a reference 
standard or norm... Happiness is measured by the ratio of what one 
has to what one thinks one ought to have in order to maintain 
self-esteem in the face of the normal consumption standards 
accepted by the society (p. 254).
This social comparison process is recognized by Marx who offers an
example in Wage, Labour and Capital,
a house may be large or small; as long as the surrounding houses 
are equally small it satisfies all social demands for a dwelling. But 
let a palace arise beside the little house, and it shrinks from a little 
house to a h u t ... Our desires and pleasures spring from society: we 
measure them, therefore, by society and not by the objects which 
serve for their satisfaction. Because they are of a social nature, they 
are of a relative nature (Selected Works, 1966, p. 163).
From their focus group discussions, Fournier and Richins (1991) report that
materialists are thought to focus on socially-sanctioned goods and
activities—golfing at the right country club, buying prestigious brand names or
products known to be expensive, and purchasing trendy items.
In order to know what the appropriate activity is, to know what the status 
items are, one must be attuned to the opinions of others and pay particular 
attention to one's "impression management." People who are "sensitive to their
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own expressive behavior" (Sampson 1978) are referred to as self-monitors. Such 
individuals are characterized as being very sensitive to social cues so that they 
might adapt and modify their behavior to be the "right person in the right place 
at the right time." In contrast, low self-monitoring individuals rely more on their 
own feelings and attitudes (Snyder 1979; Snyder and DeBono 1985). Thompson 
and Davis (1988) have tied self-monitoring to the way individuals use 
possessions as visual props in self-presentations. "[T]he furniture with which 
individuals surround themselves is an expression of their self-image and is 
intended to send messages about themselves to others" (p. 280). Belk (1988a) has 
also addressed the use of possessions in self identity. Accordingly, the first 
hypothesis suggests that self-monitoring individuals are expected to be more 
likely to be materialists than individuals who are not self-monitors.
Particular attention to external cues also has been related to the motivation 
for purchasing and using a product (Bell, Holbrook, and Solomon 1991). This 
relationship provides the connection to the second hypothesis which concerns 
materialism and intrinsic/extrinsic motivation.
H2: Those scoring high on either materialism scale will also 
score low on the intrinsic/extrinsic motivation scale (IE Index), 
thereby providing evidence of greater extrinsic than intrinsic 
motivation.
Intrinsic motivation refers to appreciating and enjoying an experience, an 
activity, or a product for its own sake. With extrinsic motivation, however, the 
experience, activity, or product serves as a means to some end, such as making a 
desired impression on others (Deci 1972,1973; Deci and Ryan 1985; Florey 1969; 
Holbrook 1986a). Just as materialists would be expected to be self-monitors, they 
also would be expected to be more extrinsically motivated. As detailed above,
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materialists are concerned with owning and doing the "right" things, of making 
decisions based on the opinions of others. These characteristics are very similar 
to the description of extrinsic motivation which is provided by Bell, Holbrook 
and Solomon (1991), "the correctness of choices is assumed to be externally 
verifiable, in that the purchase decisions made are believed to affect the 
probability of attaining future social goals" (p. 246).
If an individual pays particular attention to and acts on the wishes of 
others, that person may be self-confident and may not perceive her/himself to 
be competent (Philips and Lord 1980). Thus, the materialistic individual may 
have low self-esteem. This relationship comprises the third hypothesis.
H3: Those scoring high on either materialism scale will also 
score low on scales measuring self-esteem.
Rokeach (1973) suggests that values enable "us to maintain and enhance 
our self-esteem no matter how socially desirable or undesirable our motives, 
feelings, or actions may be... values serve to maintain and enhance self-esteem" 
(p. 13). Holding materialism as a value may be one way to bolster a lack of 
internal self-assurance. Fromm (1976) holds that insecurity and a need for 
superiority are connected with too great an emphasis on possessions. More 
recently, Fournier and Richins report that insecurity is an often mentioned 
characteristic of materialists. Berger and Luckmann (1964) explain why:
"material objects... must be called upon to testify to the individual's worth" (p. 
339). In an empirical study, Wicklund and Gollwitzer (1982) reported that male 
MBA students who had a lower chance of career success were more likely to own 
and wear status objects associated with successful businessmen, such as watches, 
suits, and briefcases, than were students who had a higher chance of career
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success. Following the lead of James (1890/1981), Ger and Belk (1990,1993) have 
suggested that low self-esteem may result from perceived or actual relative 
deprivation. That is, if we believe that having certain possessions and/or 
amounts of possessions are necessary—for whatever reason—and we see that 
others have those objects but we don't, then regardless of what and how much 
we do have, we will feel deprived and somehow "less" than those who do have 
these objects. Accordingly, one would expect materialists to have lower 
self-esteem than non-materialists. A similar relationship between materialism 
and self-actualization is expected; that is the fourth hypothesis.
H4: Those scoring high on either materialism scale will also 
score low on scales measuring self-actualization.
Kilboume (1987,1991) explains one perspective on the impact of using
material goods to provide the "meaning of existence." Historically, the person has
been important. The individual is the subject and products are the objects.
However, with the "development of the symbolic value of products, the
historical relationship is transposed" (1991, p. 451). By possessing some thing, its
symbolic value attaches to the user. And in this process, the object has become
the subject. Kilbourne provides an example. Everyone has tables; when a special
table is purchased, others are invited to sit at it and to admire it. In this way the
table reflects the purchaser's character and good taste. In effect, the table
becomes the subject and confers status on its owner. The problem with this
transposition, explains Kilboume, is that the individual
reverts to the ontological status of 'object'... thereby retarding the 
development of authenticity. In becoming an authentic individual, 
the person comes to realize that the locus of evaluation and control 
must be internal. The approval of others becomes less and less 
important (1991, p. 451-452).
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Unfortunately for the materialist, the approval of others becomes more and more 
important—just the opposite of what is necessary for self-actualization (Maslow 
1950). Instead of the reference point being "I am true to myself," it is "I am what 
I possess," or "I am as you desire me" (Moustakas 1956).
This perspective, while reflecting a decidedly postmodern perspective 
(Firat 1991),2 is similar to that advanced by Csikszentmihalyi and 
Rochberg-Halton (1981) and Belk (1988a) that while using possessions to help 
define the self is not in and of itself bad, when the possessions become an 
obsession the individual is no longer in control. Further, in such a situation, as 
has been discussed in previous chapters, the opinions and attitudes of others 
become more important than one's own. Again, the self has lost possession of 
itself and self-actualization is the casualty. This perspective is somewhat less 
cynical than that advanced by Kilbourne, but it is nonetheless pessimistic.
Validity Tests
While this research is designed to test four hypotheses about materialism 
and the self, its value is not limited to those tests. The study will also provide an 
assessment of the Belk and the Richins and Dawson materialism scales. The 
research is designed so that, with its conclusion, the validity of the two scales 
will have been addressed. As noted in the introduction, two types of construct
2
Drawing on the work of Baudrillard (1975,1988) and Jameson (1983) among others, Firat 
(1991) explains that postmodernism is a "new perspective on life" which is found primarily in 
Western cultures. It is a philosophical position which is in direct opposition to the modernist 
belief in progress and in the ability of humans to control nature through science. Postmodernists 
argue that people are controlled by the economic circumstances of their existence. People are no 
longer the essence of society; products have ascended in importance and humans live merely to 
"reproduce the simulated images for the products" (p. 74). Accordingly, w e consume not to 
improve our lives, but rather for the spectacle, the experience, provided by the product(s). 
Marketing is seen as the facilitator of the postmodern culture, in which images and meanings are 
deliberately manipulated as are the people who purchase them.
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validity—whether or not the scales are truly measuring materialism—will be 
assessed. The first, convergent validity, refers to the extent to which a measure 
correlates highly with other methods designed to measure the same construct 
(Churchill 1979). If both scales are indeed measuring materialism, then the 
correlation between the two should be highly positive and statistically 
significant. The second, nomological validity, refers to the extent to which a 
measure "correlates in theoretically predicted ways with measures of different 
but related constructs" (Malhotra 1993, p. 310). If the materialism scales are 
related to the self measures in the directions hypothesized, and the relationships 
are statistically significant, then this type of validity will have also been 
established. Finally, a scale cannot be valid if it is not reliable. Calculations of 
Coefficient Alpha for each of the scales and the subscales as well as confirmatory 
factor analysis will help establish the reliability of each scale.
SELECTION OF MEASURES
The materialism construct will be measured by the Belk and the Richins 
and Dawson scales. Following Bagozzi's (1984) rules of correspondence, when 
someone scores high on one of the scales, we may take the score as evidence that 
the person is materialistic. Bagozzi would caution, however, that the measure 
(the scales) is not the same as the theoretical construct, that we are only inferring 
the existence of the construct (materialism) from the empirical evidence (the scale 
score). This caution is not unique to Bagozzi. He is echoing the cautions offered 
by others such as Buzzell (1964) and Howard and Sheth (1969) in marketing, of 
Blalock (1962,1964) in sociology, and of Izrik and Meyer (1987) in philosophy. 
Howard and Sheth (1969) make the point quite clearly:
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We tend to hide behind the belief that operational definitions and 
measurements ensure that we have obtained the meanings that we 
want.... The important but subtle point is that we must have some 
knowledge of a construct... other than that given by a specific and 
concrete set of operations in order to know whether the operations 
are adequate to the task in the first place. For the knowledge, we 
must go back to the meaning that we originally imposed when we 
formulated the abstraction (p. 6-7).
Accordingly, it is appropriate to consider the history of these measures.
The Belk Scale
Belk (1984,1985; Ger and Belk 1993) proposed a multi-dimensional 
conceptualization of materialism. His scale is presented in Figure 4. With this 
use of the scale, the internal consistency of the subscales and the correlations 
among them are important reliability issues. In considering the subscales 
separately, Belk (1984) reports Coefficient Alphas of .68, .72, and .80 for the scales 
measuring possessiveness, nongenerosity, and envy, respectively, when scales 
were administered to a large sample of business students. When administered to 
a larger, more diverse sample (business students, secretaries, students at a 
religious institute, fraternity members, and blue collar workers), however, 
Alphas of .57 to .64 were reported for the three subscales. Correlations among 
the subscales, however, are not high. Reported subscale intercorrelations (Belk 
1985) are: possessiveness and nongenerosity .25; possessiveness and envy .35; 
nongenerosity and envy .30. In a later cross-cultural study (Ger and Belk 1990), 
Alphas ranging from .42 to .69 were reported. This study, also included a fourth 
subscale to measure tangibility. While Churchill (1979) suggests that for basic 
research, Alphas of .60 are desirable; Nunnally (1978) established .70 as the 
benchmark. Thus the results reported for the Belk scale raise questions about its 
usefulness because of low internal consistency.
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FIGURE 4 
THE BELK MATERIALISM SCALE
Possessiveness Subscale
I get very upset if something is stolen from me, even if it has little monetary value.
I don't like to have anyone in my home when I'm not there.
I don't get particularly upset when I lose things. *
I am less likely than most people to lock things up.
Nongenerosity Subscale 
I enjoy donating things for charity. *
I enjoy sharing what I have. *
I do not enjoy donating things to the needy.
• I don't like to lend things, even to good friends.
When friends do better than me in competition it usually makes me feel happy for them. *
I enjoy having people I like stay in my home. *
When friends have things I cannot afford it bothers me.
I worry about people taking my possessions.
I don’t mind giving rides to those who don’t have a car. *
Envy Subscale
I don't seem to get what is coming to me.
People who are very wealthy often feel they are too good to talk to average people.
If I have to choose between buying something for myself versus for someone I love,
1 would prefer buying for myself.
I am bothered when I see people who buy anything they want.
There are certain people I would like to trade places with.
Preservation Subscale 
I like to collect things.
I have a lot of souvenirs.
I tend to hang on to things I should probably throw out.
4 Reverse scored items.
Giiliz Ger and Russell W. Belk (1993), "Cross-Cultural Differences in Materialism," working 
paper, University of Utah.
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Belk (1985) also suggests that materialism might be considered as a 
single-factor construct which may adequately be measured with the aggregation 
of the measurement scales. "The three oblique first-order factors reproduced the 
three subscales and produced a single second-order factor with an eigenvalue 
greater than one, accounting for just over 75 percent of shared variance" (p. 271). 
Further, Belk (1985) reports Alphas of .66 to .73 for the overall scale, and 
correlations between the aggregate scale (called "materialism") and the subscales 
of .35 for possessiveness and materialism, .41 for nongenerosity and materialism, 
and .48 for envy and materialism. He believes that this aggregated measure is 
"adequate to begin exploring... [the] macro issues of consumer behavior" (p.
276) with respect to materialism.
As a test of nomological validity as well as an initial foray into macro 
consumer behavior issues, Belk investigated the correlations between overall 
materialism scores and measure of happiness and satisfaction in life. The 
correlations were expected to be negative. At significance levels of .001, he found 
that materialism and happiness correlate at -.26 and that materialism and life 
satisfaction correlate at -.24. He cautions, however, that these statistics are 
correlations only and do "not allow one to infer the direction of causality" (Belk 
1985, p. 274). That is, one should not conclude from these results that materialist 
causes unhappiness, for it may be that materialism arises in response to 
dissatisfaction with life. Findings such as those reported by Belk (and anyone 
using correlational analysis) merely demonstrate the relationship between two 
constructs.
A second validity check involved testing the ability of the scale to 
discriminate among groups of consumers thought to differ on degrees of 
materialism. Using the groups noted above (blue collar workers, secretaries, 
business students, fraternity members, and students at a religious institute), Belk
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(1985) found that, as hypothesized, the blue collar workers were the most 
materialistic,3 with a mean scale score of 74.1. The religious institute students 
were the least materialistic with a mean scale score of 70.6. These differences 
were significant at the .001 level.
As a final test of convergent validity, Belk (1985) undertook a 
three-generation study. Respondents were given a sentence completion 
taskwhich addressed four purchase and consumption areas: spending and 
acquiring, saving and consuming, giving and receiving, and precipitating 
circumstances (to elicit purchase/consumption responses). While there were no 
a priori hypotheses because of the open-ended nature of the questions, Belk 
"thought that the responses would differ according to the materialistic traits of 
the respondent" (p. 272). Overall, those scoring high on the materialism scale did 
respond in ways which would be expected of a materialist. For example, those 
scoring high on the nongenerosity subscale more often indicated that they were 
more likely to buy a gift for themselves than those who scored low on the 
subscale. It was also true, however, that there were no predictable patterns to the 
responses. Sometimes statistically significant responses came from those scoring 
high on all three subscales as well as on the overall scale. More often, however, 
statistically significant differences in responses could be attributed to those 
scoring high only on some of the subscales, or some of the subscales and the 
overall materialism scale, or just the overall materialism scale.
A more recent test of convergent validity has been carried out in 
conjunction with Ger and Belk's (1993) cross-cultural studies. Respondents were 
asked to list five products which were important to them that they owned, five
3
Earlier research by Best and Connolly (1976) and Chinoy (1955) had shown that blue 
collar workers were the most likely to engage in "compensatory consumption."
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they wanted to buy, and five they felt badly about not owning. (Later, a 
cross-cultural panel of judges ranked the responses to these wish list questions 
from materialistic products to non-materialistic products.) Respondents were 
also presented with a list of twenty products, services, and experiences and were 
asked to indicate which they considered to be luxuries and which were 
necessities. Validity was assessed by correlations of the materialism scale scores 
with the proportions of items seen as necessities as well as the proportions of 
items considered to be materialistic. Ger and Belk (1993) found that materialism 
correlated positively with the proportion of items identified as necessities and 
with the proportion of materialistic items desired, but not with the proportion of 
materialistic items already owned. The authors conclude that these results are 
consistent with their conceptualization of materialism. The construct is not 
measured by what you have but is related to the strong desire for possessions.
When the subscales were considered, these same relationships held for the 
nongenerosity scale, but were just the reverse for envy and possessiveness, an 
unanticipated result. There was no relationship between these product measures 
and preservation. Thus, the validation tests were successful for the overall scale 
and for one of the subscales, but not for the other three. This finding is not too 
surprising given the low internal reliabilities for the subscales.
This same problem has been reported by other researchers who tested 
Belk's scale and who used it along with measures of other consumer attitudes 
and behaviors (c.f., Cole et al. 1992; Ellis 1991; Hunt et al. 1990; Richins and 
Dawson 1992). Most of the research, detailed below, concluded that the three 
subscales were not equally reliable. Because of this finding, there was general 
agreement that aggregating the subscale scores to arrive at an overall measure of 
materialism which can be used for research was not warranted. As for validity, 
Cole et al. (1992) report that no data other than Belk's has been provided.
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Critiques and Tests of the Belk Scale
Working with an early version of the Belk scale, Ellis (1991) tested the two 
approaches to measuring materialism proposed by Belk (aggregating the scores 
into one and keeping the subscale scores separate) as well as a third alternative 
that materialism "is a composite construct composed, in part, of the three 
subscales. Such an interpretation does not require positive correlations among 
the component constructs" (p. 5). To investigate these three approaches, Ellis 
analyzed responses to Belk's scale using LISREL VII. Overall, "none of the tested 
models were acceptable from the point of view of generally accepted goodness of 
fit indicators" (p. 8). He concluded that, with the then current state of the scale, it 
would be a mistake to take the aggregate of the three subscale scores as a 
measure of materialism. He did not suggest, however, that the 
three-dimensional concept of materialism should be thrown out, since there 
might be "enough positively correlated factors that might be capturing some 
aspects of this higher-order materialism construct" (p. 6).
Ellis suggested that part of the problem of "fit" (of the data to the model) 
might be that, as then conceived, the three subscales did not provide 
unidimensional measures of their appropriate constructs. By removing selected 
items from the subscales, a better fit of the data to the model could be obtained. 
For the present, however, Ellis urged further refinement of the subscales and 
concluded with Belk that the use of the scales was "recommended for 
exploratory research only" (p. 8).
Richins and Dawson (1992) also reviewed 12 separate data collections using 
Belk's scales. They found Alphas of .09 to .81 for the individual subscales and 
Alphas of .48 to .73 for the aggregate scale. The reliability coefficients at the 
lower end are unacceptable (Churchill 1979; Nunnally 1978).
Cole et al. (1992) assessed both the reliability and validity of Belk's scale.
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Their factor analysis resulted in nine (instead of three) initial factors accounting 
for 64.5 percent of the variance. Further, Alphas for the three subscales were low, 
confirming other reports of a lack of internal consistency (possessiveness .42, 
nongenerosity .30, envy .57). Finally, as tests of nomological validity, they found 
that the overall materialism scale, as well as the envy subscale, correlated 
relatively well with three measures of life satisfaction. The correlations were in 
the direction hypothesized—a negative relationship between materialism and life 
satisfaction. The final validity test was to ascertain convergent validity by 
correlating Belk's scale with the Richins' scale (1987).4 The correlation was 
positive (.489) and significant at the .01 level.
With the idea that materialists seek judgments of success, satisfaction, and 
status from others, Hunt et al. (1990) hypothesized that there should be a 
relationship between materialism and locus of control. Specifically, it would be 
expected "that external scorers would possess the other-based reference system 
associated with high levels of materialism... largely because they are envious of 
others and only incidentally because of their possessiveness and nongenerosity" 
(Hunt et al. 1990, p. 1102). The results of this study indicated modest support for 
the hypothesis. Generally, as locus of control scores became more internal, 
materialism scores diminished, even when controlling for the sex of the 
respondents. The authors conclude that while the Belk scale is in need of further 
refinement and testing, their study does provide some evidence of nomological 
validity.
Hendrickson and Morrisette (1992) employed the scale in a study focused 
on lifestyle analysis. While they stress that their research program needs further
4The Richins scale employed in this study was an early version which contained seven 
items, mostly designed to measure happiness.
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development, initial results indicate that materialism may not be an independent 
variable, but instead may be the result of the choice of a particular lifestyle. In 
analyzing the results, they found the low Alphas for the subscales: .47 for 
possessiveness, .39 for nongenerosity, and .56 for envy. As did other researchers, 
they also found that Alphas could be improved by removing items from various 
scales. Consequently they, too, concluded that the Belk scale required additional 
refinement.
Revisions to the Belk Scale
Following the advice of such researchers, Belk has continued to refine his 
materialism scale and to make it applicable for cross-cultural research (Ger and 
Belk 1990,1993). The research has incorporated both qualitative and quantitative 
methods and has stretched over thirteen countries. In the process, some of the 
items in the subscales have changed and an additional subscale has been added. 
Initially the new subscale was termed "tangibility"; most recently, however, it is 
called "preservation." These changes have maintained the "moderately 
satisfactory alpha levels" for the scale and its subscales (Ger and Belk 1993, p. 17) 
and have addressed the concern expressed by Ellis that the subscales did not 
positively correlate with the overall scale. Specifically, Ger and Belk (1993) 
report Coefficient Alpha of .62 for the new overall scale and Alphas of .66 for 
nongenerosity, .61 for possessiveness, .46 for envy, and .55 for preservation. 
Further, "the correlations of the materialism scale with the subscales are 
(omitting the subscale itself) 0.15,0.19,0.22, and 0.08 with nongenerosity, 
possessiveness, envy, and preservation, respectively—all statistically significant" 
(Ger and Belk 1993, p. 18)—except for India, Thailand, and Romania where none 
are significant. With these changes, the Belk scale has addressed some of the 
criticisms detailed above, thereby making it more warranted for research
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purposes. That Belk himself is a strong presence in the marketing discipline also 
argues for inclusion of the scale in any study of materialism.
The Richins and Dawson Scale
The second materialism scale, proposed by Richins and Dawson (1992), also 
represents a multidimensional conceptualization of materialism. W ith this scale, 
however, three dimensions are hypothesized: the centrality of possessions in 
one's life, the use of possessions to define success, and the use of possessions to 
determine happiness. This scale is presented in Figure 5. With its publication in 
the December 1992 issue of the Journal of Consumer Research, the Richins and 
Dawson scale has only recently become generally available. For this reason, little 
reported research has used the full scale. What has been reported would lead 
one to assess it as a scale worthy of inclusion in a study of materialism. Richins 
and Dawson (1992) tested the scale in three different studies in four 
geographically distinct cities. They report Alphas for their subscales ranging 
from .71 to .75 for the centrality subscale; Alphas of from .74 to .78 for the success 
subscale; and Alphas of between .73 and .83 for the happiness factor. Because the 
three factors "normally act in concert with respect to external variables" (p. 20), 
the authors suggest that the subscale scores can be summed for an overall 
materialism measure. Single scale Alphas varied between .80 and .88.
To validate the scale, Richins and Dawson investigated the relationship 
between the scale and various behaviors and attitudes expected to correlate both 
positively and negatively with materialism. The first test utilized Kahle's (1983) 
List of Values. Overall, the mean materialism scores were significantly different 
for those ranking financial security, warm relationships with others, and a sense 
of accomplishment in their top three values and for those not ranking these 
among the top three. For a second test, respondents were asked about the level of
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FIGURES
THE RICHINS AND DAWSON MATERIALISM SCALE
Happiness Subscale
I have all the things I really need to enjoy life. *
My life would be better if I owned certain things I don't have.
I wouldn't be any happier if I owned nicer things. *
I'd be happier if I could afford to buy more things.
It sometimes bothers me quite a bit that I can't afford to buy all the things I'd like.
Centrality Subscale 
I usually buy only the things I need. *
I try to keep my life simple, as far as possessions are concerned. *
The things I own aren't all that important to me. *
I enjoy spending money on things that aren't practical.
Buying things gives me a lot of pleasure.
I like a lot of luxury in my life.
I put less emphasis on material things than most people I know. *
Success Subscale
I admire people who own expensive homes, cars, and clothes.
Some of the most important achievements in life include acquiring material possessions.
I don't place much emphasis on the amount of material objects people own as a sign of success. * 
The things I own say a lot about how well I'm doing in life.
I like to own things that impress people.
I don't pay much attention to the material objects other people own. *
* Reverse scored items.
Marsha L. Richins and Scott Dawson (1992), "A Consumer Values Orientation for Materialism 
and Its Measurement: Scale Development and Validation," Journal of Consumer Research, 19 (3), 
303-316.
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household income necessary to satisfy their needs. As expected, those scoring 
high on the materialism scale needed significantly more income than those 
scoring low. In the third test, self-centeredness was explored and found to 
correlate positively with materialism. Correlations with measures of voluntary 
simplicity, the fourth test, were not as successful, however. Finally, materialism 
was correlated with measures of life satisfaction and contentment. Materialism 
was negatively related to all five aspects of life measured on the Andrews and 
Withy (1976) Delighted-Terrible scale;5 it was positively correlated with Belk's 
(1985) envy subscale, and negatively correlated with Rosenberg's (1965) 
self-esteem scale. All of these relationships were statistically significant. These 
tests provide evidence of both convergent and nomological validity.
The only other known attempt to try to determine the validity of the 
Richins and Dawson scale is reported by Cole et al. (1992). As noted above, 
however, they used was an early seven-item measure directed mostly at 
happiness. Nevertheless, Cole et al. did find strong evidence of convergent 
validity (the correlation between the two materialism scales was .489 and 
significant at the .01 level). Further, correlations between the Richins (1987) scale 
and three measures of life satisfaction were all statistically significant at the .01 
level and were negative, as expected—thereby suggesting nomological validity.
Two other studies which employed the Richins and Dawson scale have 
been reported. However, they did not address validity. Williams and Bryce 
(1992) investigated the relationship between materialism and care for others via 
behavioral measures of helpfulness and selfishness. While the hypotheses were
5
This scale is comprised of one question asked twice, once before a list of other questions, 
and again after about a fifteen-to-twenty minute interval which is filled with the other questions. 
Respondents are asked to evaluate how they feel about their lives now (taking into account what 
has happened in the past year and what they expect of the future) using a seven point scale 
anchored with "Terrible" at one end and "Delighted" at the other.
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not confirmed, the study is useful as a test of the materialism scale itself. After 
factor analysis, the authors obtained factor loadings similar to those reported by 
Richins and Dawson. The scale reliability measures were also consistent. The 
Alpha for success was .80; for happiness it was .76; .68 was calculated for 
centrality; and for the overall scale, the Alpha was .86.
McKeage (1992) used the Richins and Dawson scale along with a measure 
of self-gifts to assess the relationship between materialism and self-indulgence. 
She obtained a very dissimilar factor structure and so did not attempt any 
subscale analysis. However, Coefficient Alpha for the overall scale was .86.
While no "official" hypothesis about the two materialism scales is 
proposed, it is expected that the Richins and Dawson scale will continue to be the 
more reliable of the two. While it is the less tested scale, initial results suggest 
that it is more internally consistent. Further, the authors' initial work to establish 
validity is encouraging. Accordingly, the Richins and Dawson scale is expected 
to "match up" better with the self-concept measures employed in this study.
The Self-Monitoring Scale
The Self-Monitoring Scale, presented in Figure 6, developed by Snyder 
(1979) and modified by Snyder and Gangestad (1986) will be used to measure the 
self-monitoring construct. Snyder and Gangestad (1986) report a Coefficient 
Alpha of .70 for the new scale. They also suggest that the validity of the scale can 
be attested to from the research of others which correlated the previous scale 
with behaviors expected to be associated with self-monitoring—especially since 
the new version was developed in response to validity questions which arose in 
the use of the original version. This scale is the only one which proports to 
measure self-monitoring (Snyder and Gangestad 1986) and has been used by 
researchers in various disciplines. For example, Sampson (1978) used the scale in
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a study of personality and concepts of identity. Covey et al. (1989) used the scale 
in a study of dishonest behavior. In the communication field, Gudykunst (1985) 
investigated the impact of culture and self-monitoring on uncertainty reduction 
processes. Lindsey and Greene (1987) assessed the phenomenon of social 
knowledge using the scale.
The Intrinsic/Extrinsic Motivation Index (IE Index)
Intrinsic/extrinsic motivation will be measured by a modification of an 
index developed by Holbrook (1986a), and extended by Bell, Holbrook, and 
Solomon (1991). This scale is presented in Figure 7. Until Holbrook's index was 
developed, intrinsic/extrinsic motivation scales were developed either to 
measure the motivation of children or adolescents to do their school work (for 
example, Harter 1980,1981) or to measure motivation of adults to perform some 
task (often their job). For example, The Experience of Work (Cook et al. 1981) is a 
compilation of scales relating to a variety of work-related behaviors and 
motivations. The eleven intrinsic/extrinsic scales which are included in the 
compendium all refer to satisfaction with work, to rewards from work, or to the 
value of work. Another set of intrinsic/extrinsic scales measure "intrinsic task 
interest"—motivation to perform a task based on whether or not some extrinsic 
reward (Wicker et al. 1990)—was available (see for example Mayo 1976). In a 
review of measures of intrinsic/extrinsic motivation, Holbrook (1986a) concludes 
that he is "unaware of any competing instruments suitable for use in the context 
of consumer behavior" (p. 36).
Holbrook acknowledges (1986a; personal conversation, November 7, 1992) 
that his scale is in its very early stages of development. He admits to enjoying 
developing scales but not to refining them. "Some attempt was made to purify 
the ... IE index by removing weakly correlated items. However this approach
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FIGURE 7
THE INTRINSIC/EXTRINSIC MOTIVATION INDEX
When I read a magazine, listen to the radio, or watch television, I always know what I expect to 
get out of it. *
When I take a walk I always like to have a specific destination. *
Winning isn't everything, it's the only thing. *
When I fix something or do chores around the house, I am just puttering around for the fun of it.
In playing cards, board games, or video games, winning matters less than how you play the 
game.
I would keep doing the things that I do for a living even if I won the lottery.
When I read a magazine, listen to the radio, or watch television, I just appreciate the experience 
on its own terms.
When I perform some creative activity such as writing, drawing, or playing a musical instrument, 
I set a goal for myself to try to achieve*
When I engage in noncompetitive sports like skiing, jogging, or body-building, I tend to view the 
activity as an end in itself.
I would not throw a party or take someone out to dinner unless I expected to enjoy the 
companionship of the people involved.
When I perform some creative activity such as writing, drawing, or playing a musical instrument, 
I am aware that the process is inherently its own reward.
When I play a competitive sport such as tennis, golf, or ping pong, my primary motivation is to 
enjoy the game for its own sake.
* Reverse scored items
Adapted from Morris B. Holbrook (1986), "Aims, Concepts, and Methods for the Representation
of Individual Differences in Esthetic Responses to Design Features," Unpublishedmanuscript,
Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027.
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produced only modest improvements and was therefore omitted for the sake of 
avoiding search bias" (Holbrook 1986 p. 26). Finally, Holbrook (1986b) suggests 
that the IE Index must be subjected to tests over time to determine its usefulness. 
Its inclusion in this study does just that.
The Self-Esteem Scale
Self-esteem will be measured using Rosenberg's (1965) self-esteem scale, 
presented in Figure 8. It is a short, ten-item scale which provides a global 
measure of self-esteem. This scale has been widely used and its psychometric 
properties have been well demonstrated (Blascovich and Tomaka 1991).
Cronbach Alphas of .77 and .88 have been reported for the scale. Test-retest 
reliability is equally as good. Convergent validity has been demonstrated with 
various measures as has discriminant validity (Blascovich and Tomaka 1991).
The Self-Actualization Scale
Self-actualization will be measured by the Short Index of Self-Actualization 
(Jones and Crandall 1986, Crandall and Jones 1991) which is presented in Figure 
9. Cronbach Alphas of between .63 and .68 (Flett et al. 1991) have been reported 
for the scale, and a twelve-day test-retest reliability of .69 has been achieved 
(Crandall and Jones 1991). Until this Short Index was developed, the two "best 
known measures of self-actualization" were Shostrom's Personal Orientation 
Inventory (POI; Shostrom 1964) and the Personal Orientation Dimensions (POD; 
Shostrom 1975) (Flett et al. 1991). However, the POI contains 150 forced-choice 
items and the POD consists of 260 such items, making them both time consuming 
and cumbersome to administer (Flett et al. 1991). The Short Index, which 
contains only 15 items, was developed for use when researchers wanted an 
overall measure of self-actualization—as is the case in this study. The Short
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FIGURE 8 
THE SELF-ESTEEM SCALE
I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others.
I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. *
I am able to do things as well as most other people.
I feel I do not have much to be proud of. *
I take a positive attitude toward myself.
On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
I wish I could have more respect for myself. *
I certainly feel useless at times. *
At times I think I am no good at all. *
* Reverse scored items.
Morris Rosenberg (1965), Society and the Adolescent Self Image, Princeton, NY: 
Princeton University Press.
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FIGURE 9
THE SHORT INDEX OF SELF-ACTUALIZATION
I do not feel ashamed of any of my emotions.
I feel I must do what others expect of me. *
I believe that people are essentially good and can be trusted.
I feel free to be angry at those I love.
It is always necessary that others approve what I do. *
I don't accept my own weaknesses. *
I can like people without having to approve of them.
I fear failure. *
I avoid attempts to analyze and simplify complex domains. *
It is better to be yourself than to be popular.
I have no mission in life to which I feel especially dedicated. *
I can express my feelings even when they may result in undesirable 
consequences.
I do not feel responsible to help anybody. *
I am bothered by fears of being inadequate. *
I am loved because I give love.
* Reverse scored items.
Alvin Jones and Rick Crandall (1986), "Validation of a Short Index of 
Self-Actualization,"Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 12 (1), 63 -  73.
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Index has been used by several researchers (Richard and Jex 1991; Schelle and 
Bonin 1989; Watson, Morris and Hood 1990), and Flett et al. (1991) conclude that 
"initial psychometric investigations have suggested that the increasing use of the 
scale is warranted" (p. 322).
SAMPLE DESIGN
Most materialism research has been conducted with homogeneous groups. 
For example, Moschis (1976,1984), Moschis and Moore (1982) and Moschis and 
Churchill (1978) used middle school and high school adolescents. Ward and 
Wackman (1971) and Ward, Wackman and Wartells (1977) used elementary 
school children. In Belk's studies (1984,1985), 80 percent of his sample were 
college students, though he did address small samples of secretaries (39) and 
machine shop workers (27). His more recent cross-cultural research (Ger and 
Belk 1993) has been conducted with graduate students, most of whom are 
enrolled in an MBA, or equivalent, program. Initial research by Richins and 
Dawson (1990) surveyed graduate and undergraduate students from three 
separate universities. Othman (1988) also employed a student sample for his 
dissertation, though he restricted his survey to students at one university. In 
their larger scale development study, however, Richins and Dawson (1992) 
utilized a heterogeneous sample of randomly-chosen residents of households in 
four cities.
This study also utilized a heterogeneous sample. A questionnaire, with the 
previously outlined materialism and attitude and behavior scales and 
demographic data questions, was administered to a stratified proportional 
random sample of the adult population in the Peninsula area of Southern
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Virginia. The Peninsula is part of the larger Hampton Roads Metropolitan 
Statistical Area. Recently, the U.S. government expanded the MSA to include 
three additional counties, two in Virginia and one in North Carolina. This new 
MSA, now named the Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, VA-NC MSA, 
ranks as thirty-first in the nation with a population of 1.5 million people (Daily 
Press, August 25,1992). The Peninsula itself is one of the fastest growing areas in 
the United States. With a five-year growth rate of 6.6 percent, it outstrips the U.S. 
as a whole (5 percent), the Commonwealth of Virginia (6 percent), and the state's 
capital, Richmond (5.6 percent). More specifically, the sample was comprised of 
residents of Hampton, Newport News, Poquoson, and York County, Virginia. 
Respondents were selected so that the percentage of respondents from each city 
or county was equal to the proportion of Peninsula residents living in the city. 
Thirty-seven percent of the respondents were to be chosen at random from 
Hampton residents; 48 percent of the respondents were to be chosen at random 
from Newport News residents; 12 percent of the respondents were to be chosen 
at random from York County residents; three percent of the respondents were to 
be chosen at random from Poquoson residents.
A target sample size of 300 was established. Because the research 
hypotheses were tested with correlation analysis, the sample size was selected 
according to a statistical power analysis approach, advocated by Cohen (1988), 
which is appropriate when the significance of a product moment correlation 
coefficient is desired. While the significance level of a test refers to the probability 
of rejecting the null hypothesis if the null hypothesis is true (a type I error), the 
power of a test refers to the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis if it is 
false (avoiding a type II error). Thus, power is the flip side of significance; a low 
significance level and high power are desirable. For this research, because the 
hypotheses were tested with correlation analysis, sample size was determined
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from the tables provided by Cohen (1988) for use in planning experiments which 
will employ correlation analysis. The table is presented in Table 1. To determine 
the sample size, the desired significance level, the minimum value of the 
correlation to be detected, and the desired power must all be specified. The 
rationale for each of these decisions is presented next.
First, a significance level of .05 was employed, assuming a one tailed test
since the hypotheses suggested the direction of the relationship among the
measures to be correlated. Second, since many of the scales employed in this
research are still exploratory, and since this is social science research, detecting
correlations as "low" as .20 would be desirable. This decision was made for two
reasons. As detailed earlier in this chapter, most of the correlations of
materialism scales with other measures, such as life satisfaction, were in the .20
to .30 range. Second, Cohen (1988) explains that "many relationships pursued in
'soft' behavioral science are of this order of magnitude" (p. 79). He quotes
Thurstone as saying that "in psychology, we measure men by their shadows."
That is, while there may be strong hypothetical relationships among theoretical
constructs (such as materialism and self-esteem), a great deal of noise,
"measurement unreliability, lack of fidelity to the construct," accompanies the
attempt to operationalize the relationship.
This, in turn, will attenuate the correlation in the population 
between the constructs as measured. Thus if two constructs in theory 
... can be expected to correlate .25, and the actual measurement of 
each is correlated .63 with its respective pure construct, the 
observed correlation between the two fallible measures of the 
construct would be reduced to .25 (.63)(.63)=.10. Since the above 
values are not unrealistic, it follows that often... we are indeed 
seeking to reject null hypotheses... when r [the correlation 
coefficient] is some value near .10 (p. 79).
Third, while a power of 80 is conventional (Cohen 1988, p. 100), for this type of
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TABLE 1 
SAMPLE SIZE TABLE
a  = .05
Power .10 .20 .30 .40 .50 .60 .70 .80 .90
.25 97 24 12 8 6 4 4 3 3
.50 272 69 30 17 11 8 6 5 4
.60 361 91 40 22 14 10 7 5 4
.70 470 117 52 28 18 12 8 6 4
.75 537 134 59 32 20 13 9 7 5
.80 617 153 68 37 22 15 10 7 5
.85 717 178 78 43 26 17 12 8 6
.90 854 211 92 50 31 20 13 9 6
.95 1078 266 116 63 39 25 16 11 7
.99 1570 387 168 91 55 35 23 15 10
Jacob Cohen (1988), Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences, Second 
Edition, New York: Academic Press, p. 101.
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research a power of 95 was selected to be consonant with the significance level of 
.05. With these decisions, the table indicates that a sample size of 266 is 
necessary.
DATA COLLECTION
Data for the study were collected via a questionnaire using the drop-off 
and pick-up methodology. The questionnaire contained the various scales 
detailed above as well as demographic questions to collect data about 
respondents' age, sex, occupation, income, education, and ethnic background. (A 
copy of the questionnaire is included in the Appendix.) In one way or another, 
each of these demographic variables has been hypothesized to relate to 
materialism. Thus it was important to use them to control for their possible 
confounding effects. Collection of the demographic information also made it 
possible to assess the goodness of fit between the population and the sample 
along demographic lines.
For the actual data collection, survey administrators were given the
following instructions.
Go to the first address on the list. Knock on the door and ask the 
person who answers if he/she is 18 years of age or over. If so, ask 
for his/her participation in the survey. If the person agrees to 
participate, leave the survey. Go to the next address on the list.
Once the surveys are distributed, go back to the first address and 
pick them up in sequence. If the person who answers the door is 
not over 18, ask if there is someone at home who is. If so, ask for 
that person's cooperation with the survey. If there is no one over 
18, do not leave a survey. Go on to the next house/apartm ent on 
the street. If the individual who answers the door is unwilling to fill 
out the survey, thank him /her and go to the next house/apartm ent 
on the street. Repeat this procedure until you find someone on the
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street who is willing to fill out the survey.
Because of safety considerations, survey administrators were told only to 
go into neighborhoods which were considered to be safe and not to administer 
surveys after dark. To capture individuals who work outside the home during 
the week, surveys were administered on weekends as well as on week days.
DATA ANALYSIS
To determine the compatibility of the sample with the population from 
which it was drawn, the Chi-square statistic was computed.
To compute scale and subscale scores, responses to the items for each scale 
were summed according to procedures established for each scale. Usually 
several items needed to be adjusted for reverse scoring.
To evaluate the two materialism scales, Cronbach's Alpha was computed as 
a measure of internal reliability of the scales. Correlations among and between 
the subscales and the overall scale were computed for each materialism scale. 
These results were then compared with those reported in other studies. Finally, 
confirmatory factor analysis was run to verify the factor structure of each scale 
which had been reported by the authors.
To evaluate the research hypotheses, scores for the self-monitoring, 
extrinsic/intrinsic motivation, self-esteem, and self-actualization scales were 
computed and then correlated with the materialism scale and subscale scores.
If these correlations are in the directions hypothesized and are statistically 
significant (at the .05 level), then the study provides some measure of the 
construct validity of the scales. Weiss (1991) notes that while tests such as these, 
which make use of a "nomological network," can make a convincing case for the 
validity of the scale, construct validity cannot be demonstrated solely by this
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technique (p. 283). Accordingly, convergent validity was also assessed by 
correlating the results for responses from the two materialism scales with 
responses to the four behavior/attitude scales.
Finally, to assess the differences between people scoring high and people 
scoring low on the materialism scales, cluster analysis was run. Because it did not 
provide conclusive results, respondents were grouped into terciles based on their 
scores on the Richins and Dawson scale and the top and bottom groups were 
analyzed for differences in the self measures as well as demographics.
The results of these analyses are reported in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS OF THE STUDY
This chapter presents the results of the data analysis and interpretations of 
the findings of the study. It begins with a consideration of the data itself. 
Secondly, the two materialism scales are discussed, focusing on scale reliability 
and confirmatory factor analysis. Tests of the research hypotheses are addressed 
next, along with the construct validity of the two materialism scales. Finally, the 
data are analyzed with an eye toward developing a profile of materialists.
CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS
Of the 280 surveys which were obtained, 278 were usable. The other two 
contained so many unanswered items as to be useless. Thus, the 266 surveys 
necessary to allow for testing the significance of the correlations in the 
hypothesis tests, as described in the previous chapter, were obtained. The sample 
selection criteria and data collection procedures, described in Chapter Three, 
were designed to insure a stratified proportional random sample of residents 
living in the four jurisdictions which comprise the Virginia "Peninsula": 
Hampton, Newport News, Poquoson, and York County. Examination of the 
demographics of the survey respondents provides evidence that the goal of the 
sampling design was closely met. The Chi-square test which indicates that the 
difference between the target percentages and actual sample is not statistically
115
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
significant also supports this conclusion (see Table 2).
When further demographics are considered, however, statistically 
significant differences between sample and population are present for all 
categories except income. Table 3 presents the demographic data for both the 
sample and the Peninsula along with the results of the Chi-square tests. The data 
for the Peninsula population was obtained from the research department of the 
local newspaper, the Daily Press. All income levels are well represented in the 
sample (Chi-square = 3.827; p = .281). However, there are more females in the 
sample (62 percent) than in the population (52 percent). Younger respondents 
(the 18-to-34 age group) are over represented, while the 50 and over group is 
under represented. People with a high school education or less are under 
represented, while those with "some college" are over represented; college 
graduates are well matched between sample and population. When considering 
the ethnic background, African-Americans are under represented in the sample, 
but members of other ethnic groups (Asians, Hispanics, Native Americans, and 
"other") are over represented.
Three explanations may account for the differences between the sample and 
the population. First, the Daily Press data were based on a survey conducted in 
January and February 1992 by Belden Associates, and on information from the 
1992 Survey of Buying Power. Surveys for this study were collected in February 
and March 1993. Given the rapid growth of population in the area—6.6 percent 
per year, as noted in Chapter Three—the demographics could have changed in 
the twelve months between the Belden survey and this one. Secondly, the 
Belden survey itself has a "sample tolerance of plus or minus 3.5 percentage 
points" (Daily Press 1993, p. 19). Third, it certainly must be considered that the 
original sampling methodology may have been flawed. It assured geographic 
proportionality, but it did not insure proportionality in other areas.
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Table 2
Population Distribution: Sample and Peninsula 
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Table 3 














18-34 54.3 40.0 Chi-square = 22.748















Some High School 1.4
High School Graduate 17.6
Some College 52.9
















Blue Collar 11.2 39.0


















* Chi-square was not calculated for Occupation because of difficulties in 
comparing occupational categories.
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While the drop-off-and-pick-up method did result in the desired proportional 
geographic stratification of the sample, it may have also resulted in the under- 
and over-representation in other areas. Women may have been more inclined to 
comply with a request to fill out the survey. They may also be the individual 
most likely to answer the door; the instructions were to enlist the cooperation of 
whoever came to the door, if that person were 18 years of age or over. The 
difference in education levels may be accounted for in three ways. First, people 
with "some high school" may not have been willing to admit to not having a 
diploma (since the drop-off and pick-up was a less anonymous data collection 
procedure). Secondly, people who have attended some of the private business 
colleges may have checked "some college." Third, those with less than a high 
school education or only a high school diploma tend to either be older and/or 
live in areas considered to be unsafe. The under representation of older people 
may have simultaneously led to an under representation of those without a high 
school degree. Similarly, not having the survey administrators go into unsafe 
areas may have similarly biased the education results. The differences in "ethnic 
background" may be reflective of the current controversy over racial and ethnic 
terminology. A recent study into the ethnic identity of Peninsula residents 
(Petersen 1993) reports that not all who consider themselves black believe that 
the term "African-American" describes them well. Because of multi-racial 
backgrounds, because country-of-origin may be the Caribbean basin, some who 
consider themselves black may not have checked "African-American" on the 
survey, preferring another category such as Hispanic or "Other."
After acknowledging these discrepancies, an important question remains 
unanswered. Do these differences between sample and population cause a loss of 
confidence in the study's conclusions? Had the objective of the research been to 
derive population estimates of personality traits, attitudes, or values, then the
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difference between sample and population would have been of strong concern. 
The purpose of this research, however, was to test hypotheses about materialism 
and measures of the self. The correlation analyses are not dependent on the 
match between sample and population. Further, as reported below, the match 
between this study's results and those reported by the authors of the two 
materialism and the four self scales are quite similar in most areas. Correlations 
between the materialism scales and the demographic variables are similar to 
those reported by the scales' authors. Additionally, Coefficient Alphas, scale 
means, standard deviations and ranges for almost all of the materialism and self 
scales are consistent with those reported in other studies. These consistencies 
lead one to have confidence in the hypotheses tests and conclusions of this study.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
After correcting the responses for the reverse scored items, means, standard 
deviations, and ranges were calculated for the six scales. These measures were 
then compared with those reported by the scales' authors and/or other 
researchers. The calculations resulting from this study's data generally are 
consistent with those from other studies. The results and comparisons with other 
research are reported in Tables 4 and 5.
To assess the "fit" of the data to the assumptions of the various analytical 
techniques and statistical tests employed in this study, the data were examined 
for normality and for homoscedasticity (equal variances). As the information in 
Table 6 indicates, the normality assumption is met for all six scales. In every case, 
skewness, which measures the "degree to which a distribution of cases 
approximates a normal curve" (Nie et al. 1975, p. 184), and kurtosis, which
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Richins and Dawson Scale 
(Journal of Consumer Research, December 1992, p. 303-316)
Mean Std. Dev. Range Alpha
Scale Study R&D* Study R&D* Study R&D** Study R&D
Overall scale 50.8 46.8 10.1 9.4 23-77 20-84 .83 .80-.88
Happiness 14.2 13.1 4.3 3.9 5-24 5-25 .74 .73-.83
Centrality 21.5 19.6 4.1 4.1 8-32 9-33 .64 .71-75
Success 15.5 14.3 4.1 3.9 6-27 6-30 .68 .74-.78
* Average of three surveys 
** Actual range over the three surveys
Belk Scale 










Overall scale 56.8 61.1 8.6 NA 30-80 NA .66 .62
Possessiveness 14.5 14.0 2.8 NA 6-20 NA .38 .61
Nongenerosity 19.1 22.7 4.9 NA 9-32 NA .64 .66
Envy 12.4 14.2 3.4 NA 5-21 NA .50 .46
Preservation 10.8 10.1 2.9 NA 3-15 NA .65 .55
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Mean Std. Dev. Range Alpha
Scale Study Other* Study Other Study Other Study Other
Self-Esteem 34.1 NA 5.1 NA 17-40 NA .83 .77-88
Self-Actualization 62.2 44.2 9.1 7.3 35-87 NA .68 .63-.68
Self-Monitoring 65.6 NA 15.2 NA 28-112 NA .78 .70-.79
Intrinsic/Extrinsic
Motivation 53.4 NA 7.8 NA 32-76 NA .41 .68-.74
* For Self-Esteem scale, "Other" results are those reported by Dobson, et al. (1979), 
Fleming and Courtney (1987), and Richins and Dawson (1992).
For Self-Actualization, Crandall and Jones (1991), Flett et al. (1991), and McLeod 
and Vodanovich (1991).
For Self-Monitoring, Synder and Gangstead (1986), Bell, Holbrook and 
Solomon (1991).
For Intrinsic/Extrinsic Motivation, Holbrook (1986), Bell, Holbrook and 
Solomon (1991).
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Richins and Dawson Scale -.0314 -.2299
Belk Scale -.1900 -.0447
Self-Esteem Scale -.9571 .4609
Self-Actualization Scale .1357 -.0053
Self-Monitoring Scale .2039 -.1072
IE Index -.1542 .0493
NOTES:
Skewness is a "statistic to determine the degree to which a distribution of cases approximates a 
normal curve, since it measures deviation from symmetry" (Nie et al. 1975, P. 184). Values near 
zero indicate a symmetrical bell-shaped curve. Positive values indicate that cases are clustered 
more to the left of the mean, with the most extreme values on the right. Negative values indicate 
clustering to the right.
Kurtosis is a "measure of the relative peakedness or flatness of a curve defined by the 
distribution of cases" (Nie et al. 1975, p. 185). Values near zero indicate a normal distribution. 
Positive values are indicative of a more peaked (narrow) distribution than normal. Negatiave 
values indicate a flatter, more elongated, distribution of cases.
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measures the "relative peakedness or flatness of a curve as defined by the 
distribution of cases" (Nie et al. 1975, p. 185), are close to zero, indicating a close 
to normal distribution. To test the homogeneity of variance assumption, residual 
plots were examined for the association between each of the materialism scales 
and the self scales. The plots are presented in Table 7. There seems to be no gross 
violation of this assumption either. The knowledge that the data conform to 
acceptable standards allowed the analysis to proceed.
The final general assessment was to explore the relationships between 
demographics and the materialism measures. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
was run to assess the differences in mean materialism scores for the demographic 
categories of gender, age, education, household income, and ethnic background. 
Because of unequal sample sizes, the "regression" or "unique" option for 
calculating sums of squares was selected (Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner 1985; 
SPSS-X User's Guide 1988). In the initial ANOVA calculations, interactions could 
not be computed because too many cells were empty. Some combinations of 
demographic categories, or treatments, were not represented. To deal with this 
problem, categories were combined for some variables. As a result, two-way 
interactions could be calculated. Consistent with computations by Belk (1985;
Ger and Belk 1990,1993) and Richins and Dawson (1992), correlation analysis 
was also run for the overall scales and subscales with education, age, gender, and 
household income. For both types of analysis, a significance level of .05 was 
used, unless otherwise noted.
The Richins and Dawson Scale
ANOVA. For the Richins and Dawson scale, Analysis of Variance 
indicated two significant interactions. The first was between the ethnic 
background and sex (F=2.337; significance = .099) of the respondents. The second
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Table 7
Residual Plots
The Belk Scale (Y) and Self-Esteem Scale (X)
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Table 7 (Continued)
Residual Plots
The Belk Scale (Y) and the Self-Monitoring Scale (X)
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Table 7 (Continued)
Residual Plots
The Belk Scale (Y) and the Richins and Dawson Scale (X)
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Table 7 (Continued)
Residual Plots
The Richins and Dawson Scale (Y) and The Self-Actualization Scale (X)
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Table 7 (Continued)
Residual Plots
The Richins and Dawson Scale (Y) and The IE Index (X)
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was between the education level and sex of the respondents (F=3.43; significance 
= .034). Table 8 presents the ANOVA table. The ethnic/sex interaction was 
investigated, even though it is not significant at the .05 level (p = .099). The 
Tukey multiple was selected for evaluating the comparisons since it is 
appropriate when doing all comparisons. Further, when sample sizes are 
unequal, Tukey is conservative (Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner 1985). A 
significance level of .10 was selected for this because of the significance level of 
the F statistic. Ethnic background was measured at three levels (black, white and 
other); sex was measured at two levels (female and male). After calculating the 
difference in mean materialism scores for all fifteen possible comparisons, only 
those between black females and other males, between black males and white 
females, and between black males and other males were large enough to not 
contain zero in the confidence interval. The result of the comparisons was that 
none of these were significant, an occurrence which, while unusual, is not 
unlikely (Markowski, personal communication, July 22,1993). This result is also 
consistent with other research reports of either no relationship or an inconsistent 
relationship between materialism and gender.
To investigate the interaction between education and sex, a similar 
procedure was followed, except that a significance level of .05 was used, since the 
F statistics was significant at p = .034. Education was measured at three levels 
(high school degree or less, some college, college degree or more). For six 
comparisons, the difference in mean materialism scores, when averaged over 
age, household income and ethnic background, was large enough for zero not to 
be in the confidence interval. The following pairs were selected: high school 
females versus high school males, high school males versus college grad females, 
high school males versus college grad males, some college females versus college 
grad females, some college females versus college grad males, and some college
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Table 8 
ANOVA Table: Richins and Dawson Scale and 
Selected Demographic Variables
Sum of Mean s i8
Source of Variation Squares DF Square F ofF
Main Effects 1288.793 10 128.879 1.271 .249
Ethnic background 322.407 2 161.203 1.590 .207
Education 181.506 2 90.753 .895 .410
Age 536.707 2 268.353 2.647 .074
Sex 31.8% 1 31.896 .315 .576
Household Income 489.922 3 163.307 1.611 .188
2-Way Interactions 3675.371 39 94.240 .930 .593
Ethnic Educ 104.228 4 26.057 .257 .905
Ehtnic Age 340.259 4 85.065 .839 .502
Ethnic Sex 473.770 2 236.885 2.337 .099
Ethnic Income 795.531 6 132.588 1.308 .256
Educ Age 312.256 4 78.064 .770 .546
Educ Sex 695.320 2 347.660 3.430 .034
Educ Income 198.027 6 33.004 .326 .923
Age Sex 110.052 2 55.026 .543 .582
Age Income 525.204 6 87.534 .864 .523
Sex Income 130.537 3 43.51 .429 .732
Explained 6002.815 49 122.506 1.209 .187
Residual 18549.494 183 101.363
Total 24552.309 232 105.829
278 cases were processed.
45 cases (16.2 pet) were missing.
Due to empty cells or a singular matrix, higher order interactions have been suppressed.
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males versus college graduate males. Of the six, the only comparison which was 
statistically significant was that between males having a high school degree or 
less and males with an undergraduate degree or higher. When averaged over the 
other demographic variables included in the analysis, "high school males" have 
mean materialism scores 7.8 points higher than "college graduate males" with an 
error of no more than 7.47 points and a significance level of .05. This result is 
consistent with Belk's (1985) hypothesis and finding that blue collar workers 
were more materialistic than any of the other groups he surveyed. Of course, not 
all those with a high school degree or less are blue collar workers. But they are 
more likely to be than are college graduates.
The only main effect which was significant was age (F=2.647; p = .074).
Since age was not part of either two-way interaction, it makes sense to 
investigate it separately. The Bonferroni multiple was selected since the number 
of comparisons was equal to the number of treatments (age was measured at 
three levels). Also, Bonferroni is exact for unequal sample sizes (Neter, 
Wasserman, and Kutner 1985). Because of the significance level of the F statistic, 
a significance level of .10 was selected for the calculations. The results were that, 
when averaged over sex, ethnic background, and education and income levels, 
18-to-34 year olds had mean materialism scores which were 3.92 points higher 
than 35-to-49 year olds, with an error of no more than 2.77 points. Further, 
18-to-34 year olds had mean materialism scores which were 4.34 points higher 
than those 50 years of age and older, with an error of no more than 3.98 points. 
The contrast between the youngest group and the two other age groups, 
indicates that the youngest age group had mean materialism scores which were 
4.13 points higher than the average mean materialism score of the two older age 
groups, with an error of no more than .41 points.
This finding is consistent with reports from other materialism researchers.
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Using the data from three of their four surveys, Richins and Dawson (1992) 
report that the age correlation was the only one which was not "quite low" and 
for which there was a discernible pattern. The median correlation between the 
overall scale and age was -.19, indicating that as people age, they tend to become 
less materialistic. Belk (1985; Ger and Belk 1993) has reported a similar 
relationship. However, in a study of lifestyles, Hendrickson and Morrisett (1992) 
found a positive correlation of the overall materialism scale with age.
Correlations. The correlation analysis in this study, as reported in Table 9, 
results in much the same conclusions.1 The correlation between age and the 
overall scale is -.22, and is the only demographic variable to significantly 
correlate with materialism. A statistically significant correlation is also present 
between age and each of the three subscales. The only other statistically 
significant correlations are between income and the happiness subscale (-.15; 
p=.018), and education and happiness (-.11; p=.065).
The Belk scale
ANOVA. For the Belk scale, as a result of Analysis of Variance, the only 
significant difference in mean materialism score was for the gender variable, and 
that was only significant at p = .085 (see Table 10). To investigate the nature of 
the difference, the comparison between female and male mean materialism 
scores was evaluated using the Bonferroni multiple (since the number of 
comparisons was small and sample sizes were unequal). A significance level of 
.10 was also used because of the significance of the F statistic reported above. The 
result of the comparison was that, when averaged over age, ethnic background,
E xcept for age, all correlations are Pearson product-moment correlations. For age, 
correlations are point biserial correlations—which SPSSX automatically computes when 
comparing a continuous and a dichotomous variable (Guilford and Fruchter 1978).
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Table 9 
Correlations of Materialism Scales with Demographics
Richins and Dawson Scale
Educ. Age Gender* Income
Overall Scale -.1005 -.2190 .0062 -.0655
(.100) (.000) (.921) (.297)
Happiness -.1116 -.2281 .0562 -.1477
(.065) (.000) (.362) (.018)
Centrality -.0701 -.2275 -.0622 .0124
(.250) (.000) (.316) (.843)
Success -.0621 -.1271 .0248 -.0587
(.305) (.036) (.687) (.347)
Belk Scale
Educ. Age Gender* Income
Overall Scale -.0292 -.1221 .1913 —.0730
(.633) (.045) (.002) (.245)
Possessiveness -.0108 -.0617 .0206 -.1014
(.859) (.310) (.738) (.103)
Nongenerosity .0074 -.0740 .1903 -.0076
(.903) (.224) (.002) (.903)
Envy -.0361 -.1950 .1923 -.1127
(.553) (.001) (.002) (.071)
Preservation -.0956 .0695 -.0284 .0182
(.114) (.253) (.645) (.772)
* Correlations for gender are point biserial correlations; all others are Pearson 
product-moment correlations.
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Table 10 
ANOVA Table: Belk Scale and 
Selected Demographic Variables
Sum of Mean Sig
Source of Variation Squares DF Square F ofF
Main Effects 977.175 10 97.718 1.333 .216
Ethnic background 309.667 2 154.833 2.111 .124
Education 114.183 2 57.092 .779 .461
Age 50.093 2 25.047 .342 .711
Sex 219.352 1 219.352 2.991 .085
Household Income 283.260 3 94.420 1.288 .280
2-Way Interactions 3084.466 39 79.089 1.079 .360
Ethnic Educ 249.236 4 62.309 .850 .495
Ehtnic Age 87.670 4 21.917 .299 .878
Ethnic Sex 55.724 2 27.862 .380 .684
Ethnic Income 475.259 6 79.210 1.080 .376
Educ Age 127.490 4 31.873 .435 .783
Educ Sex 218.108 2 109.054 1.487 .229
Educ Income 281.028 6 46.838 .639 .699
Age Sex 191.318 2 95.659 1.304 .274
Age Income 183.874 6 30.646 .418 .867
Sex Income 267.264 3 89.088 1.215 .306
Explained 4037.057 49 82.389 1.124 .288
Residual 13493.067 184 73.332
Total 17530.124 233 75.237
278 cases were processed.
44 cases (15.8 pet) were missing.
Due to empty cells or a singular matrix, higher order interactions have been suppressed.
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education and income levels, female mean materialism scores were 3.42 points 
lower than the mean materialism scores for males, with an error of no more than 
1.81 points. This conclusion is consistent with some materialism studies but not 
others. As detailed in the next paragraph, conclusions about materialism and 
gender are mixed.
Correlations. Correlation analysis of the Belk scale with the education, 
age, gender, and income variables also supports the gender difference, as 
reported in Table 9. And while neither Richins and Dawson (1992) nor Belk 
(1985; Ger and Belk 1990,1993) have found a consistent relationship between 
materialism and gender, Ger and Belk (1993) did find some significant 
differences by gender for some of the subscales. Women scored higher than men 
on possessiveness and preservation, while men scored higher than women on 
envy. In this study, the differences between men and women were on the traits 
of envy and nongenerosity as well as materialism overall. Additionally, age 
correlated with materialism. The statistically significant age correlations are with 
the overall scale (-.12; p = .045) and the envy (-.19; p = .001) subscale. These 
results are consistent with the findings reported by Richins and Dawson. Finally, 
there is one other significant correlation of income with envy (-.11; p = 071).
RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT
As noted earlier, several of the scales used in this study are in their 
formative stages. One contribution of this study is to provide further tests of 
them. After correcting the responses for the reverse scored items, Coefficient 
Alphas were calculated for the six scales. These results were then compared with 
those reported by the scales' authors and /or other researchers and found to be
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quite similar. The results and comparative figures are reported in Tables 4 and 5.
The Richins and Dawson Scale
For the Richins and Dawson scale and subscales, Chronbach Alphas 
calculated in this study were generally consistent with those reported by its 
authors (Richins and Dawson 1992). The overall scale Alpha was .83; the 
happiness subscale had an Alpha of .74; for centrality, the Alpha was .64; for 
success it was .68. These last two are below the threshold established by 
Nunnally (1978) of .70. They are, however, below the Alphas found by Richins 
and Dawson (1992) of .71 to .75 for the centrality subscale and .74 to .78 for the 
success subscale. To determine if any of the reliability coefficients might be 
improved with the deletion of any of the scale items, item-to-total correlations 
were calculated as well as scale Alphas with the removal of each item on an item 
by item basis. For neither the overall materialism scale nor for any of the 
subscales could the Alphas be improved. The results of this analysis are 
presented in Table 11. As a result of this reliability analysis, one can have 
confidence in further analysis with the overall materialism scale, but should use 
caution when dealing with the subscales.
The Belk Scale
For the Belk scale and subscales, while the results of this study are 
generally consistent with those reported by the author (Ger and Belk 1993, USA 
sample only), the reliability coefficients are much lower and fall into 
unacceptable ranges. In this study, the overall scale Alpha was .66, compared 
w ith .62 reported by Ger and Belk (1993, USA sample only). Alphas for the 
subscales were .64 for nongenerosity (.66, Ger and Belk), .50 for envy (.46, Ger 
and Belk), .65 for preservation (.55, Ger and Belk), and .38 for possessiveness (.61,
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Table 11
Item-to-Total Statistics



















Happier if could buy more 47.6176 97.4621 .5126 .4178 .8191
Don't pay attention to other's goods * 48.4926 103.0184 .3708 .2690 .8267
Achievements = acquiring goods 48.8860 101.4002 .4041 .2385 .8252
Better life if own certain goods 48.3824 97.1005 .5368 .4327 .8178
Enjoy buying non-practical items 48.3676 102.8754 .3160 .1866 .8298
Goods = how well I'm doing 48.5625 101.9001 .3608 .2472 .8275
Try to keep my life simple * 48.4265 102.8433 .3761 .2857 .8265
Like to own impressive things 48.5625 96.5274 .5804 .3861 .8154
Buying things gives me pleasure 47.5882 101.2837 .4648 .2615 .8225
Have all I need to enjoy life * 48.9154 101.4209 .3685 .2848 .8272
Usually buy only what I need * 48.2757 103.2779 .2847 .2422 .8317
Admire owners of expensive items 48.3897 98.6225 .5302 .3947 .8187
Don't emphasize goods as signs 
of success * 48.6875 101.5145 .4215 .2797 .8243
No happier if owned nicer things * 48.5000 99.9262 .4145 .2344 .8247
I like a lot of luxury in life 47.9890 98.9999 .4876 .3711 .8207
Things I own * important * 47.6801 102.0265 .3219 .1567 .8300
Emphasize material things less * 48.4449 103.6722 .3575 .2241 .8273
Am bothered when can't afford 
to buy what I like 48.2941 98.5036 .5123 .3508 .8194
RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 18 ITEMS; ALPHA = .8324 
* Reverse scored items
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Table 11 (Continued)
Item-to-Total Statistics




















Happier if could buy more 10.6232 11.6539 .5787 .3646 .6616
Better life if owned certain goods 11.3877 11.8092 .5665 .3467 .6668
Have all I need to enjoy life * 11.9239 13.1033 .4196 .1820 .7221
No happier if owned nicer things * 11.5000 12.8400 .4266 .1848 .7206
Am bothered when can't afford 
to buy what I like 11.2899 12.5702 .5151 .2700 .6877
RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 5 ITEMS; ALPHA = .7382 
* Reverse scored items
Centrality Subscale
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha
If Item If Item Total Multiple If Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted
Enjoy buying non-practical items 18.6813 15.5488 .2857 .1249 .6237
Try to keep my life simple * 18.7473 15.3513 .3945 .1780 .5906
Buying things gives me pleasure 17.9084 15.5835 .3749 .1591 .5966
Usually buy only what I need * 18.5934 14.3819 .4064 .1942 .5839
Like lot of luxury in my life 18.3114 14.3549 .4351 .1996 .5746
Things I own * important * 18.0000 15.4559 .2601 .0967 .6346
Emphasize material things less * 18.7692 16.1635 .3135 .1237 .6138
RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 7 ITEMS; ALPHA = .6394 
* Reverse scored items
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Table 11 (Continued)
Item-to-Total Statistics




















Don't pay attention to other's goods * 12.8051 14.1430 .2648 .0916 .6770
Achievements = acquiring goods 13.2130 12.9508 .3769 .1556 .6436
Goods = how well I'm doing 12.8917 12.3795 .4278 .1896 .6260
Like to own impressive things 12.8881 11.8026 .4781 .2512 .6069
Admire owners of expensive items 12.7256 12.3882 .4499 .2360 .6183
Don't emphsize goods as signs 
of success * 13.0036 12.8152 .4285 .1922 .6265
RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 6 ITEMS; ALPHA = .6755 
* Reverse scored items
140
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Ger and Belk). As noted before, Churchill (1979) has suggested that .60 is a 
minimal requirement for scale reliability; Nunnally (1978) has stated that .70 is 
the minimum acceptable level. Belk himself reports that the reliability levels 
associated with his scale and subscales are "moderately satisfactory," but 
suggests that in using a single scale for international research there is a trade off 
between reliability and cross-cultural adaptability (Ger and Belk 1993, p. 9).
It may be instructive, at this point, to recall the inconsistencies reported in 
Chapter Three between Belk's own findings and those who have used his scale in 
other research. That this study also found inconsistent results, therefore, is not 
unusual. However, one must use caution when comparing across studies. The 
scale employed here is the latest version and is somewhat different from that 
used by other researchers. At least four different versions of the Belk scale have 
been reported in the literature.
To determine if any of the reliability coefficients might be improved with 
the deletion of any of the scale items, item-to-total correlations were calculated 
as well as scale Alphas with the removal of each item on an item by item basis. 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 12. For only two of the 
subscales could the Alphas be slightly improved. For example, if two of the 
preservation subscale items were removed, the overall scale Alpha could be 
raised: from .66 to .67 by removal of "I like to collect things" or from .66 to .68 by 
removing "I have a lot of souvenirs." Neither of these improvements is 
significant enough to warrant removal of the items. The reliability of the 
preservation subscale can be raised from .65 to .67 if the item "I tend to hang on 
to things I should probably throw out" is removed. As before, the alteration of 
the scale does not seem to be warranted. The results of the reliability tests cast 
doubt on the advisability of further analysis with either the overall materialism 
scale or the subscales. Nunnally (1978) explains that scales with a Coefficient
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Enjoy having friends in my home * 54.8708
Don't like to lend things 54.4022
Happy for friends when they do well * 54.4170
Worry about possessions being taken 54.3063
Don't mind giving rides to the car-less* 54.6310
Bothered when friends have things 
I cannot afford 54.8672
Don't enjoy donating to needy 55.1255
Would like to trade places w /  some 54.3764
Don't like anyone in my home if 
I'm not there 53.4059
Don't get what is coming to me 54.5793
If have to choose, will buy for myself 
instead of for loved one 54.9926
Bothered when others buy what want 54.2214
Enjoy sharing what I have * 54.8893
Not upset when lose things * 53.1845
Wealthy people feel are too good 
to talk with average people 53.5867
Keep things should throw out 52.9705
Enjoy donating to charity * 54.8745
Have lots of souvenirs 53.3358
Less likely to lock up * 53.6273
Like to collect things 53.4059
RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 21 ITEMS; ALPHA
* Reverse scored items
Scale Corrected
Variance Item- Squared Alpha
If Item Total Multiple If Item
Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted
68.6867 .2336 .1642 .6520
69.8240 .1701 .1888 .6581
65.6487 .3405 .3232 .6397
68.8736 .2170 .1763 .6536
64.8577 .3732 .2149 .6355
67.2930 .3113 .2226 .6442
67.6786 .3326 .2423 .6434
68.6138 .2172 .1355 .6536
65.4060 .3281 .2424 .6407
66.5532 .2574 .1881 .6494
67.3705 .2998 .2487 .6453
66.9333 .3185 .1934 .6432
66.4471 .2767 .2125 .6470
67.4470 .3822 .3588 .6401
70.1436 .1212 .1021 .6639
69.0434 .1721 .1275 .6587
69.1991 .1491 .2139 .6618
67.1101 .3590 .3576 .6406
71.6757 .0247 .3417 .6761
69.5087 .1403 .1262 .6624
70.6939 .0734 .3145 .6704
= .6627
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Upset when something is stolen 10.2428 5.7554 .2093 .0510 .3169
Don't like anyone in my home if 
I'm not there 11.1014 5.1097 .1762 .0354 .3566
Not upset when lose things * 10.9022 5.3831 .2126 .0544 .3103
Less likely to lock things up * 11.3406 5.1490 .2342 .0551 .2855
RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 4 ITEMS; ALPHA = .3824 








If Item If Item Total Multiple If Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted
Enjoy having friends in my home * 17.1387 20.0906 .2707 .1114 .6237
Don't like to lend things 16.6606 18.5547 .3424 .1965 .6073
Happy for friends when they do well * 16.6788 20.1895 .2436 .1340 .6302
Worry about possessions being taken 16.5730 18.9196 .2925 .1197 .6214
Don't mind giving rides to the car-less * 16.8869 19.1630 .3566 .1731 .6037
Bothered when friends have things 
I cannot afford 17.1423 20.3863 .2714 .1399 .6232
Don't enjoy donating to needy 17.3978 20.6434 .1780 .0740 .6462
Enjoy sharing what I have * 17.1460 18.9603 .4906 .2911 .5786
Enjoy donating to charity * 17.1350 18.5861 .4867 .3078 .5756
RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 9 ITEMS; ALPHA = .6405 
* Reverse scored items
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Would like to trade places w /  some 9.9055 7.7793 .3120 .1197 .4213
Don't get what is coming to me 10.1345 8.2629 .3616 .1342 .3962
If I have to choose, will buy for myself 
instead of for loved one 10.5345 9.0672 .2141 .0738 .4832
Bothered when others buy what want 9.7600 8.1174 .2677 .0821 .4528
Wealthy people feel are too good 
to talk with average people 9.1345 8.6570 .2280 .0770 .4770
RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 5 ITEMS; ALPHA = .5029 
* Reverse scored items
Preservation Subscale
Scale Scale Corrected
Mean Variance Item- Squared Alpha
If Item If Item Total Multiple If Item
Deleted Deleted Correlation Correlation Deleted
Keep things should throw out 6.9529 4.7287 .3752 .1522 .6661
Have lots of souvenirs 7.3116 3.9316 .5511 .3135 .4257
Like to collect things 7.3659 4.3201 .4649 .2571 .5493
RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 3 ITEMS; ALPHA = .6511 
* Reverse scored items
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Alpha of less than .70 should be further examined because the low Alpha 
indicates that sufficient measurement error remains in the scale to call its use into 
question. The items in the scale may not be clearly written or they may not all be 
sampling the content of the same construct (p. 230). In either case, the scale 
warrants further refinement and testing.
The Self Scales
The descriptive statistics and reliability calculations for three of the self 
scales were consistent with previous studies (the results are reported in Table 5). 
This finding lends credibility to this study and provides confidence in the tests of 
the hypotheses.
The one self scale for which results were not similar is the Intrinsic/ 
Extrinsic Motivation Index (IE Index). As discussed in the previous chapter, 
Holbrook (1986a) acknowledges the exploratory nature of his scale. Further, a 
modified version of the index was used in this research because several items in 
the original scale duplicated items in the materialism, self-monitoring, and 
self-actualization scales. When those items are put back in, the reliability 
coefficient improves from .41 to .50. While this is a good measure of 
improvement, several problems remain. First, an Alpha of .50 is below that 
advocated for either basic or applied research (Churchill 1979; Nunnally 1978). 
Second, if the reliability coefficient is improved with the addition of items from 
scales measuring other constructs, the validity of the scale is called into question. 
For these reasons, the work with this scale is considered to be purely exploratory 
at this time. While further results are discussed, no conclusions are drawn about 
measures of intrinsic/extrinsic motivation and materialism.
Except for the IE Index, the self scales have been widely employed by 
researchers. As detailed in Chapter Three, the self-monitoring scale has been
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used in studies of dishonest behavior (Covey et al. 1989), of personality 
(Sampson 1978), and of culture (Gudykunst 1985). Richins and Dawson (1992) 
used the self-esteem scale, as have many other researchers (Blascovich and 
Tomaka 1991). The short index of self-actualization is a newer scale, but has been 
successfully employed in several personality studies (c.f., Richard and Jex 1991; 
Schelle and Bonin 1989; Watson, Morris and Hood 1990). The materialism scales, 
however, are still undergoing refinement and testing. One of the purposes of this 
study was to provide a further test of the two scales. The next section addresses 
the relationships among the overall materialism scales and their subscales as well 
as the scales' factor structures.
CONVERGENT VALIDITY ASSESSMENT
As a test of convergent validity, the correlation between the two scales was 
calculated. The relatively high correlation (.4691; p = .000) is evidence of 
convergent validity. That the correlation is not closer to 1.00 indicates that the 
two scales are not tapping exactly the same construct in the same way. One way 
to understand this idea is to calculate the square of the correlation coefficient, 
since it provides a measure of the amount of variation in one scale which is 
accounted for by the variation in the other (Cohen 1988; Nunnally 1978). In this 
case, the square of the correlation coefficient is .22, indicating that 22 percent of 
the variation in the Belk scale is explained by the variation in the Richins and 
Dawson scale and vice versa. This result is to be expected since, as noted in 
Chapter Two, Belk conceives of materialism as a personality trait and Richins 
and Dawson approach materialism as a value. Put another way, Belk measures 
materialism indirectly, while Richins and Dawson measure it directly.
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Correlations among the subscales further support the differences between 
the two measures. Richins and Dawson developed items to measure the 
importance of possessions in a person's life (how central possessions are) and the 
role of possessions in determining happiness and success. Belk developed items 
to measure an individual's willingness to share what s /h e  has with others 
(nongenerosity), an individual’s reaction to others who have more (envy), a 
tendency to control or retain ownership of one's possessions (possessiveness), 
and a desire to collect and hold onto tangible possessions (preservation). As 
Table 13 shows, there is not a great deal of overlap among these seven 
dimensions of materialism. Half of the correlations among subscales are less than 
.20, indicating that the variation in one subscale explains less than four percent of 
the variation in the other. The low correlations between possessiveness and the 
three Richins and Dawson subscales could simply be a function of the low 
internal consistency of the possessiveness subscale (.38). The low, and 
non-significant, correlations between preservation and two of the three Richins 
and Dawson subscales could reflect the fact that preservation is not measured in 
the Richins and Dawson scale—though aspects of preservation are implied in the 
centrality concept as indicated by the correlation analysis.
Two Belk subscales, however, do correlate positively (and significantly) 
with two of the Richins and Dawson subscales. Correlation analysis indicates 
that the more a person defines happiness and success by her/his possessions, the 
more that person is nongenerous and envious of others. This sense of this 
conclusion can be illustrated by examining the individual/collective dichotomy 
present in the relationship between two other variables with which the reader 
may be more familiar, freedom and equality. In his longitudinal study of value 
hierarchies in the United States from 1968 to 1981, Rokeach (1973; Rokeach and 
Ball-Rokeach 1989) found that while freedom ("independence, free choice") was
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B elk Happiness Centrality Success
Overall
Scale
Possessiveness .1587 .1388 .2061 .2143
(.004) (.011) (.000) (.000)
Nongenerosity .3331 .1413 .3657 .3821
(.000) (.010) (.000) (.000)
Envy .4199 .1370 .3317 .3517
(.000) (.012) (.000) (.000)
Preservation .0518 .2188 .0282 .1318
(.196) (.000) (.321) (.015)
Overall Scale .4260 .2537 .4140 .4691
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
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consistently ranked as the third most desired value, equality moved from 
ranking seventh in 1968 to fourth in 1971 to twelfth in  both 1974 and 1981. The 
explanation for the relative positions of the two values was that as individual 
freedom became more important, freedom for "me" came at the expense of 
freedom for "thee." Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach conclude that in choosing 
me-centered "pursuits of freedom, comfort, achievement, and excitement," the 
value of equality declined (1989 p. 783). A similar difference between collective 
and personal orientation is reflected in the results of this study. If one requires 
possessions (and, sometimes, more possessions) to feel happy and successful, 
then that same person is not likely to give away or share those possessions (lest 
happiness and success be somehow diminished). That person is, however, likely 
to be envious of those who have more since his/her own happiness and success 
are diminished by not having as much as someone else.
Thus, the two measures are tapping some similar aspects of materialism.
Yet it is also clear that, as expected, the two scales address different dimensions. 
Analysis of the factor structures of the scales further supports this conclusion.
CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS
Data from this study were factor analyzed to determine if the factors found 
by Belk and by Richins and Dawson could be replicated. In neither case were the 
factor structures the same as those reported by the scales' authors. Before 
investigating each scale separately, general "assumptions" about factor analysis 
need to be addressed.
A first condition for successful factor analysis is that, at a minimum, there 
should be five cases for each variable in the analysis (Nunnally 1978). There were
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278 respondents in this study. Thus, for the Richins and Dawson scale, which has 
18 items, three times the minimum number of cases were available for the 
analysis. Since the Belk scale has 21 items, two and one-half times the minimum 
number were available. Thus, both scales meet this criterion.
The main assumption of factor analysis, that the data are factorable, is not 
well met for the Belk scale, however. Evidence for this conclusion comes from a 
test for sampling adequacy as well as from examination of the correlation matrix. 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy is an index for 
"comparing the magnitudes of the observed correlation coefficients [among the 
variables in the factor analysis] to the magnitudes of the partial correlation 
coefficients" (Norusis 1990, p. 162). If the variables have any factors in common, 
the partial correlation coefficients should be relatively small, since the partial 
correlation coefficient measures what is "left" after the common variation is 
partialed out. Kaiser (1974) has devised an alliterative characterization for the 
KMO measure. He suggests that results in the .90s are marvelous; those in the 
.80s are meritorious; measures in the .70s are middling; those in the .60s are 
mediocre; and those in the .50s are miserable. According to this progression, one 
could characterize the KMO measure for the Richins and Dawson scale (.84742) 
as "meritorious," but the measure for the Belk scale (.70875) as "middling" at 
best.
Examination of the correlation matrix provides specific information about 
the problems with factor analysis of the Belk scale. Tabachnick and Fidell (1989) 
caution that "factor analysis is exquisitely sensitive to the sizes of correlations"
(p. 602) and that if no correlations exceed .30, the use of factor analysis is 
questionable. A look at the matrix of correlations among the items for the Belk 
scale reveals that only five are .30 or better (Table 14). For the Richins and 
Dawson scale, however, 29 correlations are .30 or better (see Table 15)—and there
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are four fewer items in this scale, resulting in fewer correlations. With this 
information, one would expect the confirmatory factor analysis to be more 
successful for the Richins and Dawson scale, and it was.
The Richins and Dawson Scale
For the Richins and Dawson scale, three, four and five factors are possible 
(see Table 16 for scree plot and eigenvalues), though the four factor solution 
seems optimal. The first four factors have eigenvalues greater than one, 
accounting for 49.5 percent of the variation in the data. More importantly, the 
four factor solution is the "cleanest" of the three because of the pattern of factor 
loadings as well as the interpretation of the factors. Tables 17 through 19 present 
the three, four, and five-factor matrices. A discussion of each solution and the 
rationale for the four factor solution are presented next.
The three and five factor solutions. The three factor solution, while more 
closely mirroring the structure suggested by Richins and Dawson (1992), does 
not exactly reproduce the factors they identified. The only "clean" factor is 
centrality, comprised of four items. However, the three other centrality items are 
spread between the other two factors. Interestingly, factor analysis by Williams 
and Bryce (1992) yielded the same result. They discovered "some instability" in 
the centrality scale, with two items loading on the success scale and one on the 
happiness scale. Investigation of the four and five factor solutions reveals that, 
except for the placement of two items, the structures are almost identical. (Of 
course, the number of factors and the percent of variation in the data which is 
explained are not the same.) One centrality item becomes a single-item factor; 
one other centrality item is moved from one factor to another. In terms of 
variation explained, the fifth factor accounts for an additional 5.1 percent. In 
terms of understanding, however, the knowledge of the materialism construct is
153








Scree Plot and Eigenvalues 





















8 9 10 II  12 13 14 15 16 17 18 193 4  5 72 60
Factors
Factor Eigenvalue % of Var Cum. %
1 4.809 26.7 26.7
2 1.602 8.9 35.6
3 1.318 7.3 42.9
4 1.179 6.6 49.5
5 .914 5.1 54.6
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Table 17




Happiness (with) (Pleasure from) Possessions 
I'd be happier if I could afford to buy more things. (H) .7249 -.0049 .1449
My life would be better if I owned certain things 
I don't have. (H) .7104 .0726 .1328
It sometimes bothers me quite a bit that I can't 
afford to buy all the things I'd like. (H) .6206 .0281 .2744
I have all the things I really need to enjoy life. * (H) .5802 .1334 -.1063
I admire people who own expensive homes, cars, 
and clothes. (S) .5795 .1802 .2288
Some of the most important achievements in life 
include acquiring material possessions. (S) .5505 .2533 -.1106
I like to own things that impress people. (S) .5294 .2801 .3154
I wouldn't be any happier if I owned nicer things. * (H) .4342 .1400 .2246
Buying things gives me a lot of pleasure. (C) .4111 .1954 .3442
Success
I don't pay much attention to the material objects other 
people own. * (S)
I put less emphasis on material things than most 
people I know. * (C)
I don't place much emphasis on the amount of material 
objects people own as a sign of success. * (S)
The things I own aren't all that important to me. * (C) 
The things I own say a lot about how well I'm 












I usually buy only the things I need. * (C)
I like a lot of luxury in my life. (C)
I enjoy spending money on things that aren't practical. (C)
I try to keep my life simple, as far as possessions 













* Reverse scored items.
(H) Original Happiness Subscale Item 
(S) Original Success Subscale Item 
(C) Original Centrality Subscale Item
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Table 18








I have all the things I really need to enjoy life. * (H)
I'd be happier if I could afford to buy more things. (H)
It sometimes bothers me quite a bit that I can't 
afford to buy all the things I'd like. (H)
My life would be better if I owned certain things 
I don't have. (H)
I wouldn't be any happier if I owned nicer things. * (H)
Pleasure of Acquisition(s)
I like a lot of luxury in my life. (C)
I enjoy spending money on things that 
aren't practical. (C)
Buying things gives me a lot of pleasure. (C)
I usually buy only the things I need. * (C)
I like to own things that impress people. (S)
I admire people who own expensive homes, cars, 
and clothes. (S)
Centrality
I don't pay much attention to the material objects other 
people own. * (S)
I try to keep my life simple, as far as possessions 
are concerned. * (C)
I put less emphasis on material things than most 
people I know. * (C)
The things I own aren't all that important to me. * (C)
Success
The things I own say a lot about how well I'm 
doing in life. (S)
Some of the most important achievements in life 
include acquiring material possessions. (S)
I don't place much emphasis on the amount of material
objects people own as a sign of success. * (S) .2927










































.0825 .0527 .7245 .1296
.1635 .2241 .6508 -.1158
.0256 .0748 .6154 .2630





* Reverse scored items.
(H) Original Happiness Subscale Item; (C) Original Centrality Subscale Item 
(S) Original Success Subscale Item
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Table 19
Richins and Dawson Scale — Factor Analysis
Five Factor Solution
Happiness
I'd be happier if I could afford to buy more things. (H)
My life would be better if I owned certain things 
I don't have. (H)
I have all the things I really need to enjoy life. * (H)
I wouldn't be any happier if I owned nicer things. * (H)
It sometimes bothers me quite a bit that I can't 
afford to buy all the things I'd like. (H)
Pleasure of Acquisition(s)
I like a lot of luxury in my life. (C)
I enjoy spending money on things that 
aren't practical. (Q
Buying things gives me a lot of pleasure. (O
I like to own things that impress people. (S)
I admire people who own expensive homes, 
cars, and clothes. (S)
Success
The things I own say a lot about how well I'm 
doing in life. (S)
I don't place much emphasis on the amount of material 
objects people own as a sign of success. * (S)
Some of the most important achievements in life 
include acquiring material possessions. (S)
Factor
1 2 3 4 5
.7059 .2740 .1277 -.0762 .1191
.6571 .2852 .1750 -.0784 .1981
.6425 -.1523 .3560 .2014 -.2021
.6287 .0819 -.1109 .1554 .3192
.6219 .2704 .1599 .1943 -.1064
.1813 .6853 .0801 .1865 .0766
.0629 .6438 .0063 .1365 -.1047
.1775 .5469 .1961 .0098 .2728
.2914 .4953 .3426 .1175 .1931
2839 .4821 .4324 .0473 .0056
-.0958 .2635 .6795 -.0284 .2342
.2234 -.0779 .6389 .2689 .1243
.2628 .1759 5957 -.0446 -.0103
Centrality
are concerned. * (C) .1199 .1324 .0937 .7583
I usually buy only the things I need. * (C) .0220 .4103 -.1945 .6327
I don't pay much attention to the material objects 
other people own. * (S) .0786 .0241 .1345 .53713
I put less emphasis on material things than most 
people I know. * (C) -.0007 .0601 .2998 .4704
Factor 5






* Reverse scored items.
(H) Original Happiness Subscale Item; (C) Original Centrality Subscale Item 
(S) Original Success Subscale Item
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not enhanced. The discussion of the four factor solution explains why.
The four factor solution. With four-factors, 49.5 percent of the variation in 
the data is explained. After varimax rotation, all the happiness items loaded on 
the first factor. Three of the success items loaded on the fourth factor; factors two 
and three were a combination of success and centrality items. While both of 
these latter factors were dominated by centrality items, factor two contained 
items which addressed the process of acquiring possessions, and factor three 
contained items reflecting the importance of those possession in one's life (which 
is how Richins and Dawson define centrality). The presence of the additional 
factor (factor two)—entitled pleasure from acquisition—is warranted by theory 
and may not be occasioned just by this particular data set. For instance,
Campbell (1987) theorized that in a "high level" consumer culture, in which 
people have what they need, the pursuit of acquisitions is as important, if not 
more important, than the actual possessions themselves. Further, Fournier and 
Richins (1991) found that acquiring and caring for possessions are activities 
common to materialists. Materialists are happy and active shoppers: "visiting 
shops to see what is available. Always thinking about future purchases so that 
thinking about buying involves pleasure and happiness" (p. 410).
At first glance, this four factor solution does not appear to be a clean one. 
Several items have loadings of .3 or better on more than one factor. However, 
Nunnally (1978) cautions against "over interpreting the meaning of small factor 
loadings, e.g. those below .40" (p. 434). Thus if loadings of .4 or greater are 
considered, only two items have cross loadings, and the evaluation of the 
four-factor solution is improved.
Richins indicates that as "long as the overall Alpha is reasonable," she is 
not overly concerned with the variations in the scale structure since factor 
analysis is "notoriously prone" to variations with different samples (personal
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communication, May 25,1993). While Nunnally (1978) supports that conclusion, 
the factors should be stable across similar data sets. In their Journal of Consumer 
Research article, Richins and Dawson (1992) present the factor analysis which was 
derived from only one of their four samples. So, indeed, the differences in factor 
structure between this study and theirs could be explained by differences in data 
sets. As Table 20 illustrates, there are statistically significant differences between 
the samples. Theirs contained more older respondents, more college graduates, 
and more males. For a reliable, valid scale, however, when samples are similar, 
differences in factor structures should not be a frequent occurrence.
The finding of four instead of three factors has a number of implications, 
assuming that it is not just an artifact of the data set. As noted above, there is 
theoretical support for the notion that materialists enjoy the process of acquiring 
possessions and that they admire and like to own impressive items. On the other 
hand, it might be argued that in a consumption oriented society, for many 
people, shopping is simply an enjoyable activity. Further, since it has already 
been established that in Western societies people use possessions to cement their 
self identities, then noticing, admiring, and enjoying shopping for possessions 
may not necessarily be a sign of materialism. It may simply be reflective of a 
certain amount of status consciousness. If these last two points are true, then the 
scale might be improved by omitting the items on the "pleasure in acquisition(s)" 
factor, since they measure a dimension which is not necessarily materialism.2
2
As a quick test of this idea, the six "pleasure of acquisition" items were removed from the 
scale. On a reliability basis, the removal was not an improvement. The overall scale Alpha 
remained a respectable .77 and Alpha for the happiness subscale was .74, again quite acceptable. 
Alphas for the two remaining subscales, however, fell to unacceptable levels: .58 for centrality 
and .54 for success. These results indicate that further research is required. As a final check, factor 
analysis of the reduced scale was run. Indeed, the three factors which had been hypothesized did 
emerge cleanly, accounting for 50 percent of the variation in the data. However, similar results 
might not be obtained with other data sets. That is a subject for future research.
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Table 20 
Comparison of Samples 












No Answer 1.1 0.8
Household Income




No Answer 6.5 2.4
Education
High School or less 19.0 22.4
Some College 52.9 38.0
College Grad + 27.4 37.2
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The Belk Scale
While Belk has suggested that four personality traits of possessiveness, 
nongenerosity, envy and preservation (tangibility) incline one toward 
materialism, factor analysis in this study did not suggest the same four facets. 
Instead, the results suggest that three through eight factors are possible (see 
Table 21 for scree plot and eigenvalues). When an eight factor solution was 
requested, however, varimax failed to converge in  24 iterations. Table 22 through 
Table 26 present the three through seven factor matrices. Before discussing the 
alternative solutions, the four factor structure will be addressed.
The four factor solution. Because the Belk scale is comprised of four 
subscales, factor analysis was run with four factors being specified. The resulting 
structure is presented in Table 23. Consistent with Belk (1984,1985; Ger and Belk 
1990,1993) nongenerosity was the first factor to emerge, indicating that it 
accounts for the greatest proportion of variation in  the data. Of course, this result 
is what one would expect, since the nongenerosity subscale contains nine of the 
21 items in the scale. Nunnally's (1978) caution about not ascribing too much 
importance to the first factor if the scale is constructed so that more of its items 
measure factor one-type constructs is worth remembering. The only clean factor, 
however, is preservation, on which the three intended items load. This result is 
not surprising since the Alpha for this subscale is the largest of the four, .65. The 
envy and nongenerosity subscales are composed primarily of the "right" items, 
though there is some mix between the two. Again, knowledge of the internal 
consistency of these two subscales helps explain the results. Belk acknowledges 
that the nongenerosity subscale generally has been the "most internally 
consistent factor" (personal communication, May 7,1993). Its Alpha is .64; the 
Alpha for envy is .50. The possessiveness subscale, however, is a mixture of 
possessiveness and nongenerosity items—again to be expected from the Alpha of
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Table 21 







3 0 0 -
2 . 5 0 -
2 . 2 5 -
0 7 5 -
i 1------ 1
13 14 15 16 1710 1 I
i — i— r
8 19 20 21 22
Factors
Factor Eigenvalue % of Var Cum. %
1 3.325 15.8 15.8
2 1.979 9.4 25.3
3 1.598 7.6 32.9
4 1.356 6.5 39.3
5 1.229 5.9 45.2
6 1.108 5.3 50.5
7 1.008 4.8 55.3
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.38 which was found in this study for that subscale.
What is to be made of the mix of items among the factors? Certainly factor 
analysis is not an exact analytical technique and should be interpreted using the 
numerical results as well as an understanding of the concepts involved. The four 
factor solution, however, only accounts for 39.3 percent of the variation in the 
data, while other factor solutions explain more than 50 percent of the variation.
In Ger and Belk's most recent cross-cultural study (1993), the four factors 
account for 28 percent of the variance for the overall sample. Specific information 
for different countries is not available. Another consideration is the nature of the 
construct being measured by this scale—personality traits. Since personality is 
quite variable across individuals, a scale which measures a variety of personality 
traits might also be expected to be variable. Additionally, factor analysis looks 
for commonalities. If there is not much similarity in the personalities of the 
people being sampled, more factors rather than fewer would be expected. As 
noted at the beginning of this section, the correlations among the items in the 
Belk scale are quite low, with only four being above .30. Thus there would 
appear to be few commonalites among the items.
Belk may have consistently found four factors, partly because he has 
consistently used student samples. In fact, he admits to desiring a homogeneous 
sample to smooth out differences (Ger and Belk 1993). This study's design, 
however, called for a more heterogenous sample in an attempt to reflect the adult 
population. Nunnally (1978) issues a strong caution about sample composition. 
He suggests that if a scale's factors are to be interpreted solely for people with a 
particular characteristic, such as a given age range, then the sample should be 
homogeneous with respect to that characteristic. If, however, the factors are 
intended to be generalized across more heterogeneous groups, as with the 
materialism scales, then the sample should be similarly heterogeneous.
163
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Table 22
Belk Scale: Three Factor Solution
Factor
1 2 3
Selfishness (Nongenerosity and Envy)
There are certain people I would like to trade 
places with. (E) .6532 -.0674 .1134
I don't seem to get what is coming to me. (E) .5845 -.0351 -.0124
When friends have things I cannot afford, it 
bothers me. (NG) .5441 .1490 .0257
I enjoy donating things for charity. * (NG) .5298 .2750 -.2845
I enjoy sharing what I have. * (NG) .4890 .3720 -.2475
When friends do better than me in competition 
it usually makes me feel happy for them.* (NG) .4739 -.0087 -.0701
I am bothered when I see people who buy 
anything they want. (E) .4555 .0953 .1744
If I have to choose between buying something for 
myself versus for someone I love, I would prefer 
buying for myself. (E) .4259 .2703 -.0639
I do not enjoy donating things to the needy. (NG) .3572 .0701 -.0721
People who are very wealthy often feel they 
are too good to talk to average people. (E) .3174 .0086 .1336
Possessiveness and Worry over Loss
I don't like to lend things, even to good friends. (NG) .0561 .7164 .0199
I worry about people taking my possessions. (NG) .2209 .5513 .1195
I don't like to have anyone in my home when
I'm not there. (P) .0644 .5448 -.0064
I am less likely than most people to lock things up. * (P) -.1161 .5331 -.1105
I don't mind giving rides to those who
don't have a car. * (NG) .2687 .4263 -.0579
I get very  upset if something is stolen from me, even
if it has little monetary value. (P) .0302 .4134 .3716
I enjoy having people I like stay in my home. * (NG) .1526 .3182 -.2617
Preservation/Collecting
I like to collect things. (Pr) .0346 -.1136 .6969
I have a lot of souvenirs. (Pr) .0236 -.1979 .6917
I tend to hang on to things I should probably 
throw out. (Pr) .0478 .0542 .6648
1 don't particularly get upset when I lose things. * (P) -.0584 .2489 .3657
* Reverse scored items.
(NG) Original Nongenerosity Subscale Item; (E) Original Envy Subscale Item 
(P) Original Possessiveness Subscale Item; (Pr) Original Preservation Subscale Item
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Table 23




I enjoy donating things for charity. * (NG) .6433 .2104 .0694
I enjoy sharing what I have. * (NG) .6156 .1865 .1818
I don't mind giving rides to those who 
don't have a car. * (NG) 5521 -.0534 .2598
I enjoy having people I like stay in my home. * (NG) 5128 -.1821 .1305
If I have to choose between buying something for 
myself versus for someone I love, I would prefer 
buying for myself. (E) .4376 .2309 .1530
When friends do better than me in competition 
it usually makes me feel happy for them.* (NG) .4375 .2334 -.1401
I do not enjoy donating things to the needy. (NG) .4013 .1276 -.0535
Envy
I am bothered when I see people who buy 
anything they want. (E)
There are certain people I would like to trade 
places with. (E)
When friends have things I cannot afford, it 
bothers me. (NG)
I don't seem to get what is coming to me. (E) 
People who are very wealthy often feel they 
are too good to talk to average people. (E)
Possessiveness
I don't like to lend things, even to good friends. (NG)
I worry about people taking my possessions. (NG)
I get very upset if something is stolen from me, even 
if it has little monetary value. (P)
I am less likely than most people to lock things up. * (P)
I don't like to have anyone in my home when 
I'm not there. (P)
I don't particularly get upset when I lose things. * (P)
Preservation
I like to collect things. (Pr)
I have a lot of souvenirs. (Pr)
I tend to hang on to things I should probably 
throw out. (Pr)
* Reverse scored items.
(NG) Original Nongenerosity Subscale Item; (E) Original Envy Subscale Item 
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Differences in age, sex, education, and the like can result in different factors 
emerging from the analysis. Thus, one should expect that the factors which are 
produced from Belk's student samples would not be the same as those produced 
when the sample is more heterogeneous. Hence, the results being discussed here 
are what one might expect. Similarly, the nine-factor solution reported by Cole et 
al. (1992) from a survey of adults in a large midwestem d ty  is not surprising.
The three factor solution. Of the remaining possible solutions, the six 
factor structure is the most interpretable. Before discussing it, reasons for 
rejecting the others will be addressed. The three factor solution, presented in 
Table 22 is quite appealing numerically, with no items having cross loadings of .4 
or greater. However, the three factors account for only 32.9 percent of the 
variation in the data. More importantly, their interpretation is not intuitively 
appealing. Factor one is a mix of nongenerosity and envy items, suggesting 
selfishness, since the items which load here deal with not liking to share things or 
not wanting to give to charity or to the needy. Factor two is a mix of 
nongenerosity and possessiveness items. They would appear to tap ideas of both 
possessiveness and concern for loss of possessions. Finally, the three 
preservation items and one possessiveness item load on the third factor. 
Conceptually, personality traits of selfishness, possessiveness, and preservation 
seem to be too broad for a measure of materialism. The finer distinctions which 
appear in the six factor solution are preferable.
The five factor solution. The five factor solution, presented in Table 24, is 
an improvement over the three and four factor structures. However, it too, 
contains factors which are a mixture of items from the original subscales. 
Nongenerosity items load on four of the factors, possessiveness items load on 
two, and envy items load on three. Except for the factor with the three 
preservation items, the factors are not as interpretable as in the six factor
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Table 24
Belk Scale: Five Factor Solution
Factor
Selfishness/Me-Centered 
When friends do better than me in competition 
it usually makes me feel happy for them* (NG)
I enjoy donating things for charity* (NG)
I enjoy sharing what I have.* (NG)
I don't mind giving rides to those who don't 
have a car* (NG)
When friends have things I cannot afford, it 
bothers me. (NG)
If I have to choose between buying something for 
myself versus for someone I love, I would 
prefer buying for myself. (E)
Worry over Possession Loss 
I don't like to lend things, even to good friends.(NG)
I don't like to have anyone in my home when 
I'm not there. (P)
I am less likely than most people to lock things up.* (P) 
I worry about people taking my possessions. (NG)
1 2 3 4
.6749 -.1883 .0289 -.0668
5969 .2023 -.1445 .2285
5505 .3063 -.1308 .2129
5505 .3293 .0962 -.1319
.5302 -.0525 -.0972 .1640
.4823 .1764 -.0098 .1364
.2873 .6725 .0753 -.1234
.0325 5749 -.0322 .1536
-.0103 .5355 -.1563 -.0652
.1577 .4873 -.0208 .1857
I have a lot of souvenirs. (Pr) -.0570 -.1352 .8092 .0307
I like to collect things. (Pr) -.0339 -.0779 .7695 .0178
I tend to hang on to things I probably should 
throw out. (Pr) .0026 .0522 .6703 .0036
Envy
I don't seem to get what is coming to me. (E)
People who are very wealthy often feel they 
are too good to talk to average people. (E)
There are certain people I would like to trade 
places with. (E)
I do not enjoy donating things to the needs. (NG)
Factor Five
I get very upset if something is stolen from me, even 
if it has little monetary value. (P)
I am bothered when I see people who buy 
anything they want. (E)
I enjoy having people I like stay in my home.* (NG)













.1676 .0067 -.0218 .6967
-.1245 .0614 -.0139 .5880
.3519 -.1193 .0879 .5443





* Reverse scored items.
(NG) Original Nongenerosity Subscale Item; (E) Original Envy Subscale Item 
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solution—though some of them do hint at it. For example, factor one contains 
items which indicate a self-centered orientation and factor two contains items 
which address worry over loss of possessions. The fifth factor, however, also 
seems to address the same concern—as indicated by cross loadings of two items 
on the second and fifth factors. Hence, this solution can also be rejected.
The six and seven factor solutions. Tables 25 and 26 present the six and 
seven factor structures. The common feature of both solutions is that the nine 
nongenerosity items do not form a single factor. They are dispersed among four 
factors in the six factor solution and among five factors in the seven factor 
solution. This situation would appear to suggest that nongenerosity may not be a 
single construct in people's minds.
More specifically, in the six factor solution, nongenerosity is divided into 
three dimensions. The first deals with sharing with others (with scale items such 
as lending possessions, giving rides to those without transportation, and 
generally sharing what one has). The second face of nongenerosity seems to be 
selfishness, or a "me versus thee" mentality (with statements of not rejoicing in 
others' good fortunes, not donating to charity, and buying things for oneself 
instead of for others loading on this factor). Third, nongenerosity seems to 
manifest itself in an almost siege mentality (items suggest not liking to have 
friends stay in one's home, not helping out the needy, and feeling that one 
generally doesn't get what one deserves from society).
The remaining three factors are quite separate from nongenerosity. The 
preservation factor remains intact, as before. Two envy items load on the sixth 
factor (being envious, even jealous, of the wealthy and of people who seem to be 
able to buy what they want). And, finally, the possessiveness items load together. 
This last factor might be more accurately termed a "worry over loss of 
possessions" rather than the "desire to retain control or ownership of the
168
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Table 25
Belk Scale: Six Factor Solution
Factor
Factor 1 (Nongenerosity—not sharing)
I don't like to lend things, even to good friends. (NG)
I don't mind giving rides to those who 
don't have a car. * (NG)
I enjoy sharing what I have. * (NG)
Factor 2 (Nongenerosity—selfishness)
When friends have things I cannot afford, it 
bothers me. (NG)
When friends do better than me in competition 
it usually makes me feel happy for them* (NG) 
There are certain people I would like to trade 
places with. (E)
I enjoy donating things for charity. * (NG)
If I have to choose between buying something for 
myself versus for someone 1 love, I would prefer 
buying for myself. (E)
Factor 3 (Preservation)
I have a lot of souvenirs. (Pr)
I like to collect things. (Pr)
1 tend to hang on to things 1 should probably 
throw out. (Pr)
Factor 4 (Possessiveness—worry over loss)
1 don't particularly get upset when 1 lose things. * (P)
1 don't like to have anyone in my home when 
I'm not there. (P)
I get very upset if something is stolen from me, even 
if it has little monetary value. (P)
I worry about people taking my possessions. (NG)
1 am less likely than most people to lock things up.* (P)
Factor 5 (nongenerosity—siege mentality)
1 do not enjoy donating things to the needy. (NG)
I don't seem to get what is coming to me. (E)
I enjoy having people I like stay in my home. * (NG)
Factor 6 (Envy—jealousy)
People who are very wealthy often feel they 
are too good to talk to average people. (E)
I am bothered when I see people who buy 






1 2 3 4 5 6
.739 -.083 .037 .328 -.053 .101
.638 .227 .065 .049 .016 -.102
.615 .256 -.152 -.029 .228 .193
.081 .672 -.069 .152 -.037 .153
.174 .657 .032 -.123 .021 -.249
-.087 512 -.109 .016 588 .249
.341 .448 -.170 .068 .404 -.119






































* Reverse scored items.
(NG) Original Nongenerosity Subscale Item; (E) Original Envy Subscale Item 
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Table 26
Belk Scale: Seven Factor Solution
Factor
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Factor 1 (Nongenerosity)
I don't mind giving rides to those who 
don't have a car. * (NG) .702 .054 .041 .047 .002 .061 -.094
I don't like to lend things, even to good friends. (NG) .654 .056 .024 -253 1-369| .142 .177
I enjoy sharing what I have. * (NG) .653 -.151 -.167 .228 .097 -.0% .158
If 1 have to choose between buying something for 
myself versus for someone I love, I would prefer 
buying for myself. (E) 380 -.015 [300] .166 .148 -.010 -.068
Factor 2 (Preservation)
I ha ve a lot of souvenirs. (Pr)
I like to collect things. (Pr)
I tend to hang on to things I should probably 
throw out. (Pr)
Factor 3 (Envy)
When friends have things I cannot afford, it 
bothers me. (NG)
I am bothered when I see people who buy 
anything they want. (E)
Factor 4 (Nongenerosity and Envy)
I do not enjoy donating things to the needy. (NG) 
There are certain people I would like to trade 
places with. (E)
1 enjoy donating things for charity. * (NG)
I don't seem to get what is coming to me. (E)
Factor 5 (Home)
I don't like to have anyone in my home when 
I'm not there. (P)
I enjoy having people I like stay in my home. * (NG)
I worry about people taking my possessions. (NG)
Factor 6 (Possessiveness)
I don't particularly get upset when I lose things. * (P)
I get very upset if something is stolen from me, even 
if it has little monetary value. (P)
I am less likely than most people to lock things up. *(P)
Factor 7 (Jealousy)
People who are very wealthy often feel they 
are too good to talk to average people. (E)
When friends do better than me in competition 





-.006 .812 -.101 .046 -.118 -.071 .049
.022 .769 -.047 .025 -.117 .029 .061
-.084 .682 .144 -.051 .177 .133 -.107
.137 -.065 .708 .101 .074 .065 -.148
.102 .030 .657 -.017 -.027 .032 .241
.126 .025 -304 .658 .167 .036 .118
.069 .076 |344l .629 -.105 .101 .075
|.459| -.191 .157 .479 .111 1-4291 -.204
-.126 .014 383 1 .479 | 398 -200 .183
.081 -.047 .070 .035 .654 .258 -.026
.223 -.063 -.112 .166 .629 -.213 -.119







-.181 -.148 .037 .146 .032 .701 .189
.085 .102 259 -.135 .008 .571 268





* Reverse scored items.
(NG) Original Nongenerosity Subscale Item; (E) Original Envy Subscale Item 
(P) Original Possessiveness Subscale Item; (Pr) Original Preservation Subscale Item
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possessions" as Belk (1985) suggests. This factor includes items which address 
emotional distress over actual and anticipated losses, as well as an item 
concerned with locking things up. The stray nongenerosity item which loads on 
this factor seems particularly relevant: "I worry about people taking my 
possessions." Thus, the six factor solution, which accounts for 50.5 percent of the 
variation in the data, seems to offer the tightest solution in terms of the 
personality traits which are being measured.
While the seven factor solution would appear to be optimal, it is not as 
interpretable as the six factor solution. The nongenerosity items load on five of 
the factors, but not according to a clear pattern. The envy subscale items are 
scattered among five factors, again not in any discernible pattern. Additionally, 
possessiveness subscale items load on two factors instead of loading together. 
The preservation items, however, continue to preserve their independence.
One common feature of both the six and seven factor solutions is the 
pairing of nongenerosity and envy. Belk distinguishes between the two traits 
saying that nongenerosity is an unwillingness to give or share possessions with 
others (Belk 1985), while envy is displeasure with another's superiority in 
happiness, success, reputation or possessions (Schoeck 1966, as quoted in Belk 
1985). The pairing of items from these two subscales suggests either that the 
distinction drawn in the research is not one made by people in everyday life or 
that the items are not written in a way that makes the distinction obvious. In 
either case it certainly can be imagined that one might be unwilling to share 
possessions because of not wanting to increase the success or good fortune of 
another. Hence nongenerosity and envy may be intertwined.
Decisions about the appropriate factor structure for the Belk scale, of 
course, cannot be made solely on the results of this study. While additional 
testing is required, the results reported here are not unusual. As already
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mentioned, Cole et al. (1992) identified nine factors when they analyzed a large, 
diverse, non-student sample. Results such as these tend to confirm the need to 
test the scale on samples other than student populations.
Having assessed the reliability, the convergent validity, and the factor 
structures of the two materialism scales, the discussion now turns to a 
consideration of the specific research hypotheses for the study. In addition to 
providing pleasing results, the success of these hypotheses contributes to the 
nomological validity of the materialism measures.
TESTS OF HYPOTHESES
In addition to providing a further test of the two materialism scales, this 
study was designed to augment the discipline's understanding of materialism by 
considering the nature of the materialistic self. Four constructs were selected for 
consideration: self-esteem, a global measure of self evaluation; self-actualization, 
a measure of how well an individual is fulfilling his/her potential; self­
monitoring, a life-style decision regarding attention paid to the values and 
expectations of others versus those of one's self; and intrinsic/extrinsic 
motivation, a measure of engaging in activities and buying products for the 
pleasure inherent in them or for some reason external to the activity or item. It 
was hypothesized that the materialistic individual would have lower 
self-esteem, be less self-actualized, be more likely to be self-monitoring, and
3
Ger and Belk (1993) are correct in saying that the use of student populations reduces the 
variability in the sample and the attendant influence of that variability on scale development and 
testing. However, the use of a homogeneous sample can lead to other problems as this section 
has pointed out. Further, while Richins and Dawson used students in studies aimed at scale 
development, the final testing was accomplished through surveys of adults in four different 
cities. Ger and Belk (1993) suggest that one of the next steps in the materialism research program 
should be to test the Belk scale with non-student adult populations.
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indicate that extrinsic rather than intrinsic motivation was the reason for 
engaging in various activities.
Correlation analysis was selected as the technique most consistent with the 
materialism research "tradition"—as well as with the social science tradition. 
Cohen (1988) notes that behavioral scientists frequently employ "correlational 
analysis as an investigative tool in both pure and applied studies" (p. 75), 
primarily because it allows for measures of association without making 
assumptions about causality. Belk (1985) and Richins and Dawson (1992) have 
cautioned that at this point we do not know if materialism is an antecedent or 
consequent of considerations such as life satisfaction. In addition to the 
correlations, however, this analysis extends the research on materialism by 
developing a profile of those who score high on the materialism scales.
As each research question is examined, it will become clear that the 
correlations were all in the direction hypothesized and were all statistically 
significant at the .01 level or better. Thus the four hypotheses were 
confirmed—though the caution noted above about the intrinsic/extrinsic scale 
bears repeating. The results of the correlation analyses are presented in Table 27. 
After the hypothesis tests are discussed, scale validity will be assessed. Finally, 
profiles of high and low materialists are developed.
Hypothesis One: Materialism and Self-Monitoring
The first research hypothesis was that individuals who were more 
materialistic would also be high self-monitors. The correlation between the 
Richins and Dawson scale and the self-monitoring scale was .3956 (p = .000); the 
correlation between Belk's scale and self-monitoring was .1826 (p = .001). Using 
either measure of materialism, the correlation analysis demonstrates that as 
materialism scores increase, indicating a more materialistic person,
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** Correlation significant at p = .012 
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self-monitoring scores also increase, indicating a more self-monitoring 
individual. This is the direction which was hypothesized because self-monitors 
are expected to be scanning the environment, looking for cues about how to 
behave and how to express themselves, about how to manage their 
self-presentations. Since possessions often provide those cues in our society, and 
since materialists are also expected to be focused on possessions, the two 
measures were expected to be positively and significantly correlated.
That the correlation between materialism and self-monitoring is more
pronounced for the Richins and Dawson scale (.39) than for the Belk scale (.18) is
consistent with the self-monitoring construct. Self-monitoring is not a
personality trait, one of many which an individual may have. Rather, according
to Snyder (1987), self-monitoring reflects a lifestyle choice, which is more
consistent with the value orientation adopted by Richins and Dawson. Snyder
explains that the differences in lifestyles may be accounted for by the different
conceptions of self held by high versus low self-monitors:
High self-monitors ask, "Who does this situation want me to be 
and how can I be that person?" whereas low self-monitors want to 
know, "Who am I and how can I be me in this situation?"
Researchers have found that these two characteristic interpersonal 
orientations are accompanied by differing conceptions of self—a 
pragmatic sense of self for high self-monitors and a principled 
sense of self for low self-monitors.... [PJeople structure the 
circumstances of their lives to maximize the fit between their 
self-conceptions and their social behavior (1987, pp. 31-32).
Thus, in  being pragmatic, high self-monitors consider "externally located 
identity characteristics particularly important" (Snyder 1987, p. 48). In response 
to the "Who Are You" twenty-questions test, they respond with statements such 
as, "I am a post office worker; I am quarterback of my school's football team." In 
general, they respond with answers that reflect the roles they play. In order to
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play the roles correctly, self-monitors are also avid readers of magazines and 
books which focus on fashion and appearance. They have been found to be more 
likely to select furniture and decorations for both home and office "according to 
their strategic value in controlling the images they project in social situations" 
(Snyder 1987, p. 63). In general, high self-monitors display the characteristics 
and concerns which have also been attributed to materialists.
Low self-monitors, on the other hand, in being principled selves, march to 
their own internal drummer. They consider internally located aspects of identity, 
such as emotions and feelings, to be more important. When asked, "Who are 
you?" they respond with statements such as, "I am friendly; I am a liberal."
While possessions might be employed to convey these images, low self-monitors, 
like low materialists are not expected to place strong emphasis on possessions 
because they are external to the self.
Hypothesis Two: Materialism and Intrinsic/Extrinsic Motivation
The second research hypothesis dealt with the relationship between 
materialism and intrinsic/extrinsic motivation. As noted above, the IE Index is 
suspect, so results are reported with caution. The correlation between the 
Richins and Dawson scale and the IE Index was -.3189 (p = .000); the correlation 
between the Belk scale and the IE Index was -.3382 (p = .000). Using either 
measure of materialism, the correlation analysis demonstrates that as 
materialism scores increase, intrinsic motivation (indicated by the score on the IE 
Index) decreases. This is the direction which was hypothesized because 
materialists value possessions for what those possessions will say about them 
(signs of success) or do for them (provide happiness, etc.). In either case, the 
possessions are not valued for themselves and, hence, the motivation to acquire 
them is extrinsic rather than intrinsic. Accordingly, the two measures were
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expected to be negatively and significantly correlated; and they are.
That both measures correlated well with the IE Index indicates that the 
external orientation has some explanatory power with regard to materialism, and 
vice versa. This conclusion is consistent with that which was tested in the first 
hypothesis about self-monitoring. Materialists do have an external orientation 
and seem to be motivated by extrinsic factors. Calculating the square of the 
correlations, one can see that slightly more than ten percent of the variation in 
materialism can be explained by the variation in intrinsic/extrinsic motivation. 
For social science research, this conclusion is rather significant (Cohen 1988; 
Nunnally 1978). However, because of the reliability problems with the IE Index, 
confidence in this conclusion is not strong.
Hypothesis Three: Materialism and Self-Esteem
The third hypothesis was that individuals with high scores on either 
materialism scale would have low scores on the self-esteem scale. The correlation 
between the Richins and Dawson scale and the self-esteem scale was -.1364 (p = 
.012); the correlation between the Belk scale and self-esteem was -.2109 (p = .000). 
Using either measure of materialism, the correlation analysis demonstrates that 
as materialism scores increase, indicating a more materialistic person, self-esteem 
scores decrease, indicating an individual with less self-esteem. This is the 
direction which was hypothesized.
As discussed in Chapter Two, self-esteem is an overall measure of a 
person’s confidence in him/herself. The research and theory suggested that 
people with high self-esteem are not expected to rely on outward signs of success 
and competence as much as individuals with lower self-esteem. And, as the tests 
of the first two hypotheses have demonstrated, people scoring higher on the 
materialism scales do rely on external indicators more than low scorers do. The
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point is illustrated by the remarks of a participant in one of the Ger and Belk 
(1993) focus groups: "If [people] need something to feel like someone, th e n ... 
they're trying to substitute a material thing for something that should be from 
within" (p. 17). Across all cultures, people generally agreed that the use of 
possessions as a primary means to increasing or enhancing self-esteem stemmed 
from negative feelings about one's self. Further, as Bond (1992) theorized, the 
respect from others which comes as a result of possessions alone is thought to be 
"false" respect and thus is devalued, resulting in lower self-esteem. The 
materialist, who places all hopes for happiness and success on possessions, is 
more likely to feel this "false" respect than not. Hence the correlation between 
materialism and self-esteem was expected to be negative and significant, and the 
hypothesis was confirmed.
That the correlation was higher with the Belk scale than with the Richins 
and Dawson scale may be explained by both the Belk scale and the self-esteem 
scales being personality measures. Both are more direct measures of the self than 
is the Richins and Dawson scale—even though the latter scale is a more direct 
measure of materialism.
Hypothesis Four Materialism and Self-Actualization
The fourth hypothesis was that individuals with high scores on either 
materialism scale would have low scores on the self-actualization scale. The 
correlation between the Richins and Dawson scale and the self-actualization scale 
was -.3400 (p = .000); the correlation between the Belk scale and self- 
actualization was -.4674 (p = .000). Using either measure of materialism, the 
correlation analysis demonstrates that as materialism scores increase, indicating 
a more materialistic person, self-actualization scores decrease, indicating a less 
self-actualized individual. Once again, the result is in the direction hypothesized.
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Maslow (1950) provides an explanation for the negative relationship. 
Someone who is moving toward self-actualization is also becoming an 
autonomous individual, free from the influence of external forces. As previously 
discussed, a materialist is beholden to external forces. Hence, the correlation 
between materialism and self-actualization was expected to be negative and 
significant. In this study it was.
As before, the higher correlation with self-actualization and the Belk scale 
might be explained by the two measures being designed as psychological 
measures, whereas the Richins and Dawson scale was designed to measure one's 
orientation toward the value of materialism. However, in either case, the 
relationship between materialism and self-actualization is relatively strong—for 
social science research. Once again, calculating the square of the correlation 
coefficient, one learns that variation in self-actualization explains 11.5 percent of 
the variation in materialism as measured by the Richins and Dawson scale (and 
vice versa). For the Belk measure of materialism, 21.8 percent of its variation is 
explained by variation in self-actualization (and vice versa).
Overall, all four hypotheses were confirmed, though the caution about the 
second hypothesis must again be noted. While some of the correlations were 
"low" in an absolute sense, from the standpoint of social science research, the 
correlations between measures were quite acceptable. Because so much of 
human behavior and motivation is variable and not likely to be captured in a 
single scale, that correlations of .34, of .39, and of .47 were obtained is indeed 
pleasing, since, as explained above, such correlations translate into explanations 
of between 11 percent and 22 percent of the variation in the measures. As 
Nunnally (1978) reports from a review of studies in psychology, "the average of 
all correlations reported... is less than .40" (p. 143). More recently, Cohen (1988) 
suggests that coefficients in the .00 to .60 range may be expected, with most
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falling in the lower half of that range (p. 80). The confidence in these findings is 
enhanced by the strong theoretical links among the constructs which were 
tapped by the scales and materialism.
Assessing Construct Validity
Not only does the correlation analysis provide evidence to confirm the 
hypotheses, but it also provides evidence of two aspects of construct validity: 
nomological and convergent. As mentioned before, nomological validity refers to 
the "extent to which [a] scale correlates in theoretically predicted ways with 
measures of different but related constructs" (Malhotra 1993, p. 310). Convergent 
validity, on the other hand, refers to the "extent to which the scale correlates 
positively with other measures of the same construct" (Malhotra 1993, p. 310). 
The four self measures were all predicted to correlate in specific directions with 
the materialism measures. With these hypotheses being confirmed, further nodes 
were added to a nomological network, consisting of materialism and other 
constructs which are systematically related to it. Earlier research which 
correlated materialism with life satisfaction, with sets of products, with sets of 
values, etc., had already begun to build this network. That both measures of 
materialism correlated in the same directions with the four self measures is 
evidence for convergent validity.
Having confirmed the hypotheses, and having provided evidence of the 
validity of the two scales, analysis next proceeded to building a profile of 
materialists.
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PROFILING MATERIALISTS
Belk (1984,1985), Ger and Belk (1990,1993) and Fournier and Richins 
(1991) began this process with focus group interviews which sought insight into 
descriptions of a materialist. Additionally, Belk has concluded that materialists 
are less likely to be happy with their lives, are more likely to be younger, and to 
be blue collar rather than white collar workers. Richins and Dawson (1992) 
corroborated some of these findings by providing evidence that materialists are 
more likely to be young than old, and by demonstrating that materialists are less 
satisfied with their lives. Neither of these research programs, however, have 
attempted a more specific profile of a materialist. Such a description would be 
quite useful for marketing practitioners and researchers alike. With the success of 
the hypothesis tests, additional information about materialists can be added to 
what is already known, thereby providing a deeper understanding of 
materialists.
In developing a profile, only the Richins and Dawson scale was used. For 
the reasons discussed above, this scale seems to be the more reliable and the 
more consistent across data sets. Reliability considerations also restrict the 
analysis to three of the self scales, omitting the IE Index.
Cluster Analysis.
To develop a profile, cluster analysis was run  using the rotated factor scores 
derived from the four-factor solution which was suggested by this study. Not 
only did four factors provide a more interpretable solution than three factors, but 
it also was a "cleaner" structure. The Quick Cluster option in SPSSX was used 
since it employs a nonhierarchical iterative method for partitioning the clusters. 
Nonhierarchical methods are thought to be superior to hierarchical methods
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when the number of observations is large, as in this study, and when nonrandom 
starting points are used, as with Quick Cluster (Hair, Anderson and Tatham 
1987; Punj and Stewart 1983).
Two, three, four, and five cluster solutions were examined to determine if 
distinct clusters might be developed. It was thought, however, that either a tw o- 
or three-cluster solution would be optimal. A two-cluster solution might 
represent materialists versus nonmaterialists; a three-cluster solution might 
represent high, medium, and low materialists. The two cluster solution was 
rejected because t-tests of mean scores of the self measures indicated that there 
were no significant differences between the two clusters. Standard deviations for 
each cluster were also quite high for the four self measures. The four and five 
cluster solutions were rejected because each contained clusters with a small 
number of cases. In the four cluster solution, one cluster had nine members. In 
the five cluster solution, one cluster also had nine members while another had 
eleven. Hence, the three cluster solution was further investigated—especially 
since using three clusters is consistent with Richins and Dawson's (1992) 
groupings of respondents into three categories for some of their analyses. Cluster 
centers, distance between clusters, cluster memberships, and F-tests for cluster 
means for the three-cluster solution are presented in Table 28.
To develop a profile of each cluster, ANOVA was run for the Richins and 
Dawson materialism scale as well as for the self-esteem, self-actualization, and 
self-monitoring scales. The results indicate that the only significant differences 
on mean scale scores among the three clusters were for self-esteem (F = 2.67; p = 
.071) and self-actualization (F = 2.362; p = .096). Even though neither main effect 
was significant at the .05 level used in this research, comparisons were 
investigated to learn what insight might be found. The Bonferroni method was 
used because of the small number of comparisons and because of unequal
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Table 28
Three Cluster Solution
Final O uster Centers
Cluster Factor Scores 1 Factor Scores 2 Factor Scores 3 Factor Scores
1 .5047 -.8266 -.0355 .5657
2 .7242 .4659 -1.3219 -.9184
3 -.3579 .3559 .2024 -.1600
F-Test for O uster Centers
Factor Scores 1 Factor Scores 2 Factor Scores 3 Factor Scores
F 33.9342 59.6806 28.2615 50.8106
Sig of F .000 .000 .000 .000
Number of Cases in Each Cluster




Distance Between Cluster Centers
Cluster 1 2 3
1 .0000
2 2.3614 .0000
3 1.6510 2.0203 .0000
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sample sizes (Neter, Wasserman and Kutner 1985). In neither case, however, 
were there significant differences between any two clusters, even at the .10 level 
of significance. For self-esteem, the contrast between the second cluster (with the 
lowest mean scale score) and the other two clusters (with higher mean scale 
scores) was significant only at the .16 level. For self-actualization, the contrast 
between the second cluster (with the highest mean scale score) and the other two 
clusters (with lower mean scale scores) was significant only at the .11 level. With 
this information, the interpretability and usefulness of the three clusters was 
called into question. When Chi-square tests were run to determine if there were 
significant differences among the clusters on demographic data, much the same 
conclusion was reached. There were no significant differences on the basis of 
ethnic background, education level, age, or gender. The only statistically 
significant difference was for income level. With this final evidence, the three 
cluster solution was also rejected.
Tercile Analysis
An alternative approach to developing an understanding of materialists 
versus nonmaterialists, however, was suggested by the work of Richins and 
Dawson (1992). For some of their analyses, they divided respondents into terciles 
based on their materialism scores and the top and bottom terciles were 
compared. (As mentioned above, however, no profile of materialists were 
developed as a result of the analyses.) The same analysis was conducted here 
using the overall scale score instead of individually analyzing the subscales. 
Three reasons support this decision. First, Richins and Dawson (1992) report that 
the "factors [the subscales] normally act in concert with respect to external 
variables" (p. 310). Secondly, Carver (1989) notes that using a summed scale is 
preferred for reasons of parsimony and clarity of communication— especially
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when the subscales are considered to be measures of various manifestations 
(happiness, success, and centrality) of the underlying construct (materialism). He 
concludes that "the higher level of information (i. e., the consistent relation of the 
multifaceted [summed] construct to many outcome variables) is more important 
than the lower level [subscale] information" (p. 580). Finally, as discussed above, 
the reliability coefficient for the overall scale was clearly in the acceptable range 
(.83), but it was not for two of the subscales (the Alpha for centrality was .62; for 
success it was .68)—thereby arguing for use of the overall scale.
Respondents were apportioned into three groups, with break points at the 
top, middle, and lower thirds of the materialism scale scores. The bottom tercile, 
low materialists, had 88 members; the top tercile, high materialists, had 98 
members; the middle tercile had 85 members. The analysis which follows, 
compares the top (high materialists) and bottom (low materialists) groups.
The first part of the investigation was to run t-tests to evaluate differences 
in mean scale scores between the two groups for the materialism scales and three 
of the self scales. As the information in Table 29 illustrates, in every case the 
differences were statistically significant at the .05 level or better and were in the 
direction suggested by the research hypotheses. Low materialists had lower 
mean self-esteem, self-actualization, and self -monitoring scores. They also 
scored lower on the Belk materialism scale.4 Additionally, once the respondents 
were partitioned into terciles, the standard deviations for the scale scores were 
more in line with what might be expected than was true with the cluster analysis.
The second part of the investigation dealt with the demographic data. 
Because the data was categorical (see the survey in Appendix A), the Chi-Square
4
They also had lower scores on the Richins and Dawson materialism scale, which, of 
course, was to be expected. The t-test indicated was that the difference in mean scale scores 
between the two groups was statistically significant.
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Table 29 
T-Tests of Scale Means for Bottom and Top Terciles
Group 1 = Bottom Tercile = Low Materialists 
Group 2 = Top Tercile = High Materialists
Self-Esteem Scale
Number Standard t
Group of Cases Mean Deviation Value
1 88 34.8182 5.236 1.97





Group of Cases Mean Deviation Value
1 88 65.9659 9.902 4.87





Group of Cases Mean Deviation
1 87 57.8506 13.288

























Richins and Dawson Scale
Number 
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test for significant differences was used. The "collapsed" categories which were 
used for the earlier ANOVA analysis were kept for this analysis to avoid having 
categories with fewer than five members. While there were no significant 
differences between the two terciles for ethnic background or gender (consistent 
with prior research), there were significant differences on the other variables. 
Table 30 presents this information.
The Profile
What, then, can be said about high versus low materialists? First, 
materialism cuts across gender and ethnic categories. High and low materialists 
are to be found among women and men, be they Asian, Black, Caucasian, 
Hispanic, or Native American. Secondly, high materialists tend to be younger 
than older, not to have a college degree (though they may have attended college 
at some point), and to have either relatively high or relatively low household 
incomes. In terms of the self, based on this study, high materialists are less likely 
to feel good about themselves as evidenced by lower self-esteem scores. Because 
they are less likely to be self-actualized and more likely to be self-monitoring, 
high materialists are more susceptible to the influences of outside forces than low 
materialists. Their lower self-esteem also contributes to this susceptibility. 
Because of their sensitivity to external influences (other people, advertisers, and 
products themselves), they may also be more aware of and may care more about 
fashions and fads, and are more concerned with outward expressions of 
themselves and others. They also would be expected to be more likely to judge 
others on the basis of external factors, since this is how they often judge 
themselves. Further implications of these differences are discussed in the next 
chapter.
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Table 30 
Demographic Differences Between Bottom and Top Terciles
Bottom Tercile = Low Materialists 









Male 46.9 53.1 p = .8311
Age
18-34 35.0 65.0
35-49 59.6 40.4 p = .0012
50+ 66.7 33.3
Household Income
Less than $25k 35.5 64.5




High School or Less 44.1 55.9
Some College 41.5 58.5 p = .0305
College Grad + 66.7 33.3
Ethnic Background
Black 41.4 58.6
White 47.5 52.5 p = .7318
Other 53.3 46.7
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CONCLUSION
This study has examined the relationship between materialism and four self 
concept measures. Four hypotheses were proposed and all were confirmed (with 
the caveat, of course, about the IE Index). Further, the study continues to show 
that the Richins and Dawson scale is to be preferred over the Belk scale because 
of higher reliability and better factor stability (especially for adult populations). 
At this point, however, it cannot be said that the Richins and Dawson scale is 
more valid. The hypotheses which were tested provided measures of construct 
and nomological validity. That is, they measured whether the materialism scales 
performed as expected within a network of other related constructs. Since 
correlations with the self measures were significant and in the direction 
hypothesized for both scales, validity was established for both. The validity issue 
is further discussed in the next chapter along with a discussion of the 
implications and limitations of this study.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
This chapter begins with a summary of the research findings. It then moves 
to a consideration of the theoretical contributions of the research. Next, potential 
practical implications, tempered by the limitations of the study, are addressed. 
Finally, directions for future research which flow from the study are enumerated.
INTRODUCTION
The thrust of this dissertation may be best understood in terms of a 
discussion of the necessary and sufficient conditions for materialism. According 
to Ger and Belk (1990), necessary conditions are "some bare minimum of 
economic means and communication as to available goods and how other people 
... live and consume, and a sense of affordability (I can also buy th is)..." (p. 191). 
Mukerji (1983) shares this perspective when she notes that "[o]nly in early 
modern Europe did materialism begin to spread through a large section of the 
population.... Even those people outside the ruling elite were increasingly able to 
buy objects and value their accumulation and use" (p. 9). But what about the 
sufficient conditions? Ger and Belk (1990) suggest that comparison "of one's 
own means and possessions with those of others above oneself will push one
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towards materialism.... [This comparison] may be related to a latent sense of 
relative deprivation, esteem /dignity... and the desire to self-actualize and assert 
power" (p. 191) Since we all probably feel deprived at one time or another, and 
since we all are interested in dignity, self-esteem, self-actualization, and, 
perhaps, power, this list seems to stop short of truly being an explanation. The 
question still unanswered is, "why do some people decide they are satisfied with 
'enough' and others still want more?" This dissertation investigates the 
hypothesis that that distinction might be found in each individual's self-concept. 
People with higher self-esteem, who are more self-actualized, who are low 
self-monitors, and who are intrinsically rather than extrinsically motivated are 
those more likely to be happy with their lot in life, to be satisfied with "enough." 
Lacking self-esteem, not becoming self-actualized, being a high self-monitor, 
and being more extrinsically motivated, therefore, are hypothesized to be 
sufficient conditions to push one towards materialism. This may be true because 
the materialist relies on goods to provide the greatest sources of satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction in h is/her life.
Because materialism research is in its relative infancy, these theoretical 
concerns merit attention. There is no agreement about issues such as the 
definition of materialism and how to operationalize the construct for research 
purposes. Discussions and possible resolutions of both issues are presented next.
DEFINITIONAL CONCERNS
With Veblen's (1899/1979) attack on conspicuous consumption, with the 
religious proscription against worldly things, with the dire predictions of people 
concerned about the environment, who warn of the social and environmental
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evils of overconsumption, objects (goods, possessions) have acquired the label 
"bad." In reaction, anthropologists and other social scientists have reminded us 
of the communicative role of objects and of their necessary functions in holding 
together the fabric of society (Douglas and Isherwood 179). Goods in and of 
themselves are not bad. Further, owning, possessing, and using goods are not 
bad activities. In fact such actions are necessary to our very survival as 
individuals and as members of society. What is needed in the face of all of this is 
a clear definition of materialism. As Howard and Sheth (1969) note, one function 
of a good theory is demarcation, to set one construct apart from all others.
The study of materialism, however, like the study of other aspects of 
marketing, is hampered by semantics. Terms which have specific meanings in 
the discipline have come into common, everyday usage and thereby have taken 
on other connotations. For example, the word marketing often is used as a 
synonym for sales when it appears in an advertisement for employment. Attitude 
refers to a specific construct which is different from the meaning of the word in 
the contemporary phrase of someone "having an attitude." Similarly, 
materialism sometimes is taken to refer to excessive consumption. Yet a 
materialist, in the sense of this study, need not necessarily overconsume. 
Materialism is often associated solely with negative traits and behaviors. Yet, as 
Ger and Belk (1993) and Fournier and Richins (1991) suggest, materialism may be 
freedom-enhancing and may motivate an individual to achieve.
The study of materialism is also complicated by hidden agendas. Some 
critics of materialism really seem to be objecting to capitalism (c.f., Fromm 1976; 
Kilboume 1987,1991). Others criticize the increasing spread of commercial 
values and institutions such as advertising (c.f. Galbraith 1958; Halton 1992; 
Pollay 1986,1992). Trends toward individualism, self-centeredness, and away 
from a sense of community are also denounced (c.f., Boorstin 1973; Halton 1992;
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Mukerji 1983; Rochberg-Halton 1986; Wachtel 1983), as are attitudes which are 
not environmentally conscious (c.f. Galbraith 1958; Leiss 1976). Finally, some 
critics simply seem not to like popular culture. As George Will writes,
"Contempt for consumer culture is generally an affectation of comfortable people 
addicted to the pleasures of condescension" (quoted in Rotzoll 1992, p. 208). 
Whatever the reason, the term "materialism" and its many synonyms have been 
used in different contexts and to advance many different causes and theories.
The following discussions represent an attempt to sort through the semantics to 
arrive at a conclusion about the meaning of materialism.
What Materialism Is Not
Perhaps it would be useful to begin with a consideration of what 
materialism is not Materialism is not consumerism; it is not conspicuous 
consumption; neither is it the same as material culture.
Consumerism. The term consumerism is often employed in social science 
disciplines, especially anthropology, sociology, and social psychology. According 
to the Oxford English Dictionary, it is the "name given to a doctrine advocating a 
continual increase in the consumption of goods as a basis for a sound economy" 
(1989, p. 802). While consumerism may lead people to live beyond their means, 
potentially leading to financial ruin; while consumerism may lead to an 
overconsumption of resources, thereby depleting natural resources and leading 
to ruin of another type, neither of these occurrences are what writers such as Belk 
and Richins and Dawson mean by materialism. Consumerism is more closely 
synonymous with living a materials-intensive existence. Yet living in a world of 
goods is not in and of itself materialism. It is for this reason that Bond (1992) can 
spend hundreds of dollars acquiring the latest in audio and video technology, yet 
still not be a materialist. He may be a consumerist, but he is not a materialist.
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Conspicuous consumption. Along the same lines, conspicuous consumption
is not materialism. Rochberg-Halton (1986) draws the distinction.
[While w]e nowadays in America call a "materialist" someone who 
lives for the self-centered pleasure of status prestige derived from 
material wealth, it remains true that not only is some level of 
material existence inescapable, but that material goods can act as 
genuine materials for the cultivation of their possessions, (p. 180).
The prestige factor that Rochberg-Halton mentions is central to 
conspicuous consumption, a term coined by Veblen (1899/1979). According to 
Veblen, "conspicuous consumption of valuable goods is a means of reputability 
to the gentleman of leisure" (p. 75). Additionally, there "must be an expenditure 
on superfluities," and, "[i]n order to be reputable, it [the expenditure] must be 
wasteful" (p. 96). Mason (1981) updates the concept when he suggests that 
conspicuous consumption refers to "ostentatious display of wealth, motivated by 
a desire to impress others with the ability to pay particularly high prices for 
prestige products" (p. viii). Thus, the dominant motive behind conspicuous 
consumption is the desire for status (Mason 1981).
This motivation illustrates the first distinction between conspicuous 
consumption and materialism. While the desire for status and prestige may be 
part of the motivation behind materialism, it is not dominant. As Belk's (1984) 
definition clearly indicates, with materialism, possessions assume a central place 
in one's life and represent "the greatest sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction 
in life" (p. 291). A materialist's may be motivated to acquire in order to achieve 
prestige, but acquiring possessions by also be motivated by the desire for 
happiness, for comfort, safety, or security, among others. This is the point which 
Schudson (1984) and Douglas and Isherwood (1979) made earlier. Consumption 
serves a variety of purposes, only one of which is status.
The second distinction between the two terms comes from the requirement
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inherent in conspicuous consumption for the economic means to engage in it. 
Mason (1981) explains that even though people of all economic classes may 
desire to consume conspicuously, economics determines if it can be undertaken 
and to what extent. While there are examples of people foregoing "necessities" 
to maintain a particular level of consumption, such an the unemployed steel 
workers buying a new car (Roberts 1991), economic circumstances still are 
important. Materialism, however, is not tied to spending on superfluities and 
conspicuous waste. A poor person with very few possessions can be a 
materialist, depending on how central possessions are in his/her life.
Material culture. Another term which often appears in the literature is 
"material culture," yet this concept also is separate from materialism. A New 
Dictionary of the Social Sciences discusses material culture: "artifacts are included 
as the 'embodiment' of culture, although they are more usually regarded as its 
products. Sometimes anthropologists distinguish artifacts as material culture" 
(1979, p. 45). Thus while the concept of material culture certainly is linked with 
materialism, the terms are not synonymous.
That we live in a material world, that we use material goods, among other 
things, for self-identify and to signify our relationships with others as well as our 
distinctions from others, and that we often communicate via the medium of 
goods are "givens" in a modem industrial society. These facts are true for 
everyone. Yet we do not expect everyone to be a materialist. Hence, what is 
required is a means of distinguishing between living in a materials-intensive 
world and being a materialist.
What Materialism Might Be
One approach to making that distinction would seem to lie in an 
understanding of people's motivations for possessing objects. If goods are
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desired and possessed as an end in themselves, then that is materialism. If, on 
the other hand, goods are desired and possessed to further some other 
end—good or bad—then that is not materialism. This idea was first suggested by 
Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1981) and later expanded by 
Rochberg-Halton (1986). Following the lead of Rokeach (1973), who 
distinguished between terminal and instrumental values, Csikszentmihalyi and 
Rochberg-Halton (1981; Rochberg-Halton 1986) suggest that if someone desires 
possessions for the possessions themselves, then that is an example of terminal 
materialism and is to be abhorred. If, on the other hand, the person views the 
goods as the means to achieving some other end, such as a life goal or furthering 
some personal value, then that is instrumental materialism and is not as 
undesirable. As Richins and Dawson (1992) ask, however, how is one to 
distinguish between these two forms? Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg- Halton 
provide no clear guidelines. In fact, they seem to contradict themselves when 
they decry using possessions to achieve status, which they identify as terminal 
materialism, yet that is an example of using goods for some other end. Richins 
and Dawson (1992) conclude that "except in extreme cases, it may be difficult to 
determine whether the conditions for instrumental materialism are being met" 
since the "classification as instrumental or terminal appears to rest on a value 
judgment" (p. 305). Consequently, we are still left with the problem of a useful 
definition for materialism.
Since many researchers quote Belk's (1984) definition, and since it was 
employed in this research, it merits consideration next. Belk defines materialism 
as reflecting the "importance a consumer attaches to worldly possessions. At the 
highest levels of materialism, such possessions assume a central place in a 
person's life and are believed to provide the greatest sources of satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction in life" (1984, p. 291). While this definition provides a good
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theoretical base, it does not offer guidance for interpreting what it means. As has 
already been noted, in industrialized societies, almost everyone considers some 
goods to be important (cars for transportation, labor saving devices for efficiency, 
clothing for comfort and self-expression, etc.). According to this definition, then, 
by living in a materials-intensive world, we all are materialists. Yet we are not all 
"high" materialists, for it is only "at the highest levels of materialism" where 
goods themselves are expected to provide life satisfaction. Perhaps, then, the 
distinction to be drawn is not between materialism and something else, but rather 
lies within materialism itself. Perhaps what is important is to distinguish between 
high materialists and the rest of us. This approach leads to the conceptualization 
of materialism proposed by Richins and Dawson (1992).
What Materialism Probably Is
According to Richins and Dawson, materialism is best thought of as a value 
with high materialists ranking materialism near the top of their value hierarchy.1 
This approach is conceptually appealing because, as Rokeach (1973; Rokeach and 
Ball-Rokeach 1989) has suggested, differences in attitudes and behaviors may be 
accounted for not by the differences in people's values, but rather by the 
differences in their value rankings. According to Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach 
(1989), values are beliefs about desirable means and ends of action and serve as 
standards or criteria of conduct. That is, values are beliefs about important life 
goals as well as beliefs about appropriate behaviors to attain those goals. As 
such, values transcend specific instances; they guide actions, attitudes, and 
judgements across a variety of situations, objects, places, and people (Rokeach 
1973). Further, values are organized in a hierarchical system (Rokeach 1973). The
1 Richins and Dawson are not the only ones to think of materialism as a value. Belk (1987b), 
himself, adopted this perspective for a content analysis of material values in the comics.
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hierarchy concept is important because it is the most central values, the higher 
ranked ones, which usually guide decision making and behaviors (Williams 
1968).
If materialism is a value, then acquiring material goods is a desirable goal. 
Further, acquiring material possessions is appropriate conduct to reach other 
desired goals. Fournier and Richins (1991) provide an example to illustrate the 
beliefs of those who rank materialism near the top of their value hierarchy. Such 
people "may believe that it is impossible for them to achieve such desired 
end-states as status recognition or happiness unless they have sufficient, or the 
right kind of, possessions" (p. 411). Further, high materialists would be expected 
to rank materialism above other goals in their value hierarchy. Richins and 
Dawson (1992) demonstrated that high materialists ranked "financial security" 
higher than low materialists did; low materialists ranked "warm relationships 
with others" higher than high materialists did.
Thus, if materialism is defined as a value, the relationship of materialism to 
other attitudes and behaviors, even demographics, falls into place. The 
understanding of why, while we all live in a materials-intensive society, some 
people are high materialists and others are not is made clear. Materialism may be 
a societal value, but some place it high in their value hierarchy and some rank it 
lower. While everyone desires material goods, different attitudes and behaviors 
would be expected from those ranking materialism high than from those who 
rank it low (or lower). The age differences in materialism which have been 
reported in this research, as well as other studies, can also be explained by the 
suggestion that younger people rank materialism higher in their value 
hierarchies than do older people. One reason for this progression might be that 
when one is younger, and has fewer things, possessions receive more of one's 
psychic energy. As a person grows older and acquires possessions, attention is
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focused on other matters. Similarly, when a person is younger, s/he  is still 
building her/his own identity. To the extent that material objects contribute to 
that process, the person may be more or less materialistic. As one grows older, 
the process of self construction may receive less attention. The gender differences 
in materialism which have been reported by some researchers could similarly be 
explained.
While it would seem, then, that the value perspective is not only the most 
useful, but also the most consistent with explanations of behavior and attitudes, 
there seems to be no general agreement about the definition of materialism. This 
situation is not surprising given the almost pre-paradigmatic state of 
materialism research. This state is exemplified in the literature by the lack of a 
standard, tested and validated measure of materialism. American social science 
researchers generally have used the Belk scale—though the Richins and Dawson 
scale is beginning to be used, now that it is more widely available. In the UK, 
while researchers may refer to these scales, they have employed their own sets of 
questions to assess the role of possessions in peoples' lives. Yet none of these 
scales has yet been subjected to continual refinement. This statement is not meant 
as a criticism; it is simply a fact arising from the relative newness of the research. 
Hence there may be room for yet one more approach to materialism, which is 
suggested by this dissertation.
An Alternative Conceptualization of Materialism
In proposing an alternative approach to defining materialism, it would be 
appropriate to "return to our roots." That is, to return to the philosophical school 
which gave the construct its name. According to philosophical materialism, 
nothing exists, is real except for matter and its movements, which can be 
observed (Lange 1865/1925). Perhaps materialists are those who take this notion
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to heart today. The explanation is as follows.
Several themes have been repeated in the course of this dissertation. One of 
the more prominent ones is that people use material objects to construct their self 
identities and to assess the identities of others. The explanation for this 
seemingly universal aspect of human nature comes from the philosophers 
Descartes, Kant, and Hume, all of whom suggested that knowledge about 
oneself, like knowledge of the world, is inferential. James (1890/1981) 
appropriated this tradition for his now famous statement that the distinction 
between "me" and "mine" is difficult to make. People learn about themselves as 
they observe themselves using, owning, and acquiring possessions. As Solomon 
(1983) notes, material objects are "a potent information source from which to 
draw inferences" about oneself and others (p. 322). "As the self is dressed, it is 
simultaneously addressed" (Stone 1962, p. 102).
Hume, however, cautioned that conclusions from inferential knowledge 
(inductive reasoning) can never be certain. Yet what people would most like to 
be certain of is themselves, who they are! Thus, in an attempt to fix identity, 
people may come to rely on material objects simply because they are material. 
Such a tendency is well documented in other aspects of human behavior, such as 
ritual behavior and in ways of dealing with the sacred. Douglas and Isherwood 
(1979) explain that the most effective rituals, those which have a strong intention 
to fix meaning, are set up with material things (p. 65). Belk, Wallendorf, and 
Sherry (1989) note that in an attempt to understand "the sacred," we objectify it. 
That is, by representing the sacred in a physical object, "the sacred is 
concretized" (p. 7). For example, elaborate rituals surround the raising and
2
Of course, the irony is that the meaning of goods continually shifts, and one must keep 
up with those shifts, but that is for another discussion.
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lowering of the American flag, which is a concrete representation of our 
country's ideals. The strong negative reaction to the work of an artist who put 
the flag on the floor for people to walk on may be taken as evidence that the flag 
is, indeed, a sacred symbol.
So far, then, in this conceptualization of materialism it has been posited that 
people construct their identities, in part at least, with the aid of material objects. 
An explanation for reliance on these objects has also been developed. The 
conclusion is that materialism may be thought of as an orientation not so much 
to the external as to the concrete and the certain. This conceptualization of 
materialism is analogous to the distinction between visualizers and verbalizers. 
Visualizers are more receptive to and more easily remember information 
presented in a visual format. Verbalizers, on the other hand, are more attracted to 
the written or spoken word than to pictorial presentations.
Thus it may be for materialists and non-materialists. A (high) materialist 
may have a preference for certainty—a preference which finds reflection in 
concrete representations of the self, of others, and of relationships (or 
distinctions) between the self and others. Other signs, such as emotions and 
ideas, can be ambiguous and ephemeral. Therefore, they are subject to 
misinterpretation. Material possessions, on the other hand, evoke constant 
responses over time (within a community of shared meaning) and can be more 
permanent (Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton 1981). The reason for this 
preference may be found in a less confident self arising from low self-esteem and 
from being less self-actualized. In discussing the relationship between products 
and human behavior, Solomon (1983) draws a similar conclusion. When people 
are uncertain about or uncomfortable with their role, he suggests that they are 
more likely to use goods to establish their position. Specifically, he contends that 
"confidence in one's ability to meet role demands may determine the degree to
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which one must rely upon material symbols to convince others and oneself of 
this ability" (p. 326). When people don't have an internal force to guide them, 
they tend to rely on external cues which can be validated by others. Solomon 
provides two examples. The first is young males who appropriate "macho" 
products to "bolster developing and fragile masculine self-concepts" (p. 325).
The other example is members of the lower upper class who demonstrate their 
status with the purchase of ostentatious homes, luxury cars, and designer 
clothes—consumption which is eschewed by the more confident upper upper 
class. In both instances, material objects are used to "stand for" the desired 
self-concept. In both instances this use of goods is successful when other people 
recognize the objects' meaning and impute it to the individuals in question.
Being a high self-monitor is also consistent with this preference for the 
concrete. By definition a high self-monitor assesses the physical cues in the social 
marketplace and determines his/her own behavior accordingly (Snyder 1987). 
Non-materialists (or low materialists), on the other hand, may be more tolerant 
of ambiguity and consequently may not require as much material evidence. 
Again, higher self-esteem and self-actualization would lead to a more confident 
self. The concept of a low self-monitor is consistent-with this idea of a non (low) 
materialist marching to and feeling comfortable with an inner drummer.
Overall, then, it might be said that in the search for certainty, materialists 
have taken the construction of identity too far. Not being confident selves, they 
continue to rely on and require the feedback from other people which comes 
from others' interpretations of one's possessions. While some people wean 
themselves from this need for external validation, materialists do not. "This 
apparent attempt to use the acquisition of material goods to buoy self-image ... 
seems notably materialistic" (Belk 1985, p. 272).
This conclusion is not meant to be pejorative, but rather is a statement of
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condition. A low materialist is not "better" than a high materialist. High 
materialists do not necessarily neglect their relationships with other people or 
neglect spiritual matters in favor of material concerns. Rather the distinction is 
that high materialists prefer concrete representations of relationships to enhance 
feelings of certainty. Obviously, some materialists may neglect their family and 
friends, but so may low materialists. Nothing inherent in this definition makes a 
materialist a loathsome creature.
Whether this conceptualization of materialism will be helpful can only be 
determined by further research. At this point what can be said is that the 
proposed conceptualization is consistent with definitions which have been 
suggested by others (see Table 31 for a summary). The value of the approach 
suggested here is that it provides an explanation for the materialistic 
orientations, values, and personalities suggested by other researchers. For 
example, people with a less confident self, who desire concrete representations of 
who they are, would be expected to rank materialism high in their value 
hierarchies.
Resolution of the definitional issue, however, still leaves open the question 
of how to operationalize the construct. Two scales are available. What we know 
about the relative merits of each is discussed next.
MEASUREMENT CONCERNS
Nunnally (1978), among others, has proposed that measures, such as scales, 
should be judged on two criteria: reliability and validity. Reliability refers to "the 
extent to which measurement error is slight... the extent to which measurements 
are repeatable" (p. 191). Validity goes beyond looking for errors and is concerned 
with whether a measurement "does what it is intended to do" (Nunnally 1978, p.
2 0 3
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Table 31 
Definitions of Materialism




Russuli and Hollander (1986)
Hunt, et al. (1990)
Richins and Dawson (1992)
Ger and Belk (1993)
Micken (1993)
Materialism is an orientation which views material goods and 
money as important for personal happiness and social progress 
(p. 422).
Materialism i s ... a cultural system in which material interests 
are not made subservient to other social goals and material 
self-interest is preeminent (p. 8).
Materialism reflects the importance a consumer attaches to 
worldly possessions. At the highest levels of materialism, such 
possessions assume a central place in a person's life and are 
believed to provide the greatest sources of satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction in life (p. 291).
[W]e nowadays in America call a "materialist" someone who 
lives for the self-centered pleasure of status prestige derived 
from material wealth (p. 180).
Materialism is a m ind-set... an interest in getting and spending 
that results from the perception of possibilities for acquiring large 
sets of desirable goods and services, and the perception that 
others are generally also so engaged (p.10).
In the extreme, materialism is an orientation that equates 
symbols with substance and objects with essence (p. 1101).
Materialism is a value that guides people's choices and conduct 
in a variety of situations, including, but not limited to, 
consumption arenas (p. 307). Materialism is a set of centrally 
held beliefs about the importance of possessions in one's life"
(p. 308).
A consumption-based orientation to satisfaction-seeking (p. 1).
Materialism is an preference for certainty reflected in the 
accumulation of concrete meaning-fixers.
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86)—in this case, measure materialism. By their nature, both criteria require 
assessment over time by different researchers in different settings. This is 
especially true of validity, since it "usually is a matter of degree rather than an 
all-or-none property, and validation is an unending process. New evidence may 
suggest modifications of an existing measure or the development of a new and 
better approach to measuring the attribute in question" (Nunnally 1978, p. 87). 
The reliability and validity of the Belk and the Richins and Dawson scales will 
be summarized next.
Reliability
As discussed in Chapters Three and Four, the Richins and Dawson scale is 
the more reliable. Coefficient Alphas for each of the subscales and for the overall 
scale are within the acceptable range established by Nunnally (1978) and 
Churchill (1979). Richins and Dawson (1992) report that test-retest reliability had 
similarly acceptable results. These same statements, however, cannot be made for 
the Belk scale. Only two of the four subscales and the overall scale itself have 
Coefficient Alphas between .60 and .70. While these Alphas might be judged by 
Churchill (1979) to be acceptable for basic research, they would not be by 
Nunnally (1978). Indeed, Belk himself refers to the Alphas as "moderately 
acceptable." He suggests, however, a willingness to trade some reliability for 
cross-cultural applicability. The acceptability of such an exchange to the 
discipline given the availability of a more reliable instrument remains to be seen. 
No information about test-retest reliability is available for the Belk scale. On the 
criterion of reliability, then, the Richins and Dawson scale is judged to be better.
Reliability tests alone, however, are insufficient. A scale could reliably be 
measuring nonsense! Validity assessment helps to determine whether the scales 
are in fact measuring materialism. That establishing validity is indeed an
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incremental process, as Nunnally (1978) has suggested, is illustrated in the 
following discussion.
Content (Face) Validity
The weakest form of validity is content or face validity which refers to a 
"rational appeal to the carefulness with which a domain of content has been 
sampled and placed in the form of a good test" (Nunnally 1978, p. 110). In 
making this assessment, it should first be noted that both scales are indirect 
measures of materialism, since materialism itself is a theoretical construct 
(Bagozzi 1984). The Richins and Dawson scale assesses materialism by 
considering if and to what extent a person uses goods as indicators of happiness 
and success, and by assessing how central goods are in that person's life. Of 
course, the scale does not directly measure how central possessions are, or if 
goods are used to determine happiness and success. What it provides are 
responses to scale items, and we make the assumption that high numbers are 
indicative of these attitudes and motivations. Still, the scale is designed to 
measure three dimensions of materialism.
The Belk scale, on the other hand, is a doubly indirect measure. It assesses 
four personality traits: possessiveness (concerned about retaining 
control/ownership of possessions), nongenerosity, envy (of the possessions as 
well as successes of others), and preservation (preserving experiences in tangible 
ways). As above, these traits are not directly measured. The second area of 
"indirectness" is the assumption that people with these traits are more inclined 
to be materialistic. Thus, the Belk scale is an indirect measure of the construct 
itself and employs indirect measures of personality traits in the process.
Perhaps more importantly, however, in measuring personality traits, the 
Belk scale is not true to Belk's definition of materialism—that at the highest levels
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of materialism, "possessions assume a central place in a person's life and are 
believed to provide the greatest sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction" (Belk 
1984, p. 291). While centrality of goods is implied by the personality measures, 
deriving happiness and satisfaction from goods are not.
In assessing to the general issue of content validity, then, the Richins and 
Dawson scale appears to come closer to measuring materialism. The Belk scale 
focuses on whether there is a personality type that is more prone to materialism 
and concludes that people who are less generous, who are envious of others' 
possessions and possessive of their own, are materialistic. However, an envious 
person would not necessarily seem to be a materialist, neither would a selfish 
person necessarily be materialistic. Further, the scale provides no means of 
assessing the role of possessions in one's life, which is what Belk's definition of 
materialism would seem to require.
The more rigorous validity assessment, however, is concerned with 
construct validity, which is a closer examination of the relationship between the 
scale and the theory which underlies it. Construct validity can be established via 
convergent, discriminant, and nomological validity.
Convergent and Discriminant Validity
Convergent validity assesses how well one measure of a construct 
positively correlates with other measures of the same construct. In this research, 
the correlation between the Richins and Dawson and the Belk scales was .4691 
(p = .000) and correlations among the subscales were positive and statistically 
significant (see Table 13). That the values of the correlations were not high, 
reflects the differences in approaches to materialism (value versus personality 
trait). Thus, for both scales, convergent validity can be established.
Discriminant validity, "the extent to which a measure does not correlate
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with other constructs from which it is supposed to differ" (Malhotra 1993, p. 310) 
was not addressed in this study. However, the discussion above, which 
distinguishes materialism from living in a materials-intensive world, gets at this 
issue.
Nomological Validity
Nomological validity, however, was directly assessed with the tests of the 
research hypotheses. As noted before, nomological validity refers to a process of 
building a network of relationships between the construct of interest and other 
constructs which "sensible theories" would suggest are systematically related to 
it (Nunnally 1978, p. 103). In this study self-esteem, self-actualization, and 
intrinsic motivation were hypothesized to correlate negatively with materialism, 
while self-monitoring was hypothesized to correlate positively. For all four self 
measures, the correlations with both materialism scales were statistically 
significant (p = .01 or better) and were in the direction hypothesized, thereby 
providing evidence for the nomological validity of both scales.
However, as Nunnally (1978) has warned, construct validity cannot be 
established unequivocally by this means, for the correlations do not "prove" all 
the hypotheses on which the correlation tests rest. That is, we have hypothesized:
1. that materialism and self-esteem correlate negatively,
2. that the Rosenberg (1965) scale is a measure of the self-esteem construct,
3. that the Belk scale is a measure of the materialism construct, and
4. that scores on the self-esteem scale will correlate negatively with scores 
on the Belk scale.
Demonstrating the truth of the fourth hypothesis still leaves much unproven. For 
example, the measures of materialism and self-esteem may be faulty. If that is 
the case, then the correlation between the two measures certainly still exists, but
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it does not offer evidence of the relationship between materialism and 
self-esteem which was suggested in the first hypothesis. The measures of 
materialism and self-esteem might be correlated not because of a direct 
relationship between the two, but rather because their relationship is mediated 
by some other construct. Simon (1954) refers to this situation as a spurious 
correlation. And there is some reason to believe that such may be the case with 
the Belk scale, as discussed next.
Spurious correlation. The Belk scale measures materialism indirectly by 
measuring personality traits. For this reason alone, some researchers have 
objected to its use (e.g. Cole et al. 1992; Williams 1992). However, the scale may 
be objected to on other grounds—that several items may be measures of 
individualism not materialism. In a cross-cultural study of individualism and 
collectivism, Triandis et al. (1988) sought to develop an operational definition of 
individualism which was appropriate for the United States. Several of their 
findings are relevant here.
One of their primary determinations was that, paradoxically, people living 
in an individualistic culture, such as the U.S., had to be more attuned to the 
attitudes and behaviors of others than people in collectivistic cultures. The 
explanation is that in collectivist cultures one is almost bom a member of various 
ingroups; one need not work at becoming accepted. A person in an individualist 
culture, on the other hand, generally is not born with many ingroup 
memberships and must work to become accepted into and retain ingroup 
membership. The flip side, however, is that because of the almost a priori 
ingroup acceptance in collectivist cultures, people have close ingroup 
relationships. In individualist cultures, on the other hand, the distance between 
the individual and ingroup is much greater. One final factor, competition, needs 
to be added to the situation. In collectivist cultures, ingroups compete with
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outgroups, but people compete as ingroup members and not as individuals. In 
individualistic cultures, however, individuals compete with other individuals.
Three consequences relevant to the Belk materialism scale emerge from 
these ideas. First, in collectivist cultures individuals take pride in the 
achievements and successes of other ingroup members. In individualistic 
cultures, however, personal achievement and success as a result of competition 
with other individuals is prized. Second, in collectivist cultures not only are 
honor and success shared, but so are other items such as money. In fact one way 
that Triandis et al. (1988) measured concern for an ingroup was with a "lending 
money to ingroup members" scenario. The third consequence is a repeat of the 
fact that in individualist cultures people often are emotionally detached from 
ingroups. The implication for the Belk scale is that all but three of the 
nongenerosity subscale items and one of the envy subscale items measure 
characteristics which would be expected of someone living in an individualist 
culture. Statements about sharing one's possessions and lending them to friends, 
about having people stay at one's home, about friends doing well, and about 
buying for oneself instead of a loved one all would seem to measure an 
individualistic orientation. This situation, of course, raises the question of 
construct validity. What is being measured, individualism or materialism?
If these items are removed from the scale, nongenerosity is measured by 
just two items which address donating things to charity and one item which 
expresses concern over people taking one's possessions. None of these items 
necessarily seem to be connected to materialism. The charity items may be 
related more to measures of income, social class, or religion. Concern over theft 
of possessions may be related to where one lives and perceptions of the crime 
rate in society. Of course, these same concerns might be addressed to all the 
possessiveness subscale items which deal with loss of possessions.
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For reasons such as these, Nunnally (1978) cautions against taking 
correlation tests as evidence of nomological validity unless the truth of some of 
the hypotheses is very evident. Certainly this research, as well as some others, 
has been able to demonstrate statistically significant correlations between the two 
materialism scales and measures of other constructs (life satisfaction, self-esteem, 
self-actualization, etc.). And, by using scales which have been validated by 
previous research (such as the self-esteem, self-actualization, and 
self-monitoring scales), the hypotheses that these scales are measures of their 
respective constructs is warranted. However, similar hypotheses about the 
relationship between materialism and the two scales under investigation are not 
well established. In fact, the hypothesis for the Belk scale is much in question. 
Hence, the conclusion from this lengthy discussion is that, at this point, the 
Richins and Dawson scale appears to better meet the validity criteria.
Social Desirability
Before leaving this section, one additional test, social desirability, merits 
consideration. Because of materialism's negative image, social desirability may 
have a potentially confounding impact. The Richins and Dawson scale was tested 
with items from the Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale (Crowne and 
Marlowe 1960). Correlations with this measure were low, indicating that social 
desirability bias was not a problem (Richins and Dawson 1992). The Belk scale, 
however, has not been so tested. Certainly some of the items about donating to 
charity or not being happy at another's success might be susceptible to social 
desirability influences.
Thus a number of important theoretical implications can be concluded from 
the research. The definition of materialism has been clarified. An explanation for 
why a person may be a materialist has been suggested by the conclusions about
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the materialistic self. Further evidence that the Richins and Dawson scale is the 
more reliable and more valid scale has been provided. Possible reasons for the 
problems with the Belk scale (lack of sufficiently high correlations among the 
items, the double indirect measure, and the influence of individualism, or other 
constructs, as possible mediating factors between personality and materialism) 
have been suggested. That the results are not more clear cut and precise is 
testimony to what Bagozzi and Yi (1988) refer to as the "fickleness of theories 
dealing with social science phenomena and the evolutionary nature of 
knowledge" (p. 93). Nonetheless, several practical implications are suggested by 
the research.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
The materialist's search for external validation of the self suggests several 
intriguing possibilities for marketing practitioners. The following ideas are not 
offered as recommendations. They are suggested as avenues for future 
consideration when the knowledge of materialism has advanced.
Advertising
Drawing from the finding that high materialists are also high self-monitors, 
high materialists are expected to pay close attention to the symbols and 
behaviors required in the situations in which they find, or expect to find, 
themselves. This high level of concern for appearances and for the reaction of 
others may manifest itself in behavior which has been termed "social 
comparison" (Richins 1992). Thus, high materialists are expected to be receptive 
to information about fashion and about desirable products and brands. They are
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expected to be constantly scanning the environment for information, reading 
magazines, shopping, paying attention to advertising. These activities make high 
materialists a high involvement segment. It may also make them a more readily 
influenced segment if the right appeals are used.
High materialists were also found to have low self-esteem. Further, 
research by others has suggested that people may try to bolster low self-esteem 
via goods. If this is the case, then high materialists will also be susceptible to 
appeals which suggest that buying a particular brand demonstrates "how smart 
you are," or that using a certain brand is "the right thing to do." Messages which 
show successful people purchasing and owning the brand also should be 
successful strategies with this segment. The appeal that using the product will 
make "you feel good about yourself" also should be a successful strategy. 
Marketers may also find that materialists are particularly loyal to brands which 
meet their self-esteem needs. Along the same lines, sales personnel might be 
encouraged to maintain contact with their clients after the sale to reinforce the 
"smart" purchase decision and brand or store loyalty.
The low self-esteem may have another social comparison implication. High 
materialists may be more susceptible to the idealized images portrayed in 
advertising. Accordingly, advertising would be expected to reinforce the high 
materialists' drive to acquire more of the desired goods (which they perceive will 
bring their lives more in line with the images portrayed).
The low degree of self-actualization suggests that high materialists have an 
other-based reference system. Their sense of accomplishment, success, and 
satisfaction is anchored in external signs. Consequently, high materialists would 
be likely to respond positively to messages which suggest that a product/brand 
would bring satisfaction and would be an indication of one's accomplishments.
That high materialists tend to be younger may have an impact on the
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models used in advertising, on the music, and on the settings which are selected. 
Certainly if people are looking for validation of their "selves," then all these 
aspects of a marketing communication must be authentic.
That high materialists tend not to have a college degree, and that some have 
a relatively low household income, has a similar implication. Coleman (1983) has 
suggested that middle-Americans strive to be like and to emulate 
upper-Americans. However, such is not the case with working-Americans. Once 
again, the appeals of accomplishment, success, and satisfaction must be set in 
surroundings which will ring true for the target. It would be a mistake to assume 
that a high materialist wishes to emulate a Donald Trump (at his peak).
Segmentation
The importance of physical objects for materialists may be useful for 
segmentation strategies. Marketers could expect to find materialists in the 
"heavy half"—the people who account for the greatest percent of the purchases 
of a product. High materialists may also be good targets for high prestige or high 
fashion products which are socially visible. Their possible role as opinion leaders 
would also make them a worthy segment.
Product Design and Benefits
If it is true that high materialists prefer certainty and the concrete, then 
marketers may find that written guarantees of quality and of satisfaction may be 
attractive. If the display of possessions is important to high materialists as signs 
of success and accomplishment, then to attract materialists, product design, 
color, and packaging should receive attention. A product with style, which is 
offered in fashionable colors, should be more attractive to high materialists. 
Marketers may also want to offer more functional models to low materialists.
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Retailing
Implications for the retailer may be that store image and atmospherics must 
be well planned to attract high materialists who are sensitive to cues in the 
marketplace. Store "packaging" can be as important as product packaging. It is 
suggested that a high materialist would not be likely to shop at a store whose 
image was not consistent with the materialist's own desired self-image. 
Additionally, Schiffman and Kanuk (1991) report that female shoppers with high 
self-confidence are more likely to feel comfortable shopping at off-price stores, 
while female shoppers with less self-confidence may not. The "smart shopper" 
appeal offered by many off-price stores may help overcome this feeling.
LIMITATIONS
This research was begun in full knowledge of potential limitations 
occasioned by the pre-paradigmatic nature of the study of materialism and the 
exploratory nature of the materialism scales being employed. If materialism 
research is to advance, however, then studies such as this one are necessary. 
Thus, for example, even though inspection of the correlation matrix suggested 
that factor analysis of the Belk scale might not be successful, the analysis was still 
attempted. Indeed, the results were indeterminate.
A second limitation is the nature of the sample. As discussed in Chapter 
Four, in some areas the sample was not representative of the population of the 
four Virginia cities which comprise the "Peninsula." Various reasons from a 
flawed sampling methodology to shifting population demographics were 
proposed to explain the difference. The importance of this difference, however, is
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mitigated by the results of this study which often replicated those reported by 
others (scale Alphas, means, and standard deviations, correlations of scales with 
demographic characteristics, etc.)- The potential impact of the difference seems to 
have been limited to the factor analysis results which are quite sensitive to 
differences in samples. Thus while one might wish for, and next time plan more 
carefully for, a more representative sample, it does not seem to have negatively 
affected the conclusions. It should also be noted that no attempt was made to 
derive population estimates from the sample.
FUTURE RESEARCH
Because materialism research is a relatively new field, much remains to be 
discovered. Before research is carried too far, however, some basic issues require 
attention. For that reason this section is divided into two. First basic issues are 
addressed, then the more wide-ranging ones are presented.
Fundamental Research
If we all use goods to bolster and communicate about our selves, then how 
does the materialist use goods differently? In investigating the nature of the 
materialistic self this study is a start along that path. This study found strong 
correlations between materialism and low self-esteem, lack of self-actualization, 
and higher self-monitoring. These all suggest that the materialistic self is a less 
self-assured, less confident self. Nunnally (1978) suggests that when measures 
which are thought to be related to a construct correlate well with the construct, 
"this should encourage investigators to keep working with the specified domain 
of observables and should encourage continued investigation of theories relating
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that construct to others" (p. 102). The first recommendation, then, is that research 
which investigates materialism and the self should be continued.
Second, research on the two materialism scales must be continued. This is 
especially true for the Richins and Dawson scale which is the more reliable and 
which seems to be the more valid. With its recent publication, additional studies 
should be forthcoming. If the reliability questions about the Belk scale can be 
sorted out, then the validity issues can be addressed (for reliability is a necessary 
but not a sufficient condition for validity). One productive direction might be to 
investigate the relationship between the Belk scale and other constructs which 
might mediate the relationship between the Belk scale and materialism. 
Individualism was suggested here as one such possibility.
Third, conceptual work with the definition of the materialism construct 
should be continued. This work certainly will be informed by the various 
research projects, but it should not be delayed because of the importance of 
demarcation to theory development. At this juncture, it appears that the value 
orientation to materialism would be the most productive. If so, then research 
which furthers our understanding of values as well as measurement of values is 
necessary. Quantitative techniques for comparing value systems (instead of 
single values), such as the one proposed by Kamakura and Mazzon (1991) offer 
interesting and fruitful pathways.
Additional Research Suggestions
A variety of other projects spring from this research. Because of its 
newness, materialism is fertile ground for research. Some of the many potential 
projects are briefly presented next along with the rationale for each.
Materialism and emulation. This study did not test how a less confident 
materialistic self uses goods in ways which are different from the more confident
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self. One approach to investigating this difference is suggested by the categories 
in the original VALS typology. The outer directed group was comprised of 
achievers, who were "into" conspicuous consumption; emulators, who wanted 
to be achievers; and belongers, who were traditionalists. It might be 
hypothesized that materialists are emulators. Rassuli and Hollander (1986) 
define emulation as "the desire to copy some respected other(s) in a 
superordinate class, fashion leaders, or others.... [it involves] an ability to 
fantasize oneself absorbing some of the status of the model" (p. 12). This 
definition is consistent with the VALS description: emulators copy achievers, but 
really do not "get it right"; they tend to go overboard with fads and fashion—or 
to come to them belatedly, once the world had moved on to something else.
In Ger and Belk's (1990) Turkish focus group interviews, this idea of 
materialists being emulators was explored. A new term "kro" has come into the 
language to refer to people who "identify with what they consume... they 
display their new wealth with no regard to subtlety and refined tastes" (p. 22). 
Further, these people are seen as engaging in "foolish emulation of others' 
consumption choices" (p. 22). The emulation-materialism connection was also 
suggested in Ger and Belk's (1990) earlier cross-cultural article. They noted that 
as people in emerging cultures developed desires for the comforts and goods of 
the industrialized nations, the incidence of materialism increased. They 
speculated that the emulation desire ran deeper than a general interest in 
acquiring products seen in advertisements. It stemmed from a desire to be like 
people in "winning" cultures. Hence, they found that materialism was greatest in 
Turkey (whose citizens were members of a vanquished Ottoman empire), and 
greater in the U.S. (whose citizens looked to Europe for much of their cultural 
heritage) than in Western European countries (whose citizens already had a 
strong cultural heritage).
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Materialism and the adoption process. A second hypothesis which flows 
from this same idea would be to investigate materialism and the adoption 
process. It has already been observed that materialists exhibit behaviors 
characteristic of opinion leaders, but that they are more likely to be opinion 
followers. Are materialists, then, early adopters, or do they tend to be members 
of the early majority? If materialists are early adopters, do they also function as 
opinion leaders? If so, when, where, and how?
A final research project which fits this program is whether materialism be 
"product-category specific," just as opinion leaders are product-category 
specific. That is, can a person be a materialist in some areas but not in others? We 
might expect the answer to be "yes." Fournier and Richins (1991) have suggested 
that the ways in which materialism manifests itself might depend on the other 
central values a high materialist has: "For instance, a materialist valuing status 
would try to acquire status signifiers; a materialist valuing recreation might 
acquire a portfolio of leisure products such as skis, scuba equipment, and the 
like" (p. 411). Thus, while materialism, itself, may not be product-category 
specific, the way it manifests itself may be.
Materialism and self identity. Other research might focus on the role of 
goods in self identity. If the self is a social construction, then the task is to learn in 
what ways the materialist constructs him/herself that is different from the 
non-materialist. How does a person select from among all the possible choices 
those things, experiences, references, and meanings which make up the self? 
William James provides direction. He suggests that we attend to what is of 
interest to us. "Millions of items in the outward order are present to my senses 
which never properly enter into my experience. Why? Because they have no 
interest for me. My experience is what I agree to attend to. Only those items which I 
notice shape my mind—without selective interest, experience is an utter chaos"
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(1890, p. 402). This idea of interest, however, begs the question. We are still left 
with no specific means for determining what is of interest and what is not—and 
how these interests develop.
Of course, there are the usual suspects of culture, family, reference groups, 
etc. which influence the individual. These influences, however, are too broad to 
be specifically useful in the question of what separates high from low materialists. 
Valuable insight could be gained from research which would ascertain the sorts 
of things that are of interest to the high materialist but which are not of interest to 
the low materialist. Perhaps after an initial study, which would assess 
materialism, researchers could go back for personal interviews with people in 
each group (high, medium and low). The purpose would be to see how the 
houses were furnished, how the people were dressed, to learn how they made 
decisions about purchases (what, how often, etc.). Of course such a study would 
be confounded by numerous items (income, etc.), which probably could be 
controlled. There is precedent for this sort of study. Belk has often asked people 
to note which items on a list are necessities and which are luxuries as a way of 
distinguishing between the goods of high and low materialists.
A related study might investigate when the use of goods for self identity is 
constructive and when it is no longer constructive. What determines the line of 
demarcation? The answer to this question may facilitate a deeper understanding 
of materialism.
A final self identity project flows from the idea that high materialists prefer 
certainty and the concrete. A study of materialism and dogmatism and or 
authoritarianism might be be warranted. Like the materialist, a highly dogmatic 
person is not comfortable with the unfamiliar and unknown (Rokeach 1960).
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FINAL THOUGHTS
It would be a grave mistake if readers of this research were to conclude that 
because there are serious questions about the reliability and validity of the Belk 
scale, that his work with materialism should be dismissed. At almost every turn, 
the ideas and hypothesis proposed by Belk have been important guides to this 
work. The connections among disciplines and the resulting insight into consumer 
behavior, which his articles make, are also reflected in this study. Desphande 
(1983) makes an interesting and telling point about the importance of not 
confusing the logic of discovery with the logic of verification. While it is not my 
wish to engage in the qualitative/quantitative debate, I do want to emphasize 
that good ideas and insights should not be rejected because of methodological 
problems which attend their operationalization. Put more prosaically, let's not 
throw out the baby with the bathwater.
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CONSUMER SURVEY
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey. We are interested in your opinions and ideas about 
possessions, other people, and yourself. The information you provide will be kept strictly confidential.
In each section contains a number of statements which represent commonly held opinions. There are no 
right or wrong answers. You will probably disagree with some of the statements and agree with others. 
We are interested in the extent to which you agree or disagree.
SECTION I
Read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement by circling the 
number at the end of each sentence. The numbers and their meaning are indicated below.
If you agree strongly, circle 5 
If you agree somewhat, circle 4 
If you neither agree nor disagree, circle 3 
If you disagree somewhat, circle 2 
If you disagree strongly, circle 1
First impressions are usually best. Give your opinion on every statement. If you find the numbers do not adequately 
indicate your own opinion, use the one which is closest to the way you feel.
I’d be happier if I could afford to buy more things.
I get very upset if something is stolen from me, even if it has 
little monetary value.
I don’t pay much attention to the material objects other people own.
Some of the most important achievements in life include acquiring 
material possessions.
My life would be better if I owned certain things I don’t have.
I enjoy having people I like stay in my home.
I enjoy spending money on things that aren’t practical.
I don’t like to lend things, even to good friends.
The things I own say a lot about how well I’m doing in life.
When friends do better than me in competition it usually makes me 
feel happy for them.
I worry about people taking my possessions.




2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
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I like to own things that impress people.
I don’t mind giving rides to those who don’t have a car.
Buying things gives me a lot of pleasure.
When friends have things I cannot afford it bothers me.
I do not enjoy donating things to the needy.
I have all the things I really need to enjoy life.
There are certain people I would like to trade places with.
I don’t like to have anyone in my home when I’m not there.
I don’t seem to get what is coming to me.
If I have to choose between buying something for myself versus for 
someone I love, I would prefer buying for myself.
I usually buy only the things I need.
I am bothered when I see people who buy anything they want
I enjoy sharing what I have.
I admire people who own expensive homes, cars, and clothes.
I don’t get particularly upset when I lose things.
People who are very wealthy often feel they are too good 
to talk to average people.
I don’t place much emphasis on the amount of material objects 
people own as a sign of success.
I wouldn’t be any happier if I owned nicer things.
I tend to hang on to things I should probably throw out.
I enjoy donating things for charity.
I have a number of souvenirs.
I like a lot of luxury in my life.
I am less likely than most people to lock things up.
I like to collect things.
The things I own aren’t all that important to me.
I put less emphasis on material things than most people I know.
It sometimes bothers me quite a bit that I can’t afford to buy all 
the things I’d like.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
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SECTION n
Read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement by circling the 
number at the end of each sentence. The numbers and their meaning are indicated below.
If you agree strongly, circle 6 
If you agree somewhat, circle 5 
If you agree slightly, circle 4 
If you disagree slightly, circle 3 
If you disagree somewhat, circle 2 
If you disagree strongly, circle 1
First impressions are usually best. Give your opinion on every statement. If you find the numbers do not adequately 





I do not feel ashamed of any of my emotions.
I feel I must do what others expect of me.
I believe that people are essentially good and can be trusted. 
I feel free to be angry at those I love.
It is always necessary that others approve what I do.
I don’t accept my own weaknesses.
I can like people without having to approve of them.
I fear failure.
I avoid attempts to analyze and simplify complex domains.
It is better to be yourself than to be popular.
I have no mission in life to which I feel especially dedicated.
I can express my feelings even when they may result in 
undesirable consequences.
I do not feel responsible to help anybody.
I am bothered by fears of being inadequate.
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SECTION m
Read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement by circling the 
number at the end of each sentence. The numbers and their meaning are indicated below.
If you agree strongly, circle 7
If you agree somewhat, circle 6
If you agree slightly, circle 5
If you neither agree nor disagree, circle 4
If you disagree slightly, circle 3 
If you disagree somewhat, circle 2 
If you disagree strongly, circle 1
First impressions are usually best. Give your opinion on every statement. If you find the numbers do not adequately 
indicate your own opinion, use the one which is closest to the way you feel.
When I read a magazine, listen to the radio, or watch television, I always 
know what I expect to get out of it.
I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people.
At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that 
others will like.
I can only argue for ideas which I already believe.
I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost 
no information.
?When I take a walk I always like to have a specific destination.
I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others.
Winning isn’t eveiything, it’s the only thing.
When I fix something or do chores around the house, I am just puttering 
around for the fun of it.
In playing cards, board games, or video games, winning matters less than 
how you play the game.
I would probably make a good actor.
I would keep doing the things that I do for a living even if I won the lottery. 
In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention.
When I read a magazine, listen to the radio, or watch television, I just 
appreciate the experience on its own terms.
When I perform some creative activity such as writing, drawing, or 
playing a musical instrument, I set a goal for myself to try to achieve.
In different situations and with different people, I often act like very 
different persons.
I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them.
When I engage in noncompetitive sports like skiing, jogging, or 





2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
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I am not particularly good at making other people like me.
I would not throw a party or take someone out to dinner unless I expected 
to enjoy the companionship of the people involved.
I’m not always the person I appear to be.
I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please 
someone or win their favor.
I have considered being an entertainer.
When I perform some creative activity such as writing, drawing, or playing 
a musical instrument, I am aware that the process is inherently its own reward.
I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.
I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and 
different situations.
At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going.
When I play a competitive sport such as tennis, golf, or ping pong, my 
primary motivation is to enjoy the game for its own sake.
I feel a bit awkward in public and do not show up quite as well as I should.
I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end).
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
SECTION IV
Read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement by circling the 
number at the end of each sentence. The numbers and their meaning are indicated below.
If you agree strongly, circle 4 If you disagree somewhat, circle 2
If you agree somewhat, circle 3 If you disagree strongly, circle 1
First impressions are usually best. Give your opinion on every statement. If you find the numbers do not adequately 
indicate your own opinion, use the one which is closest to the way you feel.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others. 1 2  3 4
I feel that I have a number of good qualities. 1 2  3 4
All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. 1 2  3 4
I am able to do things as well as most other people. 1 2  3 4
I feel I do not have much to be proud of. 1 2  3 4
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Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
I take a positive attitude toward myself. 1 2  3 4
On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. 1 2  3 4
I wish I could have more respect for myself. 1 2  3 4
1 certainly feel useless at times. 1 2  3 4
At times I think I am no good at all. 1 2  3 4
SECTION V
Finally, we would like some information about you. This information will be used for research purposes only and will not be
used to identify you in any way. Please put an “X” in the appropriate space.
Clerical
Skilled Labor
Thank you for participating in this survey!
The Survey Administrator will be back shortly to pick up the survey.
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Bom in Lawrence, Kansas, October 3,1949.
Educational Background
A. B. in Philosophy, College of William and Mary, 1971
M.B.A., College of William and Mary, 1983
D.B.A. in Marketing, Old Dominion University, 1993
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Rights, Fear Appeals and Arousal," AMA Summer Educators' Conference 
Proceedings.
Professional Background
Instructor of Marketing, Department of Management, Marketing and MIS, College of 
Business and Economics, Christopher Newport University, 1992 -  present
Instructor of Marketing, Department of Marketing, College of Business and Public 
Administration, Old Dominion University, 1984 -1989
Coordinator, Acquisitions Department, Swem Library, College of William and Mary, 
1983-1984
Principal, KSM Consultants, Williamsburg, Virginia, 1978-1983 
Coordinator, Donor Research. College of William and Mary, 1975-1978
Honors and Awards
Outstanding Doctoral Student Award 1991 -1992, College of Business and Public
Administration, Old Dominion University
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Virginia Department of World Trade Fellowship in International Business, 1990-1991
Excellence in Teaching Award 1985 -1986, College of Business and Public
Administration, Old Dominion University
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